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First Person Narration in the Modern Italian Novel
The aim of this thesis is to examine the technique of first
person narration as it appears in the modern Italian novel. It
begins by examining the concept of first person narrative as a
narratological category and the means by which the first person
pronoun as a grammatical feature comes, paradoxically, to
function as a guarantor of identity and authenticity, constituted
by both the individual act of memory and the location of the
first person in history. Nievo's Le confessioni di un italiano
is considered in this light as a paradigm of the retrospective
roman-m6moires form. The thesis goes on to demonstrate the
manner in which the subject's identity is jeopardized in Pavese's
La 1 una e i fal6 and Bassani's II qiardino dei Finzi-Contini as
memory, history and the self are revealed to be discursive, hence
mobile products. In Calvino's Trilogy, the referential aspect of
the narrative is abandoned completely and the first person
narrator is shown to be a function of discourse, dependent on
discourse for its position and constitution as subject. In
Calvino's later work, this loss of subjectivity is represented
more acutely as the self attempts to gain mastery over the
discourse of the Other through a series of ludic strategies which
conceal a more critical intent. Finally, the images of death
which abound in these texts are incorporated by the narrators of
Sciascia's Todo modo and Eco's II nome dell a rosa in their ironic
strategies to overcome their erasure in discourse. The major
contention of this study is that first person narration
represents more than a narratological category on the grounds
that it functions as an enactment of the subject's entry into
language and catalogues the subject's desire to create a self
through the mastery of language and critically, through
recognition by the Other. The thesis is informed particularly by
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The object of this study is to examine what Henry James
referred to as 'the darkest abyss of romance1 or what is more
commonly and prosaically known as first person narrative.i At
first sight, James' choice of phrase might appear perplexing, for
the notion of first person narration is a widely-used,
descriptive critical concept, the meaning of which seems too
self-evident and perhaps too devalued to arouse any particular
feelings of interest. It is merely a common-sense device for
ordering texts: either a text is written in the third person or
in the first. The distinction is one of fact and its use would
seem to bear little trace of the sinister connotations suggested
by James. What this study proposes to demonstrate, however, is
the significance of this remark in the context of modern first
person texts where the first person technique signifies more than
mere narrative category. It will suggest that the I of such
texts is indicative of an uncanny link between the self and
narrative fiction, proposing the notion of the I as the locus of
contradiction between the self and narrative, consequently
casting a vertiginous glance into the abyss which lies between
the two.
In his preface to The Ambassadors, James evinces a distinct
dislike and contempt for the first person form, condemning in
particular the looseness which its adoption entails. He does,
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nevertheless, in his brief discussion allude to certain features
of the form which will be of central importance to the issues
which will be examined and which may serve here as an
introduction. Firstly, he refers to the possibility of having
made Strether, the main character of the novel, the 'hero and
historian1 of the tale. Immediately, we are made aware of a
duality, structurally imperative to first person narrative. If
the main character of a novel is to tell his own tale, he at once
takes on a double function which necessitates a radical
splitting, or perhaps duplication, of his role. 'Hero' inasmuch
as he figures large within the text, he is also his own
'historian' and, consequently, embodies an authoritative role,
responsible for the arrangement, disposition, authenticity and
value of the narrative itself. In terms of the fiction, the dual
role is also a temporal one, for it implies a relationship not
only with historical time, but also with time as experience, a
relationship between past and present selves. The result, as
James points out, is that the first person narrator becomes
endowed with 'the double privilege of subj'ect and object', being
figured both as the source of the text and as its main point of
interest. The question of subjectivity, however, in first person
narrative is one replete with difficulty and complexity, and will
be discussed later in greater detail. He, once again, does
enough in noting the splitting which occurs in the I of first
person texts in the light of the apparently antithetical
positions which it must occupy. Finally, James draws attention
3
to the fact that first person narrative unleashes what he calls
"the terrible fluidity of self-revelation', marking the last note
of his disapproval. Without wishing to attribute such a notion
of value to the form, it is nevertheless possible to recognise
that the idea of 'self-revelation' to which James refers, is an
essential feature of first person narrative. The questions
raised point directly to the relationship between the self and
language, and the manner in which the self functions in language.
The idea of revelation also intimates the relationship which
first person narrative fiction has with non-fictional genres such
as autobiography, the memoir and confessional forms of writing, a
relationship which critically determines its generation.
James' critique is based on his notions of 'showing' and
'telling', the two opposing modes in which he believes narrative
may operate. His privileging of the former over the latter leads
him to view first person narrative in terms of a supposed
formlessness, a linguistic sprawl which is not conducive to the
artistic presentation of narrative material. While not wishing
to uphold his evaluative representation of the first person
method, the features highlighted by him are not unworthy of
further investigation. He focuses attention on the relationship
between the narrator and the narrative material, a relationship
which will be activated by the narrative text itself. He raises
questions of authority, history and temporality which as will be
demonstrated are crucial features of first person narrative.
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Further, he also broaches the problems of self-representation,
textual identity and the act of writing, all of which again will
figure large in our investigation.
James was writing at a time when the first person form had
largely gone into eclipse, and, in many ways, his critical work
is proscriptive rather than descriptive or analytical. The
historical reasons for the demise of the form and its more recent
renaissance are complex and will only be alluded to sketchily.2
Nor will it be our purpose to provide instruction in the
technique of writing in the first person. What will be attempted
in the first chapter of our study is an analysis of the concept
of first person narrative. This will examine not only the issues
alluded to by James, but will also examine the value of the
concept as a critical tool, for not all critics accept the easy
categorisation of first and third person as a valid or
significant means for dividing texts. Wayne Booth, for instance,
has remarked: 'To say that the story is told in the first person
or the third person will tell us nothing of importance unless we
become more precise and describe how the particular qualities of
the narrators relate to specific events 1•3 Doubtless he is
right, for merely to divide all texts into two opposing camps is
a strategy devoid of import unless some further significance can
be attributed to it.
Firstly, we shall try to be more precise in defining the
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concept of first person narrative, which is more problematic than
might at first appear. Secondly we shall examine the concept in
terms of 'point of view1 i.e. the relationship between the
narrator and the text, for it is in this sphere that first person
narrative has traditionally been discussed. This will lead on to
an examination of the objective/subjective dichotomy in fiction,
and within first person narrative in particular, before
broadening out to deal with the questions of time and history in
the first person novel, and its relation to similar, related
genres; finally, we will broach the question of the narrator
himself and his activity. This final aspect will prove crucial
in the development of this study, for it represents the specific
place in which the narration meets the narrative, and the
conflicts revealed here will form the basis of our discussion
when we turn our attention to specific texts.
The equivocal nature of the terms first and third person
narrative is underlined by Genette in 'Piscours du r^cit':
Ces locutions courantes me semblent en effet
inaddquates en ce qu'elles mettent 1'accent de
la variation sur l'<§16ment en fait invariant de
la situation narrative, explication imp!icite
de la 'personne' du narrateur qui ne peut etre
dans son rdcit, comme tout sujet de
1'^nonciation dans son 6nonc6, qu'& la premiere
personne.4
These terms which masquerade behind a supposedly linguistic
difference are shown to refer not to the narrative situation, but
to whether or not an I or a he is posited as a textual object.
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Third person narrative refers to a situation in which the
narrator remains concealed whereas first person narrative is one
which reveals the presence of its source. Third person narrative
is thus the narrative which excludes an overt avowal of its
source, but this exclusion can always be breached by the
insertion of the narrator1s I. Genette1s typology of narrative
situations will be examined later as, for the moment, it is
enough to have highlighted an ambiguity inherent to our
terminology.5
Not every narrator whose presence is revealed is commonly
regarded as a first person narrator however. Kate Hamburger in a
definition which is curiously self-fulfilling states: 'The first
person narrative shall first be considered in its proper sense as
an autobiographical form which reports events and experiences
referred to by a first person narrator'.6 Romberg offers an
initial definition which is similar but more explicit: 'By a
first person novel is meant a novel that is narrated all the way
along in the first person by a person who appears in the novel,
the narrator'.7 This seems to suggest that in order to merit the
appellation, the first person narrator must also appear as a
character in the novel and not appear simply as a feature of
discourse as is the case in Thackeray's Vanity Fair: 'The "I"
that we encounter here does not form any organic part of the
fiction; it stands to one side of it, or rather above it. It is
not the "I" of a created character, but the "I" of the creator
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himself' (5). The first person narrator therefore is not merely
an authorial presence, but, more importantly, a presence within
the narrated world itself. For Romberg, he is a feature of
content rather than form.
The exact boundary between 'authorial' and 'narratorial'
presence may be a feature difficult to determine. This is
compounded by a further distinction Romberg makes between the
first person narrator as 'main character' and the first person
narrator as 'observer'. Instinctively, we may feel able to
establish the distinction, but in practice the boundaries between
main character, observer and author may slide imperceptibly into
each other. Similar distinctions in first person technique were
previously noted by Percy Lubbock in The Craft of Fiction.a Very
much a Jamesian inspired critic, Lubbock is reluctant to approve
any display of the first person in fiction. He berates
Thackeray's authorial interventions, but more significantly notes
too that the first person narrator can be either the centre of
interest or serve as witness of great events. Only the latter
instance is to be at all approved of, but previously Lubbock had
remarked on the use of the form in a particularly interesting
1ight:
The use of the first person, no doubt, is a source
of relief to a novelist in the matter of
composition. It composes of its own accord, or so
he may feel; for the hero gives the story an
indefeasible unity by the mere act of telling it.
His career may not seem to hang together logically,
artistically; but every part of it is at least
united with every part by the coincidence of its all
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belonging to one man. (131)
Despite generally agreeing with James1 notion of the
formlessness of first person narrative, Lubbock nevertheless
upholds its essential unity by virtue of the existential link to
a single identifiable source. This echoes Romberg's defence of
organicism, but points also to a definition suggested by Dorrit
Cohn in her work Transparent Minds.9 She argues that it is
possible to identify similarities in the relationship between the
'third person' narrator and his characters and that between the
'first person1 narrator and his past self as character, but
concludes that in the latter case, the narrator's 'two selves
still remain yoked by the first-person pronoun. Their
relationship imitates the temporal continuity of real beings, an
existential relationship that differs substantially from the
purely functional relationship that binds a narrator to his
protagonist in third person fiction1 (144) This 'existential
relationship1 which is itself purely fictive indicates the
instinctive feeling which demands that there is a difference
between first and third person forms of narrative.
Cohn's book is neatly divided into two sections dealing
firstly with third person and then first person narrative. The
concept which appears 'naturally' in James and Lubbock is never
seriously questioned by these later critics. The difference is
felt to be there. Even Genette who seems to toy with the notion
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finally constructs his typology on the basis of this difference
despite a more exotic nomenclature. The only two critics who
would at all contest this distinction are Stanzel and Lanser,
whose work shall be examined more fully later.10 Stanzel does
not actually contest the existence of the category of first
person narrative, but refuses to recognise a simple split between
first and third person texts, arguing that greater stress must be
laid on the concept of 'mediacy' i.e. the way in which the story
is told, rather than by whom it is told. Lanser too does not
refute the distinctions as such, but the focus of her work lies
elsewhere, with the question of narrative authority.
The critics whom we have mentioned approach the area of
narrative technique in a variety of different ways which will be
examined in due course, but it is significant that for all of
them the difference between third and first person is a
significant narrative factor; it is somehow natural and its
existence is fundamentally unproblematic. The brief survey which
we have done, suggests that its significance, however, lies
beyond the purely narratological, for the first person referent
seems to exceed the ontological status of its text as fiction,
and intimates a relationship of the first person pronoun with
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CHAPTER ONE
Theoretical Approaches to First Person Narration
Towards the end of The Craft of Fiction, Lubbock writes:
The whole intricate question of method, in the
craft of fiction, I take to be governed by the
question of the point of view - the question of
the relation in which the narrator stands to
the story. (251)
Lubbock, here, is addressing the question of how information in
narrative may be conveyed and the relationship which exists
between the narrator and the material which he proposes to relate
and which will in due course become his narrative. It is the
question of how, in the terms of the Russian formalists, 'fabula'
is transformed into 'sjuzet'.i Lubbock's panoramic account of
narrative technique surveys the various methods by which the
story may be transmitted, but he does not provide in any sense a
typology of narrative situations nor does he clearly provide
tools for distinguishing between different types of 'point of
view', for his method is essentially an evaluative one. In order
to take our discussion of first person narrative further, it
seems necessary at this point to be more accurate in our
definition, not only of the concept, but also of the position
that it holds in the field of narrative fiction. We shall
examine the work of three theorists who do try to establish some
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form of typology of narrative situations, not in order to compare
the value of their respective work, but in order to clarify for
ourselves the object and the limits of our study.2
Norman Friedman begins his discussion of the problem by
attempting to give a brief history of narrative theory from Plato
to the modern age.3 Like Lubbock, he seems to exhibit a
predeliction for the Jamesian notions of 'showing' and 'telling',
inevitably preferring the former to the latter. He does go
further, however, in setting out a range of eight possible means
by which the 'problem of the narrator' may be solved. The
categories range, on the one hand, from 'editorial omniscience1
in which the narrator, an authorial presence, is able to delve
into the minds and hearts of all his characters and make show of
his knowledge to the reader, to the other extreme, 'the camera',
in which knowledge is limited to purely external features of
perception, and even authorial selection takes second place to
the demands of contingency which shape the narrative. Friedman
establishes his schema on the basis of the response to four
questions which he feels must be asked in order to define 'point
of view'. He asks:
1) who talks to the reader? (author in the first or third person,
character in first or ostensibly no-one)
2) from what position (angle) regarding the story does he tell
it? (above, periphery, center, front or shifting)
3) what channels of information does the narrator use to convey
the story to the reader? (author's words, thoughts,
perceptions, feelings; or character's words and actions; or
characters thoughts perceptions and feelings: through which
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of these or combinations of these three possible media does
information regarding mental states, setting, situation, and
characters come?)
4) at what distance does he place the reader from the story?
(near, far or shifting.)- (1168-1169)
The problem with Friedman's criteria is immediately evident from
the selection of possible answers which he gives, for it seems
impossible to place every possible variation into one of his
eight categories. The notion of 'point of view' which can be
used so glibly is immediately problematised by the seemingly
endless range of possibilities which appear to offer strikingly
discordant methods of division and sub-division. It is not that
the questions asked by Friedman are irrelevant, but rather that
their juxtaposition suggests a plethora of potential
contradiction and compromise.
In the eight categories, two are reserved for what we might
notional!y at this stage classify as first person narration. The
two categories are similar to Lubbock's distinction and are where
the 'I' is positioned as 'witness', and, secondly, where the 'I'
is positioned as protagonist. For both, the stress is placed on
the limitations of the narrative information which may be
conveyed. Omniscience is surrendered and the narrator has
recourse to secondary sources of information for things which may
be said to take place outside the orbit of his own experience.
The sense of limitation is not confined to what may be known, but
also to the problems of logistics. The embodiment of the
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narrating voice consequently entails an existential limitation on
what the narrator may narrate and the position from which the
narrator may speak. Referring to the case of the 'I as
protagonist1, Friedman states that 'the angle of view is that of
a fixed center1, locating a strictly defined space for the source
of the narrative. Another significant point made by Friedman can
be gleaned from the following remark: 'Albeit the narrator is a
creation of the author, the latter is from now on denied any
direct voice in the proceedings at all'. (1174)
For Friedman, first person narrative signals the eclipse of
the 'author' as source, for the source in first person narrative
is decidedly located elsewhere. In a sense, he seems to be
suggesting that first person narrative is distinctly anti-
novel1esque.
The difficulty with Friedman's work lies not in his project
to solve 'the problem of the narrator', but in the multiplicity
of issues he attempts to address and then to reduce by means of
an over-reductive synthesis. His main achievement is perhaps in
highlighting the difficulty inherent in the term 'point of view',
and by opening up the area for exploration in addressing issues
which unfortunately he cannot fully answer.
As a corrective to the over-synthetic approach of Friedman
and the anglo-american tradition, Genette in 'Discours du r^cit'
attempts to break the narrative situation down into discrete
units which may be analysed and identified separately and further
recombined thus escaping the normative categorisation of
Friedman's schema. Genette writes:
Une situation narrative comme tout autre est un
ensemble
complexe dans lequel 1'analyse ou simplement la
description ne peut distinguer qu'en d6chirant
un tissu de relations 6troites entre 1'acte
narratif, ses protagonistes, ses determinations
spatio-temporel1es, son rapport aux autres
situations narratives impliquees dans le meme
recit etc. (227)
In his study Genette analyses narrative metaphorically in
terms of grammatical structure, dividing aspects of narrative
formulation into the three broad categories of 'time', 'mood' and
'voice' which correspond generally to aspects of the verb. The
temporal aspects of his work do not concern us here, for they are
not necessarily characteristic of first person narrative.4 What
do interest us, however, are the categories of 'mood' and 'voice'
in which Genette attempts to articulate more precisely the
responses to the type of question asked by Friedman by offering a
broader range of potential solutions and by allowing them to
stand as separate categories. The most crucial distinction made
by Genette here is to create a divide in the narrative structure
between 'who speaks' i.e. who tells the tale and his relationship
to it, analysed under the category of 'voice', and 'who sees'
i.e. the means by which information is conveyed at the level of
the text. Whereas Friedman had tried to reconcile these factors,
Genette explicitly recognises their difference which demands a
separate analysis.
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Although Genette departs from previous formulisations of
narrative situations, he does nevertheless adhere to the notion
that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between first-
person/homodiegetic and third-person/heterodiegetic narratives.
This view is, however, contested by Stanzel in A Theory of
Narrative who disputes this binary distinction as a significant
means of classifying narrative, emphasising instead 'mediacy of
presentation' as the generic characteristic of narration. The
result of this refusal to work with a binary model is the
construction of the 'typological circle' which would allow the
arrangement of narrative relatively rather than oppositionally.
For Stanzel, the narrative can be told primarily in one of three
ways: by a first-person narrator, by an authorial presence or by
a figural presence. Stanzel seeks to stress the means by which
the story is told, the mediacy of narrative presentation. He
writes:
Narration can be considered to be effected by
two kinds of narrative agents, narrators (in a
personalized or unpersonalized role) and
reflectors. (48)
What Stanzel means by narration is not solely who speaks but how
the narrative is produced. Reflector characters, which may occur
in authorial/third person situations and also in first person
narratives, serve the function of acting as centres of perception
by means of which the narrative is channelled. The reflector is
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a centre of consciousness who narrates not in the sense of
speaking, but of conditioning and limiting the sphere of that
which is spoken about. Stanzel argues that both first person and
authorial narrators are to be seen as 'elements of the surface
structure of the narrative1. (17) Their existence per se tells
us nothing of significance about the narrative. It is only when
the narratorial situation is combined with the question of
mediacy that a significant statement can be produced.
Stanzel's 'typological circle' thus posits all narrative as
part of a continuum of possibility rather than as belonging to a
field of difference.s His circle stresses similarities between
works which merge into each other rather than presenting works as
polar opposites. As Dorrit Cohn points out in a critique of the
typologies of Genette and Stanzel, the project of Stanzel is to
assimilate everything into his typology and by effectively
eradicating meaningful differences he can do so.6 Genette,
however, seeks to isolate elements and identify anomalies through
the erection of boundaries. Stanzel, like Friedman before him,
is aiming at synthesis.
The aim of this brief discussion has been to examine the
ways in which first person narrative has been theorised as a
narratological concept, or as Stanzel remarks, as an 'element of
surface structure'. While we have highlighted differences in the
three approaches, we have yet to elucidate James' description of
the technique as being 'the darkest abyss of romance1. Perhaps
the problem with this approach is summed up by Lanser who
criticises all formalist approaches for their 'concentration on
the quantifiable and on binary oppositions..., [their] tendency
to grapple primarily with surface structures of the text;
adherence to a supposedly value free methodology; and most
critically, an isolation of texts from extra!iterary contexts and
from their ideological base' (39). Her own approach is concerned
much more with how 'point of view' functions, the effects which
it produces and the analysis of 'the contextual ideological
framework of discourse'. She asserts that 'the point of view of
the text, along with the text's aesthetic structures...functions
somewhat like a metaphor in relation to the underlying systems,
and especially (in the case of point of view) to the
communicative situation represented by the text. Like the
metaphor, the text both conceals and reveals the social reality
it encodes' (107).
What we wish to do now is to examine the ideological
function of point of view, acknowledging the narratological
framework as a means of identifying narrative situations, but
taking the concept beyond this in order to probe the meanings
which it produces. As a starting point to this discussion, we
may look to a remark by Cohn relating to Stanzel's typology. She
refutes his attempt to assimilate first and third person
narrative into a single continuum stating that 'no text can be
19
placed on the boundary separating first and third person
narration: for the simple reason that the grammatical difference
pertaining between persons is not relative but absolute... The
boundary between persons is...both real and absolute: no
gradation is possible between "I" and "he"1.7 Her statement
brings us directly to the heart of the issue: what is the nature
of this absolute difference between 'I' and 'he' and why does it
appear sacrosanct?e
It has already been noted that first person narrative has
not enjoyed equal fortune throughout the development of the novel
genre. The idea of the 'existential link1 which certain
theorists have ascribed to the first person form is something
which may be said to adhere particularly to the novel. Robert
Elliot has remarked that, in literature of the medieval period,
'the concept of literary property hardly existed: the audience
understood that in writing "I", the poet represented himself not
in a personal way, but himself insofar as he represented
mankind'.9 Conversely the notion of personal property is
essential to the concept of the existential link, for therein
lies the idea that the 'I' belongs to someone who can be
identified in terms of his difference from others. It serves as
a sign of difference not of generality. The notion of literary
person cannot be separated from that of literary property. F W J
Hemmings notes that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
the first person pronoun was used in great abundance as an
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authenticating figure in the vogue for the historical and pseudo-
historical memoir form.io The I as witness served not only to
authenticate, but also to counterfeit as its usage constantly
challenged the reader to defy its authority. Hemmings writes:
'The reason for the universality of the practice in the Age of
Reason, as it was so complacently denominated, was that no story
that was not vouched for by a principal participant - active or
passive - was thought to warrant belief. There could be no
narrative without a narrator' (24).
More than this the narrator had to make himself visible as a
source of authority in order to make himself credible. This
seems to testify to a relationship between the self and the world
which grants primacy to the experiencing I, and displays
confidence in the I's conquest of experience. Interesting also
is the way in which the pseudo-historical interfered with the
historical, merging the difference between fiction and non-
fiction on the basis of the properties of the first person.
Hemmings notes the demise in the use of the first person during
the course of the nineteenth century, the 'Age of Realism', and
seems to attribute this to the form's fundamentally unreal
qualities, particularly in the accumulation of and accrediting of
information which forced personalised narrators into fantastic
logistical shifts and farcical manifestations of eavesdropping.
Yet as Scholes and Kellog point out, 'the natural form of mimetic
narrative is eyewitness and first person. Circumstantially,
verisimilitude and many more of the qualities which we recognise
as identifying characteristics of realism in narrative are all
natural functions of the eye-witness point of view1 (250).
It is tempting to agree with this latter perspective that
the most 'real' narrative mode would be that of the first person
account, and, in this light, its eclipse during the nineteenth
century is revealing. The Realism, which Hemmings refers to, was
concerned less with verisimilitude than with authority and
knowledge which would transcend the mere particular. Authority
comes from the erasure of the self, the partial and limited point
of view and is based on a strategy of concealment in which the
text is completed through the omission of a narratorial I. The
tale is told without a teller. It is perhaps from this point
that we can begin to examine the problematics of first person
narrative which seem to be grounded in the apparent antithesis
between authority and experience. The dual function taken on by
the narrating I as both source of authority and centre of
experience confronts two apparently antagonistic modes. First
person texts will be seen to enact the duel which takes place in
the hollow between narrative authority and autobiographical
revelation, challenging and fragmenting both in a constant battle
between two opposing modes of discourse. For Hemmings, the
objectivity of realism was based on 'a representation...
..undistorted by any subjective or partial vision. The realist
must strive to make things clear and see them whole' (12). The
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achievement of this must necessarily be effected through the
omission of the self in which acknowledgement of subjectivity is
exchanged in return for power over the other.
The anomaly created in the fiction by the conflation of the
roles of narrator and narrative participant is addressed by
Hamburger in The Logic of Literature. She refers to first person
narrative as 'a structural alien in the realm of fiction',
claiming that 'the origins of first-person narration lie in the
structure of autobiographical statement' (311). She goes on: 'it
is an innate characteristic of every first-person narrative that
it posits itself as non-fiction i.e. as a historical document.
And it does this on the basis of its first person properties'.
She thus lays stress on the authenticating properties of the
first person pronoun, the very existence of which engenders a
difference from other works of fiction. The I, she argues, is
not oriented towards the recounting of subjective phenomena, but
'like every historical I, is oriented toward the objective truth
of the narrated' (313). However, given that first person
narrative remains resolutely fictional, the text is directed
towards the production of 'objective untruth', for the persona
indicated by the I represents at most a surrogate author and an
ersatz authority which both conceal and make explicit the
fictional authority of all narrative fiction.
The altered relationship between the 'real' author of first
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person fiction and his narrator has been commented on by several
critics. Friedman writes that 'point of view provides a modus
operandi for distinguishing the possible degrees of authorial
extinction in the narrative act' and that consequently, first
person narration represents the most complete form of his
extinction.il Romberg asserts that the adoption of first person
narrative means that 'the author vanishes from the scene', but
most explicit and revealing is Rousset who writes that its usage
entails 11'£vanouissement de 1'auteur, plus exactement des signes
de 1'auteur dans son texte'i2. Within the context of the fiction
the authority of the text is itself fictionalised, becoming the
focus of a homologous activity which in fact asserts pre-eminence
over the authorial situation. First person narrative draws
attention to that which third person narrative would conceal i.e.
the narrative text as work of language, in language, through the
constant reminder of its source as an element of its production.
The signs of the author which gather round the omission of the I
are supplanted by those of the narrator who usurps the authorial
role not solely on account of assuming the fictional authority of
the text, but by overtly making present narrative as a fiction
making process whose reality resides in its own generation. As
Hamburger points out 'the first person perspective is consciously
incorporated into the novel as a factor of content' (318).
If we are to pursue our study of first person narrative, it
is the relationship between the method as 'surface structure' and
its status as 'a factor of content', which must be tested. The
coincidental situation of both narrator and character within the
first person pronoun will lead us into an exploration of conflict
and contradiction between two antithetical and equally impossible
positions. Hamburger's suggestion that first person narrative
may be read as a 'feigned-reality statement1 can easily be
reversed to imply that, in fact, first person narrative is a
statement of feigned fictitiousness. This paradox is taken up by
Michael Glowinski who asserts that while third-person narration
moves forward by means of a 'quasi-objective language' directed
outwards to the object, first person narration is determined by
the notion of language as a performative strategy.i3 Hence he
argues that the very idea of a first person novel foregrounds the
presence of two avowedly contradictory realms of discourse. On
the one hand, it partakes of the narrative strategies inherent in
the authoritative third-person novel while on the other betrays a
striving towards the autobiographical modes of writing.
Glowinski draws on the notion of 'formal mimetics' in order
to tease out the contradictions of the first person form. Formal
mimetics refers to a conscious acknowledgement of other genres
which are deliberately worked into the fiction and whose presence
is recognised by the reader. Thus, in the case of first person
narration, the genres alluded to are autobiographical forms such
as the diary, the memoir and the epistle.i^ However, the
conflict with the demands of narrative results in a situation of
impasse and Glowinski concludes that 'formal mimetics rather
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resolves itself into a set of analogies which ought to suggest
identity but at the same time attest to the impossibility of
achieving identity1 (106). Consequently, first person narrative
ends up by awkwardly attempting to retain one foot in each camp.
In conclusion Glowinski, who had earlier referred to the
subversive possibilities of exploiting this contradiction,
remarks on the historical stasis of first person narrative, which
he feels, is always subject to following the development of
narrative in the third person. His argument that the form which
we are studying remains in the perpetual shadow of other genres
and in particular third person narrative is one which we shall
contest. We shall argue that the borrowings suggested by
Glowinski may indeed serve a subversive function and that first
person narrative should not be viewed as a lesser form.
Glowinski's notion of the necessity of the reader
recognising competing genres is a constituent feature of first
person narrative. It has been noted already the effect to which
this was put in past centuries where writers of fiction
deliberately exploited the first person in order to establish a
sign of authenticity. The difficulties in distinguishing between
a genuine and a fictitious I form the basis of Philippe Lejeune's
work on autobiography. In Le pacte autobiographique, Lejeune
argues that the only means by which a reader may distinguish
between autobiography and first person fiction is by relying on
the identity or non-identity of narrator and author.i5 He argues
that there is no grammatical nor structural d1stinction and that
only an extratextual referent can determine the quality of a
particular work. If this point is accepted, the possibility of
counterfeiting the text is evident. In order to avert the threat
of a counterfeit identity, other means must be employed either to
assimilate the textual I into that of the author or to distance
the I by making it profusely other in the case of first person
fiction. All writing which foregrounds the I inevitably
foregrounds the question of identity.
The belief in the authenticating power of the fictional I is
central to Romberg's study of first person narrative. Romberg
insists on viewing this form of fiction as if it were 'real', and
his analysis of first person technique is grounded in the notion
that in order to 'work', the author of a first person text must
fully uphold the 'illusion of reality' which can only be effected
through the creation of an authentic authorial double in the
figure of the narrator.i6 He writes: 'An investigation of the
first person novel must take into consideration how far the
author really hides behind his narrator, how credible he succeeds
in making the illusion that the narrator is responsible for
telling the story' (9). For Romberg, the author must seek to
create a homologous authorial structure through the creation of a
fictive narratorial personage 'whom the author interposes between
himself and the reader and who is given authority for the whole
story'. Like Hamburger, Romberg defends the idea that first
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person narration must be considered as content, as part of the
semantic texture of the narrative, rather than as an aspect of
form.
Authority is a critical factor in Romberg's discussion of
the first person novel. It is paradoxical however that while in
third person narrative, authority is bestowed and consummated
through the absence of the teller, in first person narrative
authority is dependent on the maintenance of an overtly
individualised presence. As his argument develops, however,
certain problems are revealed regarding the question of the
identifying powers of the I. For Romberg, the whole issue of
narratorial authority rests not on the I itself, but on the
authenticating documentation which would give it credibility.
The narrator must be presented with enough biographical
information to establish the illusion of real identity. This
presentation must 'be modelled upon the real curriculum vitae,
the data-crammed preamble of a biography' (85), for without this,
the illusion cannot be maintained. The necessity of biographical
detail is, for Romberg, transformed into an evaluative necessity
since its absence alters the confines of the illusion upon which
his theories are based. If the narrator remains anonymous, he is
deprived of the authority which he should wield over his tale,
for we no longer know 'who speaks'. The problem of the narrator
is thus invested with a much more profound significance than that
which is identified within a narratological framework. It
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addresses the question of being in language itself.
Unless the I can be identified, the relationship which it
instigates between discourse and the world is one which threatens
both the identity of the speaking subject and the reality of the
object evoked in language. If we do not know who speaks, we
cannot rightly establish their point of view, which is located
not in them, but in the proliferation of circumstantial detail by
which they are identified. This alteration of perspective and
refusal to foreclose the circuit of identity through wilful
anonymity, for Romberg, disrupts reality's illusion. Reality,
thus, can only be conceived of as something which exists wholly
outwith the self and which offers the self a position within it,
a position which the self must occupy in order to produce
significant discourse and signify within discourse. The I who is
posited as the source of textual authority is ultimately reduced
to the authority of a text through which his authority to speak
is articulated. This reversal of authority is not approved of by
Romberg.
Romberg's study focuses particularly on the form of first
person narrative which takes the form of the fictional memoir,
certainly the most common type of first person text in the period
on which he concentrates. The most salient feature of this form,
as far as the narrator is concerned, is that, on the level of the
text, his dual role as narrator and character is split, on
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account of the temporal disparity between the now of narration
and the then of the narrated. Unlike the narrators of the diary
and epistolary forms, who write shortly after events are supposed
to have taken place, the gulf created by time delineates a clear
distinction between the two Is. Narration and experience are not
contingent and, by necessity, the memoir novel is dominated by
the activity of recollection. A dual perspective is thus an
integral feature, for the narrator must inevitably know more than
his younger self, and importantly, is sure of how the narrative
will end. This is another aspect of the 'fictional paradox' of
first person narrative evoked by Glowinski, for in the
maintenance of novel!istic suspense, the narrator abjures the
benefit of his own hindsight. Genette notes:
Le r6cit ci la premiere personne se pr6te mieux
qu'aucun autre k 1'anticipation du fait meme de
son caract&re r6trospectif d£clar6, qui
autorise le narrateur a des allusions k
l'avenir, et particuli&rement k sa situation
prdsente, qui fait en quel que sorte partie de
son role. (106) 17
However, it does not follow that a sliding up and down the
temporal scale necessarily takes place, for, as Glowinski
suggests, the narrator can adhere more closely to his role of
organising the unfolding of the tale than to the effusive
communication of information.
The 'epic situation' of the narrator may or may not be
represented as a significant feature within the narrative
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structure, yet the present position of the narrator is evoked
each time that the narrator uses the first person pronoun. It is
a constant reminder to the reader, of the text as a linguistic
performance. The distance created between the narrating I and
the character I establishes a perspective which can be likened to
that of a third person narrator and his characters. The temporal
gap instigates an otherness which is, on the one hand, bridged by
the narrator's superior knowledge, yet which, on the other,
signals a dramatic discontinuity in the life of the subject. The
subject's self which is such a prominent aspect of the narrative
is shown only to be determined long after the event. As Rousset
says of the first person memoir form:
On rend compte de soi, de son etre le plus
intime, mais d'un etre qui ne peut devenir
objet de compte rendu que s'il s'est bloignd
dans le temps: tout ensemble proche et
different, sujet et objet du rdcit. (91)
We have thus returned to the distinction posited by James
that the narrator's position is antithetically that of both
subject and object. In the traditional memoir, the gap between
subject and object gradually decreases as the narrative
progresses until the younger self finally catches up with the
older narrator and they merge as one. An effect of closure is
consequently induced, and the narrative is seen to consume itself
at the moment of this occurrence. An apparent truce is declared
between the subject and object positions which would negate the
hiatus produced by the discordant text. The fusion suggests a
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respite for the self in its strategy to contain the unruly
happenings of lived experience in an authoritative account in
which the narrator has the final word in the vicissitudes of his
past self's confrontation with the world.
The activity of recollection, which is never problematised
in the traditional memoir form, is the thread which unifies the
past and present Is and is constitutive of the 'existential link'
between the two. Remembering and narrating become a single
activity, a synonymous mode of retracing a life. Memory,
however, is a feature of the performative nature of narration
which is dependent on the moment of the text's articulation. In
itself, it is an activity free from internal verification, yet it
relies on the authority of the text for its authentification.
Employed as a strategy in the text's production, its veracity is
a product of the text. In his study, Romberg refuses to address
the text which exploits these contradictions and is dismissive of
any apparent subversion of the conventions of the memoir form.
He seeks to reduplicate in his theorising the nostalgic,
comforting aspects of the traditional memoir which allow the
unproblematic reproduction of a life in words as a guarantee of
the self as a transcendental entity outwith the textual product,
declining to engage with the problems of the I constituted by the
text's production.
In the concluding chapter of his work, Romberg investigates
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the use of the first person narrator in Durrell's The Alexandria
Quartet as an example of how the technique is employed in the
twentieth century. Darley, the narrator, does not recount his
own life, but is an observer of that which happens around him.
He differs from the narrator of traditional first person forms in
a variety of ways, and it is this variation which disrupts
Romberg's theory. Unlike the works previously touched on by
Romberg, Durrell's novel is a 'difficult' piece and much of the
difficulty is caused by the apparent capriciousness of the
technique employed. Romberg writes:
The seemingly very puzzling narrative technique
in Durrell's work stands out more distinct and
more intelligible against a foil of established
features and methods in the first person novel
and may thereby also, to a certain extent,
serve as a sort of summing up. (277)
The modes of subversion used by Durrel 1 will be highlighted
shortly, but first a point must be made with regard to Romberg's
critical strategy. A great sense of genre is exhibited by
Romberg who appears to value the conventions of the tradition for
their own sake and to regard them as somehow self-validating:
consequently Durrell's text may be perceived as anomalous.is
More importantly, however, he seeks to exorcise the problems cast
up by Durrell's text by explaining them in terms of their
difference to the tradition and by attempting to effect a
resolution through closure and a denial of the critical
difference.
Unlike the traditional first person text, the A1 exandria
Quartet questions certain of the conventions which hitherto had
been taken for granted. Emphasis is placed on the epic
situation, usually eclipsed by the narrative, in order to
demonstrate that narrating is not a simple spontaneous activity,
and that it is an activity consumed in time. A narrative is not
produced all at once and the shifting perspective of the narrator
who changes in time as he writes is reflected. The past,
therefore, is seen to be subject to correction, for age alone
does not bring certainty. Statements are always open to revision
and supplement, for it is acknowledged that the narrating I has a
strategy which is not necessarily bent on revealing the truth as
historical fact and may be proved a purveyor of falsehood or, at
least, guilty of putting forward a partial version. Memory for
him is difficult. The past will not be yielded simply as a plot,
but is revealed gradually and reticently like the hidden layers
of a palimpsest. It is fragmented and discontinuous and may seem
more like an imperfect chronicle than a history. Time, which had
previously been represented as something stable, continuous and
external to the self, is now represented as an internal
phenomenon. Romberg writes:
The various chronological planes in the
sequence of recollected action are all mixed
together to the point of equivalence, or else
depicted without regard to or feeling for time
and chronology, but only according to the
degree of intensity (294).
The notion of life as a learning process in time is thus
undermined, for internal demand is seen to be the regulator of
temporal significance. Romberg's theory is based on the notion
of the self as a single, unified whole and he is unable to
incorporate the threat posed by the destabilising of the I
suggested by Durrell's novel. The manner in which Durrell
highlights the omissions and silences of the traditional first
person novel which refuses to engage with the problematics of
narrating is berated by Romberg who dismisses Durrell and with
him the majority of modern novelists who abandon 'the devices for
securing an illusion of reality'. The illusion of reality is to
be bought at the expense of verisimilitude.
Romberg would prefer to regard Durrell's 'abuse' of first
person technique as something of a cuckoo in the nest of first
person narrative, yet Durrell's approach cannot be considered as
a simple anomaly in the context of twentieth century narrative
fiction. Romberg regards this technique as one which has largely
fallen into abeyance in this century, but patently this is not
the case. It is certainly employed differently, but is no less
prominent for all that. What we shall seek to do in our study is
to highlight this difference and examine the ways in which modern
first person texts refute the conditions of meaning proposed by
Romberg and other theorists who insist on the unity of the I in
first person texts.
Lanser, in her work, rejects a purely formalist notion of
point of view, questioning the validity of dividing texts into
third and first person categories. She nevertheless seeks to
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engage with the question of 'who speaks* but does so in
ideological rather than formal terms. Point of view, she argues,
must be seen as a relationship constructed by the narrator and
his audience which is determined on the basis of the narrator's
position within a network of socially determined signifiers. She
stresses not only the performative nature of narrative discourse,
but also the conditions of that performance. She writes: 'The
separation of discourse from its performance is not merely
artificial, but impossible; it is tantamount to erasing or
distorting the very meaning of the utterance' (75). Her notion
that point of view functions like a metaphor which 'conceals and
reveals the social reality it encodes' is thus an essential
adjunct which allows us to question the ideological conditions
favourable to the construction of specific texts. It questions
Romberg's preference for first person texts which represent long
lives chronologically unfolding as something which is neither
natural nor to be esteemed per se, and permits an examination of
anomalous texts as equally significant forms of discourse.
While broadly agreeing with Lanser's position relating to
the ideological nature of our subject matter, we shall
nevertheless insist on the disjunction of third and first person
forms. Even according to Lanser's own system of evaluation, the
'absent' third person narrator speaks differently to a narrator
who is present in the first person. She is much concerned with
the value system propagated by narrative which affords authority
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to statements seeming to emanate from an (absent) white,
heterosexual, middle-aged male. Our purpose is not to contest
this in the slightest. Our focus is placed elsewhere, however,
on the act of narrating about the self and the means by which the
narrating I is represented in and by language i.e. by its
performance and by the ways in which its performance is
conducted. In order to do so, we need some theory which accounts
not only for linguistic performance, but also addresses the
position of the subject in language and, for this, we shall turn
to the work of Emile Benveniste.
In his work Problfemes de linguistique qfenferale, Benveniste
adopts a broadly Lacanian-psychoanalytic perspective in order to
develop a theory of language and the functioning of the subject
in language.19 In the chapter, 'L'homme dans le langage',
Benveniste begins by asserting a distinction between first and
third person forms on the basis of the performative nature of
language. He argues that only the first and second person may
rightly be referred to as such, for only they are constitutive of
the process by which language is enacted. They function
primarily at the level of language as event:
Dans les deux premiferes personnes, il y a fe la
fois une personne impliqufee et un discours sur
cette personne. 'Je' dfesigne celui qui parle
et implique en meme temps un fenoncfe sur le
compte de 'je': disant 'je', je ne puis ne pas
parler de moi. (228)
Thus it can be said that the first person pronoun functions
both as an indicator of the producer of language and as an
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element of its production. Consequently, because the third
person is categorically absent from the performative aspect of
language, Benveniste consigns it to the category of 'non-
personne', subject to, but not subject in, language. A further
difference is posited by Benveniste who notes that whereas 1je1
and 'tu' are constituted by language as performance, 1i11 has no
such identity:
Le 1je1 qui enonce, le 'tu' auquel 'je1
s'adresse sont chaque fois uniques. Mais il
peut-etre une infinite de sujets - ou aucun.
C'est pourquoi le "je est un autre" de Rimbaud
fournit 1'expression typique de ce qui est
proprement 1'alienation mentale, ou le moi est
ddpossedd de son identity constitutive. (230)
It thus emerges that the performance of language which
initially seemed to confer an identity upon the I also marks the
instance of its dislocation from itself. The I which speaks, is
also spoken about and, consequently, to speak is constantly to
enact this process of self estrangement. Benveniste pushes this
further when he argues that while the I can be identified as he
who speaks, this identity refers only to the duration of its
performance and has no other identity outwith that of denoting
the speaking subject.
'Je' ne peut etre ddfini qu'en termes de
'locution' non en termes d'objets, comme 1'est
un signe nominal. 'Je' signifie 'le personne
qui dnonce la pr^sente instance de discours
contenant 'je'. Instance unique par definition
et valable seulement dans son unicite. (252)
As has been noted, however, the 'dnonciation' is dependent
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on a second term for its enactment, the 'tu' which the 'je'
addresses. The performance of language calls the other in a bid
for recognition which demands acknowledgement of the speaking
subject's position. It does not wish to be ignored. As a result
'c'est dans une ryality dialectique englobant les deux termes et
les dyfinissant par relation mutuelle qu'on d^couvre le fondement
linguistique de la subjectivity1 (260). The 'subject' which
Benveniste distinguishes from the 'person' is to be located in
the gap between the 'je' and 'tu' as a textured, shifting entity
which is determined by position in language and not by
'identity'. It is perhaps possible at this stage to comprehend
Romberg's fear of the anonymous first person pronoun, for it
eschews the notion of identity by refusing to give up its
performance and a dialectical position. It is rejecting a
position in language by not allowing its self to be substituted
by a reference.
In addition to distinguishing between the categories of
'personne' and 'non-personne', Benveniste also makes a
distinction between two different types of language which he
labels 'histoire' and 'discours' and which, to some extent, may
be seen as corollaries to the category of person. Of the first
category, he writes:
L'^nonciation historique...caractyrise le rycit
des yvynements passys. Ces trois termes
'rycit', 'yvynements', 'passys' sont ygalement
k souligner. II s'agit de la prysentation des
faits survenus k un certain moment du temps
sans aucune intervention du locuteur dans le
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rdcit (238).
Benveniste might be offering a description of what is
traditionally referred to as third person narrative which is
distinguished by the collation of past events by a narrator who
remains absent from the narrative. Conversely, 'discours' is
that form of language which overtly acknowledges the role of the
speaking subject, and the epic situation forms an essential
feature of its production. The 'dnonc6' plays a secondary role
to the '6nonciation' as the autobiographical nature of the
language is foregrounded. The two modes of language are also
distinguished by a different series of verb tenses. The tenses
of 'histoire' (the aorist, imperfect and pluperfect) take their
meaning from the time of the 6nonce whereas the tenses of
'discours' (the present and perfect) signify on the basis of
their relation to the £nonciation. In addition, 'histoire' is
characterised by the 'absence' of 'shifters', which function as
signs of the here and now of the 6nunciative present and of the
presence of the narrator. 'Discours', on the other hand, is
constituted by their appearance. 'Histoire' is used to convey
the sense of events which have no connection with the site and
condition of their representation in language, whereas 'discours'
instigates a continued link between the level of 6nonciation and
that of the 6nonc£. In 'discours', the presence of a speaking
subject is central to that which is being recounted.
Benveniste is forced to acknowledge, however, that, on an
40
empirical level, the two modes intermingle. Theoretically,
'histoire' should exclude absolutely the tenses of discours, but
transgression does take place. Of the appearance of the present
tense in histoire, Benveniste writes: 11e present serait
n^cessairement alors le present de I'historien mais I'historien
ne peut s'historiser sans dementir son dessein1 (245). The
inclusion of a subjective presence entails the disavowal of the
objectivity of historic discourse. This disavowal is, however,
then revealed as a feint, for, as Genette remarks, the third
person
narrator is always at liberty to intervene in his text in the
first person. Another obvious site of contradiction emerges in
the case of first person narrative, for the narrator casting a
retrospective eye over his past naturally (sic) uses the aorist
as the basic tense of his narrative. Benveniste himself
concedes: 'on peut mettre en fait que quiconque sait 6crire et
entreprend le r^cit d'6v6nements passes emploie spontan^ment
I'aoriste comme temps fondamental, qu'il 6voque les ev^nements en
historien ou qu'il les cr6e en romancier' (243). The I of the
first person narrator is once again positioned in a contradictory
situation. Supposedly indexing the speaking subject, I in this
instance functions solely on the level of the <§nonc£ as a past
event. It partakes of the dominion of the non-personne. As a
result of this impasse, the I is obliged to eradicate its self
from the order which instigates its subjectivity. The
autobiography is enshrined in a linguistic mode which engenders a
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life in language only at the expense of the erasure of the
speaking subject. First person narrative thus occupies an
impossible position within language as it both initiates a
dialogue with the other, calling for its recognition on the basis
of its discursive properties, and admits recourse to a domaine of
past events for its authentification through a medium which
radically undercuts its historic propensity.
Benveniste analyses the communicative aspect of language in
terms of the analysand's quest for self determination:
Son discours est appel et recours soilicitation
parfois v6h£mente de 1'autre h travers le
di scours 0C1 il se pose desesp^rement, recours
souvent mensonger h 1'autre pour
s ' indi vidual i ser ci ses propres yeux. Du seul
fait de 1'allocution, celui qui parle de lui-
meme installe 1'autre en soi et par !£. se
saisit lui-meme, se confronte, s'instaure tel
qu'il aspire & etre et finalement s'historise
en cette histoire incomplete ou falsifie (77).
Writing the story of the self is an attempt to historicise
the self, an enterprise which inevitably brings forth errors of
omission, falsification and makes explicit the subject's
privation. The urge to historicise demands an actualisation of
discourse, but also the location of the speaking subject in a
network of positioning in relation to the other. The problem
with the traditional memoir form is that it views subjectivity as
product rather than as a dialectical process between the self and
the other which knows no resolution. Romberg remarks that 'the
perfect fictional memoir is that which seeks to reproduce a whole
life experienced in recollection and which begins as far back as
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the memory can reach - and if possible still earlier1 (38). For
him, the self as an image of wholeness becomes a metaphor for the
authenticating power of language, for it is through language that
the 'I• is subject to verification. Absence of verification
shatters the 'illusion of reality1, and lies which seek to
distort the relationship between language and the world are not
to be countenanced. For Benveniste, however, distortion is the
concomitant result of the self's entry into language. There can
be no such thing as a perfect memoir, and if language can be said
to generate truth, it is in terms of its production and not of a
presumed parallel between word and world.
By means of its production, first person narrative seeks to
attain the imaginary wholeness desired by the subject, yet its
very structure eludes and refuses such wholeness in its address
to the other. Lacan writes:
Ce que je cherche dans la parole, c'est la
riponse de 1'autre. Ce qui me constitue comme
sujet, c'est ma question. Pour me faire
reconnaitre de 1'autre, je ne profire ce qui
fut qu'en vue de ce qui sera. Pour le trouver,
je 1'appelle d'un nom qu'il doit assumer ou
refuser pour me ripondre.20
The subject demands primarily not to communicate with the other,
the insistent addressee of the act of language, but to be
recognised by the other. The act of language is the symptom of a
narcissistic demand which renders satisfaction impossible through
its constitution in the place of the Other.
For Lacan, the subject, split through entry into language,
weeks to historicise himself in order to find confirmation, not
only in the present, but for the future. It is the response of
the other which will condition the identity of the subject.
Language functions as a gift which is bestowed in order to obtain
some purchase from its recipient. Consequently, first person
narrative which appears to assert the priority of the self over
the other, will be seen to be an entreaty, begging recognition
from the other.
The death or erasure of the self which is occasioned through
the accession to the symbolic haunts narrative of the first
person as the reconstruction of the past is ceded to a desired
realization in the future. Lacan continues:
C'est comme d£sir de mort en effet qu'il [le
sujet] s'affirme pour les autres; s'il
s'identifie & 1'autre, c'est en le figeant en
la metamorphose de son image essentielle, et
tout etre par lui n'est jamais dvoqud que parmi
les ombres de la mort (205).
In the readings of first person narratives which follow, the
spectre of the subject's death will be seen to dominate the quest
for identity.
Benvem'ste's debt to Lacan, will become our debt as we argue
that first person narrative can be read as the dramatisation of
the subject's entry into language. A narrative, purportedly
directed towards the past, will be seen to be compellingly
structured around the call to the other and the anticipation of
44
its response. The question of identity which appears fundamental
to any theory of first person narrative is one which will be
determined by the desired relation between the subject in
language and the other, a relation which reveals the inherent
narcissism of the self's desire and the fatal priority of the
other in its constitution.
In this chapter, we examined various theories of first
person narrative before arriving at this conclusion which will
prove the starting point for our study. Rather than attempting
to erect a typology of first person narrative, we shall
endeavour, in the chapters which follow, to explore the ways in
which the first person narrator confronts the other in his desire
for self-affirmation and to consider the status of first person
narrative to be a strategy of failed communication.
As a basis for our study we shall call on the theoretical
framework of Benveniste to examine texts written in the first
person which underline the paradox of first person narrative and
undermine the notion of a 'perfect fictional memoir'. We shall
consider first person narrative to be something of a mixed form,
a 'structural alien' on account of the merging of the modes of
'discourse' and of 'histoire'. First person narrative will be
studied as something other than purely a narratological feature,
as a mode of narration which enacts the adventure of the self in
language. The texts which we shall examine all betray this
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duality which might be interpreted as representing the struggle
by the self for recognition from the Other. Consequently, texts
such as Pirandello's Uno nessuno e centomila and Volponi's La
macchina mondiale, which demonstrate an absolute dislocation
between the self and the other, will not be considered.21 Such
texts offer perhaps valuable insights into the problem, but they
are monologues rather than narratives which turn completely
inwards on a psyche apparently in disfunction. They represent a
stage of language in which the other is no longer addressed, and
in which the I is the sole point of reference.
We shall begin by discussing Nievo's Le confessioni di un
italiano, a mammoth work of nineteenth century prose which
details the life of a narrator in hi story.22 This text will be
considered as a paradigm of traditional first person narrative in
which an elderly narrator casts a retrospective glance on to the
experiences which constitute his life. The relationship between
the 1I' and history will be foregrounded as well as the
examination of experienced temporality, memory, identity and the
mode of narration. We shall consider the manner in which these
features combine in order to produce the notion of a unified
self, a notion, as we shall see, that is challenged by the text
itself.
Subsequently, we shall tackle the problems of identity in
Pavese's La 1 una e i fa!o and Bassani's II qiardino dei Finzi-
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Contini.23 in the first of these texts we shall focus
particularly on the function of the narrator's name within
narrative and also on the activity of memory, two features which
have been viewed as representing constants which anchor the I to
the notion of its self as a unified whole. In Bassani's novel,
we look at the ways in which being is constructed as a textual
identity and the ways in which this is subject to alteration
which lies beyond the control of the narrator. Both these texts
challenge the traditional concept of first person narrative by
problematising and destabilising the I as the centre of
experience.
Our discussion will then lead on to broach the question of
first person narrative in fantastic literature. We shall examine
Calvino's trilogy, I nostri antenati, and attempt to engage with
the meaning of first person narration where the narrative has no
acknowledged external referent.24 This will cause us in turn to
examine more closely the activity of narration itself as a
meaningful, existential activity and, consequently, our attention
will turn to two of Calvino's later texts II caste!lo dei destini
incrociati and Se una notte d'inverno un viaggiatore.25 in these
texts narration becomes its own justification, but, unlike the
texts of Pirandello and Volponi, it remains other directed,
retaining the status of a significant performative strategy while
questioning the notion of self-representation in narrative.
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Finally our study will conclude by examining Sciascia's Todo
modo and Eco's II nome del la rosa.zs These texts both seek to
overcome the anxiety expressed by the other texts in our study
with regard to writing the self, by adopting strategies which
seek to impose the I onto language without demanding recourse to
the authenticating ploys of earlier example of the genre.
In a sense our purpose is in an elucidation of Henry James's
definition of first person narrative. We do not seek to
interpret what he meant, but to suggest a possible reading of our
own as an insight into the 'darkest abyss of romance'.
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It may be argued that the opening paragraph of Nievo's Le
confessioni di un italiano stands as a highly condensed r6sum<§ of
the entire work. The narrative begins:
Io nacqui veneziano ai 18 ottobre del 1775, giorno
del 11 evangelista san Luca: e morrd per la grazia di
Dio quando lo vorr& quel la Provvidenza che governa
misteriosamente il mondo (3).
The first person narrator of Le confessioni goes on to tell
of the upheavals which he has witnessed as Venice loses its
autonomous status and becomes part of the new Italian republic
during the course of the eighty years of his life. His fate as
an individual is indissociably linked to the fortunes of the
nation, and his transformation from Venetian to Italian will be
understood as a metaphor for the transformations of the century.
In this opening sentence, the changing socio-political status of
the narrator is related to the desire to encompass the totality
of the life experience. Dorrit Cohn has written that 'infancy
and death point up the most obvious limitations imposed on self-
narration by the figural identity of hero and historian', and
Nievo's text seems, from the very outset, intent on appropriating
the entire range of possibilities offered to the
■ hero/historian'.i The limitations alluded to by Cohn serve also
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to remind us of the demands which verisimilitude places on first
person narrative. In the course of his eighty years, the
narrator may well witness many things which he will wish to
relate, yet these eighty years map out the boundaries of the
narrator's possible discourse. The narrator can only tell of
that which he witnessed himself, but the problems which this
creates and the narrative solutions which this imposes will test
the notion of verisimilitude to breaking point: the effects of
this will be examined 1ater.
The third structural aspect of the narrative introduced here
is the role of God or Providence in the narrator's life. At this
point, the narrator's attitude seems to be one of passivity in
yielding to the deity which mysteriously regulates existence, but
the narrative will reveal that his attitude is, in fact, more
complex. We will, therefore, begin our study of the novel by
examining the role of history in the structuring of his life
story before going on to discuss the notion of a life in time,
for as Cortini points out in her work on Le confessioni, 'uno dei
piii profondi significati del romanzo.. .non & solo l'immagine di
un viaggio attraverso la storia, ma anche del viaggio attraverso
la vita'.2 Nievo's text gives a thorough account of the
significance of the dual function of the narrator's position as
both 'hero and historian' and makes plain the field of tension
which both unites and divides the two.
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As has been noted, the narrator's life covers the final
years of the eighteenth century and the first half of the
nineteenth, a period filled with turmoil in the history of the
peninsula. The events of the era figure large within the
narrative and famous names of the period co-exist, more or less
happily, alongside the purely fictitious characters of the novel.
The novel has very much the flavour of a romance. As a
historian, however, the narrator does not relate events solely
from an academic point of view, but as someone who actively
participated in them. The narrator met Napoleon, engaged in
militant action with Foscolo, fought in the battles whose outcome
was to forge the identity of the nascent nation and suffered and
enjoyed the vicissitudes of the last days of Venetian autonomy.
Only vaguely aware of that which is taking place elsewhere in
Europe, the narrator's experience of history is that of an active
participant and observer.3 Despite a brief moment of glory as he
quells his rioting 'compaesani', his life is not crowned with
success and his memoir is not to commemorate the life of a great
man. The significance of his life, however, lies in the fact
that he was a witness to great change. He writes that the only
value which may be attributed to his life is that it spanned an
era of great import for Italy and that, consequently, his life
may be regarded as 'typical' in being representative of his time.
He writes:
L'esposizione de' casi miei sar& quasi un
esemplare di quelle innumerevoli sorti
individual!" che dallo sfasciarsi dei vecchi
ordinamenti politici al raffazzonarsi dei
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presenti composero la gran sorte nazionale
itali ana (4).
Consequently, the life of the individual is posited as being
a direct product of historical circumstance. Later he notes that
'1'uomo £ cosi legato al secolo in cui vive che non pud
dichiarare 1'animo suo senza riveder le buccie anche alia
generazione che lo circonda1 (180). The bringing together of
history and the self in this manner suggests a self which is
subordinate to that which lies outside it and declines the notion
of a transcendent subject. This concept of the narrator as
'typical' raises too the question of agency. The narrator is
certainly a participant in history in that he participates
enthusiastically in the events of his time, but it is less
certain the degree to which he can be said to influence history
or exercise control over the events in which he takes part.
Towards the end of his narrative, the narrator reiterates
this point, stating that 'altro non d la vita del popolo se non
la somma delle vite individuali' (774). This remark, while
underlining the 'typicality' of the individual experience,
proposes nevertheless an individual contribution to history
which is reminiscent of the narrator's comments on the decline of
the Venetian state.4 it might be contended, therefore, that in
some way the individual does determine the course of history
through his actions, yet the transcendent term in the debate, at
this stage, must remain history rather than the self. At one
point, the narrator invokes 'la Musa imparziale del la storia'
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(228) which seems to confirm the notion of History as a free-
ranging independent force external to the will of man, suggested
also by the idea of historical progression intimated in the
novel's opening paragraph by the transformation from 'veneziano'
to 'italiano'. We shall return later to examine further the
question of the subject in history after considering the
narrator's 'viaggio attraverso la vita' in order to discover
whether or not there might be a private space reserved for the
self, free from the intervention of circumstance.
Perhaps the most salient feature of the narrator's life has
already been alluded to, in that he writes essentially as a
witness to great events, without having any claim to greatness
himself. As he sets out to retell his life, he lays great stress
on the fact that he is 'vecchio e non letterato', and the preface
to his autobiography reads almost like an apology. He writes:
Ma gi& la chiarezza delle idee, la semplicitci
dei sentimenti, e la verity del la storia mi
saranno scusa e piu ancora supplemento alia
mancanza di retorica: la simpatia de buoni
lettori mi terri vece di gloria (5).
The alleged simplicity of his life story written 'alia
buona' parallels the simplicity of the man himself. From his
humble beginnings in the kitchen at Fratta to the high offices
bestowed upon him in Venice after the return of his father, the
narrator seeks to retain a large portion of common sense, and on
the rare occasions when he does transgress, his elder self gently
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corrects the follies of youth. The function of the narrator's
simplicity is noted by Cortini:
La mediocrity intende essere, infatti, un
supporto al valore testimoniale,
del 11esperienza di un uomo come tanti altri
che, come o piu di altri, ha avuto la ventura
(non il merito) di un percorso biografico
d'eccezione (53).
The value of this is thus evident, in that it seeks to guarantee
the honesty and truth of the narrator's representation of the
world. Similarly, the narrator indicates that what he relates
will be afforded authority by virtue of being told by 'la voce
d'un ottuagenario'. However, the authority granted to old age
and simplicity are posited as givens of the text. The narrator,
as he surveys the landscape of his past, is already in a position
of authority and the tale which will unfold can be read as the
story of how he came to reach an authoritative position. The
implication is, clearly, that life, like history, is experienced
as a progression or as a learning experience in time.
In terms of the narrative, therefore, the relationship
between the narrating I and the narrated I is one which is
dominated by the former who does enjoy the benefit of hindsight.
He is a self who has learned, and although the gap between the
two selves gradually closes as the time between the narration and
the narrated events gradually decreases, it can never be sealed
completely even if the narrator continues until the moment of his
death.
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The need for authenticity in Le confessioni, a feature
reckoned to be central to all first person narrative, is
compounded by the fact that although the narrator may himself be
very ordinary, he does not lead an ordinary life. Giovanni
Carsaniga notes:
Narrative truth...emerged for Nievo out of a
rendering of the whole of human experience,
individual, social, economic, political, set
against a vast fresco of Italian history
extending from the
end of the eighteenth century down to his own
time. s
It seems, therefore, that in order to contain such a vast
range of concerns within a single text or single life span, Nievo
requires a narrator who not only is very old, but who also has
enjoyed almost miraculous changes in fortune and a startling
ubiquity of movement. The inverisimilar nature of such shifts
must be compensated for, not only by a trustworthy narrator, but
by one who is aware of the exceptional circumstances in which his
life has taken place. In this context, it should also be noted
that the historic events and famous historical figures which
populate the novel serve to authenticate the narrator's memoir.
The truth of their existence spills over onto the narrator's text
in order to add credence to his account, but as we shall later
see, the narrator's fictional existence also contaminates the
veracity of historical fact.
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Although the narrator is identified primarily as a witness
to history, there exists another, deeper level on which his
identity is constructed. In the first chapter of the novel, the
narrator introduces the reader to his earlier life in the castle
at Fratta and to the people who shared this dimension. He
remains peculiarly silent about his origins, however, revealing
only his first name, but giving no further information regarding
who he is. Significantly, he begins the second chapter:
II maggior effetto prodotto nei lettori del
capitolo primo sar& stata la curiosity di saper
finalmente, chi fosse questo Carlino. Fu
infatti un gran miracolo i1 mio od una
giunteria solenne di menarvi a zonzo per un
intero capitolo del la mi a vita, parlandovi
sempre di me, senza dir prima chi io mi
sia.(49)
The withholding of substantial information regarding his own
identity is recognised by the narrator as a significant omission.
On the one hand, it may be interpreted as a tantalising narrative
ploy, but, perhaps more importantly, suggests that despite the
truth bearing strategies of the opening chapter, the narrator's
discourse somehow verged on the meaningless, due to the lack of
an external (albeit fictional) referent on which to situate the
anonymity of the narrator's I. In the second chapter, Carlino is
rather more fulsome in documenting information which might give
the reader a more detailed record of his identity, but he has, at
the same time, established a structure through which identity
will be periodically revealed in the course of the novel.
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The idea of revelation might seem to run counter to what we
had already noted regarding life as a gradual learning
experience, for this earlier notion indicates that the securing
of an identity is one based on maturity and the accumulation of a
totality. It must, however, be recognised that an antithetical
structure is also in operation. Carlino's identity shifts as the
network of his family relationships is uncovered, altering
radically his social and affective situation in a manner which
could not have been predicted. The result of these shifts is, on
the one hand, to allow Carlino access to a much wider variety of
social situations, but, on the other, it questions the notion of
an inherent, permanent and unified identity. Identity comes to
be seen as something which depends upon the other and its
manifold manifestations are best seen as alterations or
fragmentations in the self's relationship with the other. If the
narrator's identity can be said to parallel the chronological
unfolding of history on one level, it can also be argued that his
identity within the family causes his experience to be layered
into larger blocks of time. The prime example of this is his
change in status subsequent to the return of his father, but
other significant shifts occur whenever a family tie is exposed.
The sense of identity constructed here has little to do with
linear temporal progression, for its development is unpredictable
and sporadic. The constant revision of the self which such
revelations betoken, necessitates the finding of a common thread
which will join together the various, divergent points on the
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continuum of life. It is these supports which we will now
examine.
In a life as varied and momentous as that of Carlo Altoviti,
the main link between past and present selves is constructed
through the narrator's ability to span the decades of his life
through the act of memory. In retrospective first person
narration, the ability of the narrator to remember is the
fundamental structuring device of the text, although there is no
obligation on the part of the narrator to draw attention to this
act nor to the hazards which such a performance might involve.
In Le confessioni, however, the narrator does make explicit
reference to the fact that his narrative is an act of memory,
recognising this as an important feature of his life and work.
One of the principal functions of the narrator's memory is
to guarantee the veracity of his narrative. Towards the
beginning of his story, he remarks with reference to the great
upheavals of the past:
Leggere al giorno d'oggi di cotali ordinamenti
politici e militari che somigliano buffonerie,
parr^i forse una gran maraviglia. Ma le cose
camminavano appunto com'io le racconto. (18)
The significance of the verb 'raccontare' may be gleaned, if
we note the narrator's later reminder to the reader, which serves
also as an admonishment: ' io racconto e non invento' (773).
Carlo is telling, but he clearly believes that what he is telling
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is the truth and not a fiction invented by him. He takes great
pains to underline the veracity of his narrative, abandoning the
focus on his past self in order to address the reader directly:
ma ve 1o giuro una volta per sempre: io non vi
ricamo di mio capo un romanzo: vo semplicemente
riandando la mi a vita. Ricordo a voce alta; e
scrivo quello che ricordo. Scommetto anzi che
se tutti vorrete tornar daccapo col la memoria
aglianni dell a puerizia, molti fra voi
troveranno inessi i germi e quasi il compendio
delle passioniche poscia inorgoglirono (200).
Carlo, in denying that he is composing a novel, appears to
substantiate his claim by subordinating the written dimension of
his narrative, not only to memory, but to memory activated
orally.e Orality takes precedence over the written text which is
posited as a mere transcription or supplement to the genuine
performance of narration which is spoken out loud. This seems to
coincide with Carlo's earlier claims regarding the absence of
rhetoric in his narrative, suggesting that the spoken language,
being somehow spontaneous and devoid of artifice, bears a truth
which is distorted and confused by the written text. He does not
question, however, the enormity of his mnemonic capacity in
recalling events, however formative, from his earliest childhood.
The suggestion, too, that the tribulations of childhood may be
read as a key to the later development of the self, seems to
contradict the idea of the self growing and progressing in time,
although it could also be contended that the maturity of the self
lies in its being able to recognise itself across the span of
time.
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The linking of memory and its oral source is, nevertheless,
contradicted elsewhere by the narrator. He writes of waking one
day to find that 'le memorie del giorno prima mi passarono inanzi
chiare ordinate e vivaci come i capitoli d'un bel romanzo1(125).
More significantly, however, he had previously noted:
Per me la memoria fu sempre un libro, e gl i
oggetti che la richiamano a certi tratti de'
suoi annali mi somigliano quei nastri che si
mettono nel libro alle pagine piu interessanti.
Essi ti cascano sott'occhio di subito; e senza
sfogliazzar le carte, per trovare quel punto
del racconto o quel la sentenza che ti ha meglio
col pi to, non hai che a fidarti di loro (122).
This passage suggests immediately that, through memory, the
past is easily recuperable, and also that it is fixed there, to
be inspected at will from an unchanging perspective. The
implication is too that the book itself is a transparent medium,
serving only as a vehicle through which the past can be brought
back to life. The book is a true representation of the past and
reading is an unproblematic activity.
That life is also experienced as a book is indicated by the
narrator when he asks:
Ma chi si dava cura di tener dietro alle
passioncelle e ai romanzi del la nostra
adolescenza? - Ci giudicavamo novelli affatto
nella vita, che ne avevamo gi& fornita tutta
l'orditura; e il compiere la trama k opera
manuale alia quale siamo sospinti il piu delle
volte da forza ineluttabile e fatale (290).
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His fatalistic response betrays an anxiety which is more
clearly expressed later when he addresses the reader thus:
io vi posso assicurare che quel personaggio
(Saffo) non & una grottesca finzione poetica,
ma ch'esso ha vissuto in carne ed ossa, come
appunto viviamo io e voi (591).
The uneasy juxtaposition of fictional and real figures blurs
the distinctions between the two as both become textualised on
the same level. The device of addressing the other, coupled with
the narrator's claims of orality, indicate the distress of the
narrator as he seeks to secure an identity through the evocation
of his past and expresses a desire for recognition which would
secure also an identity in the present. Memory, although directed
towards the past is, nevertheless, an activity in the present and
an activity which seeks satisfaction in the present.7 While the
narrator has implied that his memory is capable of encompassing
the totality of his past, it is possible to detect breaches in
this. In another aside which breaks from the focus onto the
past, he laments:
Ad ottant'anni dura ancora il rammarico di non
poter contemplare nel memore pensiero
l'immagine del la madre. Le labbra che non
ricordano il sapore de suoi baci inardiscono
piu presto al fiato maligno dell'aria mondana
(534-535).
His memory is thus imperfect for it cannot restore his most
fundamental desire of all, that of the primary recognition of his
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self by the other. Whereas La Pisana's lock of hair can help him
recall his relationship with her, and his other mementos bring
back other periods of his life, they serve ultimately only to
underline the absence of the desired object in the present.
Consequently, memory is not restorative, for although it may
enable the narrator to commemorate moments from the past, it
cannot console him for their loss. In his eulogy to memory, he
writes:
Memoria, memoria, che sei tu mai! Tormento,
ristoro e tirannia nostra, tu divori i nostri
giorni ora per ora minuto per minuto e ce 1 i
rendi poi rinchiusi in un punto, come in un
simbolo del 1'eternity! Tutto ci togli, tutto
ci ridoni; tutto distruggi, tutto conservi;
parii di morte ai vivi e di vita ai
sepolti!....Ma la mi a memoria frattanto mi
servi assai male; essa mi legb giovane ed uomo
ai capricci d'una passione fanciullesca. La
perdono tuttavia; perch£ val meglio a mio
giudizio il ricordar troppo e dolersene, che il
dimenticar tutto per godere. (318)
This lengthy quotation demonstrates all of the narrator's
ambivalence towards a memory which has the dual function of both
evoking the past and reminding him, in the present, of his loss.
Concluding that he prefers the pain of the acknowledged loss to a
blissful ignorance, is the only means by which the narrator can
ensure any degree of continuity between his past and present
selves. The text which he speaks and then writes, functions as a
metaphor for the illusory hold which the narrator has on the
past.
At this point in his narrative where Carlo laments the
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passing of his youth, he expresses disbelief and intense grief
that all that he has experienced will end in nothingness. He
asks: 'oh come mai avr& a finire in nulla un tesoro di affetti e
di pensieri che sempre s'accumula e cresce?1 (477). He goes on
to say that 1i 1 tempo non & tempo ma eternity, per chi si sente
immortale', revealing the manner in which he has become trapped
between the feelings of immortality associated with his youth and
the present recognition of his impending death. Through memory,
the narrator seeks to immobilise his past by means of his
narrative in an attempt to become his own measure of time. The
narrator no longer feels immortal, hence the recourse to
narrative which imposes its own time on the past which he has
accumulated, but which threatens to dissolve. Later the narrator
refers to his memory as a 1reliquiario1, suggesting his
veneration of an object already dead. His position lies
somewhere between those of Lucilio and Clara, the former claiming
that memory is a 'sepolcro', while the latter stating that 'la
memoria k urn tempio, un a!tare' (192). Whereas Lucilio is ready
to regard the past as dead and buried, and Clara worships the
past in nostalgic fervour, the attitude of the narrator is more
complex. As ever in Le confessioni, the narrator seeks to find
parallels between the life of the individual and the life of the
nation. Just as the self has tokens which remind of the past so
too does the state:
II fatto si 4 che quei simboli del passato sono
nella memoria di un uomo, quello che i
monumenti cittadini e nazionali nella memoria
dei posteri. Ricordano, celebrano,
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ricompensano, infiammano.... Un popolo che ha
grandi monumenti onde inspirarsi non morr& mai
del tutto, e mori bondo sorgerb a vita pi Q col ma
e vigorosa che mai... (123).
The monuments of the past have, therefore, a symbolic value
pointing towards the future, with which a symbolic identity may
be constructed. This does, however, necessitate a dislocation
with the real which the narrator seems to wish to retrieve by
means of his private memory. The identity, which he constructs
by means of the mnemonic activity of writing, is therefore
idealised in the sense that it is partial and can only substitute
that which was experienced. The problem for the narrator is, as
he notes, that 'vi sono momenti che la memoria sente ancora e
sentirb sempre quasiche fossero eterni, ma non pub nb esaminarli,
n<§ descriverli' (751). The gap between experience and narrative
is caused by the fact that while life may be beyond language, it
can only be expressed by it. Memory can only be activated as a
linguistic, hence symbolic activity, in order to achieve
recognition by the other. If the narrator is to have an identity
at all, he must submit to these demands of imperfection and
concede specificity to typicality.
Despite the narrator's repeated disavowals, he cannot escape
the fact that he is presenting the reader with a literary text.
The elements of 1discours' which punctuate the 'histoire' draw
attention to the artifice of the construct even when they do not
make direct reference to the literary experience. The purpose of
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such 'digressions' is always to instigate a direct rapport with
the reader, the other to whom Carlo directs his address. Such
digressions, he feels, are an inevitable part of the
autobiographical mode. He writes:
Pur troppo in chi racconta la propria vita
s'hanno a compatire sovente di cotali
digressioni. Io poi per tirar innanzi ho
proprio bisogno del la vostra generosity, o
amici lettori (401).
As well as establishing contact with his readership, the
narrator also demonstrates an awareness of his place in a
literary tradition. In the course of his narrative, he alludes
to the great works of Italian literature, which as an uncultured
reader he could not fully appreciate, but which he recognises as
an essential feature in the forging of a unified, Italian
identity.s Democratic like the times, he calls for a greater
clarity of expression and a return to a form of writing which
would more closely resemble everyday speech. The aim of such a
project would be to aid the development of a national
consciousness which could sustain the political changes which
Italy has seen. Earlier he had written: 'io scrivo per dire la
verity, e non per dilettare la gente, con fantasie prettamente
poetiche' (48). His task is not only to record his life for its
own sake, but to offer it as an example to future Italians.
The narrator is, however, aware of his role in the internal
organising of his narrative as its author.9 Apart from
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maintaining the gap between his present and past selves with his
'senno di poi', he also playfully refers to the circumstances of
his own act of writing. Perhaps the most notable example of this
occurs at the end of chapter 14 and the beginning of chapter 15.
He concludes the former chapter, writing: 'ma sono stanco di
scrivere, e voglio chiudere il capitolo lasciandovi
nell'incertezza di quello che ne avvenne poi' (580). He begins
the next chapter by excusing himself and explaining that he had
got into the habit of writing a chapter per day, carrying on
until sleep had overtaken him. Each chapter can no longer be
conceived of as a natural segment of the narrator's life, for its
duration depends not on its own realisation, but on the material
conditions which determine its writing. Carlo's life may seem
episodic as he hurtles from one adventure to another, but, it is
revealed, so is the writing of it.
At the beginning of the novel, the narrator's introduction,
which also functions as an epilogue, reveals that the narrative
has, in fact, been nine years in the writing. A large portion of
the narrator's life has, therefore, been turned over to the task
of its transcription, yet this information is glimpsed only on
the margins of the text. Part of the fiction of first person
narrative is that life and the act of narrating are mutually
exclusive events. In terms of sheer duration, narration must be
regarded as a significant biographical fact, yet its significance
is eclipsed by its own production. Even the elements of
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1discours' which overtly reveal the performative nature of
narration, consume themselves at the moment of their enactment as
they are transformed into plot. The present of narration which
is the moment of the narrative's generation is extinguished by
the temporality it engenders through its linguistic strategies.
The past which is represented through history, as experience and
by memory, is formed at the expense of the present. The
narrator's determination to construct a personal myth in terms of
an historical identity can only achieve satisfaction through the
eclipse of subjectivity.
If, on one level, Carlo's narrative can be read as a
eel ebrati on or commemoration of a momentous epoch and the rise of
a unified Italian state, its significance on a personal level may
be seen to lie elsewhere. As Cortini pointed out, Le confessioni
detail also Carlo's journey through life and it is at the point
of the narrator's death that the memoir is written. Carlo
remarks:
Gli d del la storia dell a mi a vita, come di
tutte le altre, credo. Essa si diparte
solitaria da una cuna per frapporsi poi e
divagare e confondersi col 1'infinita
moltitudine delle umane vicende, e tornar
solitaria e sol ricca di dolori e di
rimembranze verso la pace del sepolcro (180).
In his present isolation, the narrator is forced to contemplate
his own death and, in a sense, the writing of his life is an
attempt to ward off his imminent departure. On two occasions, he
refers to his confessions as an epitaph both to his life and
times but no amount of words will do to prevent the inevitable
end.10 The gap between writing and living is noted by Carlo who
comments on the rapidity of passing time compared to the apparent
stasis of narration:
A questo modo passano rapidi gli anni come i
mesi del la giovinezza; ma non crediate che in
effetto fossero tanto veloci come sembra a
raccontarli. Piu il tempo k lungo a narrarlo e
piu forse fugge rapidamente in realty (778).
Carlo's experience of time is various as the relatively brief
account of his years of marriage shows, if compared to the
lengthier analyses of his more active earlier life. However,
just as the diary of Giulio, his dead son, cannot repair Carlo's
loss, the narrator's own text serves only to highlight the
inevitability of his own death. If his aim is to prolong his
life through writing, the narrator's ploy ultimately fails.
In his 'proemio', Carlo refers to 'la pace dell'animo' as
the only fruit he has gathered from life. He continues:
La pace di cui godo ora, 6 come quel golfo
misterioso in fondo al quale 1'ardito
navigatore trova un passaggio per 1'oceano
infinitamente calmo dell'eternity. Ma il
pensiero, prima di tuffarsi in quel tempo che
non avr& piu differenza di tempi, si slancia
ancora una volta nel futuro degli uomini, e ad
essi si lega fidente le proprie colpe da
espiare, le proprie speranze da raccogliere, i
propri voti da compiere (6).
The interesting feature of Carlo's narrative, as he teeters on
the brink of death, is the extent to which it remains directed
towards the future. The evocation of the past is never
undertaken solely for its own sake, but is used to instruct the
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reader of the manner in which the narrator grew in time. The
eulogistic aspects of his retelling of the past never fully
obscure the desire also to move on. Thus, the narrator's early
years in the kitchen of Fratta serve, on the one hand, as the
focus of nostalgic return, but also as the point from which the
narrator can re-enact his entry into the outside world.
The narrator's most urgent call to the other is, however,
felt in the final pages of the novel. We noted in the opening
lines of the novel the fact that Carlo appears to place his trust
in God and throughout his autobiography, faith and justice are
deemed to occupy a significant role in his journey through life.
Early in the novel, the narrator breaks off from his narrative in
order to give the reader an insight into one of the lessons he
has learned from his experience:
Dopo molti anni strappai al mio cuore un brano
sanguinoso sul quale era scritto giustizia, e
conobbi che la vita umana & un ministero di
giustizia, e l'uomo un sacerdote di essa, e la
storia un'espiatrice che ne registra i
sagrifici a vantaggio dell'umanitci che sempre
cangia e sempre vive(78).
Despite the religious imagery, Carlo's message is undoubtedly
secular. The hallowed concepts of faith and justice are located
not in God, but in man. Although he professes a belief in the
role of Providence, he is, nevertheless, a materialist at heart.
Towards the end of his narrative and hence of his life, he
addresses once more the reader:
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Vi sarete accorti che di tutte le profession!'
cui io mi dedicai, a nessuria mi avea condotto
il mio libero arbitrio; e che o la volontA
degl i altri, o la necessity del momento, o un
concorso straordinario di circostarize m'aveano
dato in mano il parti to bell'e fatto senza che
io potessi pur ragionarci sopra (889).
If any one term is afforded the quality of transcendence, it is
circumstance or history. Carlo does not claim responsibility for
the manner in which his life has unfolded, and his work has been
to fulfil his duties to mankind within a circumscribed space.
His call to the other, however, seeks to go beyond these
limitations, but it is interesting that although, in the final
pages of his narrative, he does appear to turn to God, his final
thoughts are directed towards La Pisana. He writes:
Sperammo ed amammo insieme; insieme dovremo
trovarci 1& dove si raccolgono gli amori
dell'umanita passata e le speranze dell a
futura. Senza di te che sarei io mai?... Per
te per te sola, o divina, il cuore dimentica
ogni suo affanno, e una dolce malinconia
suscitata dalla speranza lo occupa soavemente
(959).
This passage, which expresses the desire for the transcendence of
the self, indicates also the materialist basis of this desire.
La Pisana may undergo a process of deification, yet this must be
read as the desired transfiguration of a purely earthly
attachment. The strength of his desire is so intense on account
of the fact that she is already dead, hence absent from the scene
of desire. Like the impossible recollection of his mother's
lips, Carlo's desire to be reunited with La Pisana in the place
where all longing has ceased, betrays the failure of his
narrative to achieve satisfaction by means of its own
73
realisation. The narrative ends on a note of unfiliable desire
which expresses both the narrator's anxiety to be recognised by
the other and his ultimate failure to achieve recognition.
In this context, the significance of the novel's title may
be explored. The title succeeds in juxtaposing the two principal
aspects of the narrative i.e. the personal and political sides of
the narrator's journey. As an Italian, Carlo has completed the
transformation imposed by the century, while the term
'confessions' expresses all the ambiguity of his personal
experience. Firstly, it evokes again a religious connotation as
a declaration of faith, but, as has been noted, the narrative
secularises this dimension. It is worth remarking too on the
fact that the 'roman-mdmoire' form can be said, partly, to have
its roots in this religious, confessional mode of writing,
locating the narrator and his text, once more, in a literary
tradition. The title also implies an admission on the part of
the narrator, a profession of faith and a desire for expiation.
Significantly, these performative acts of language require an
audience, for it is from the audience that absolution may be
granted. Carlo again addresses the reader:
Eh ora che avete stretto dimestichezza con me,
o amici lettori, ora che avete ascoltato
pazientemente le lunghe confessioni di Carlo
Altoviti, vorrete voi non darmi 1'assoluzione?
(957).
The reasons for Carlo's need for expiation are not clear, but it
may be that all he desires, is recognition in order to confirm
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and, hence, consecrate his existence. His narrative is his act
of contrition, but, as we have argued, does not succeed in
absolving him.
There is one final definition, however, of the word
1confessione' which although lesser known, adds an interesting
perspective to the life and narrative of the narrator. In
Zingarelli, we find the following as the final definition of
1confessione1: 'luogo sottostante 1'altare in cui si conservano
le spoglie di un santo' or 'tomba di un santo'. Whether or not
Carlo qualifies for sanctification is perhaps debatable, but the
illuminating point is that 'confessione1 may designate also a
tomb or place of interment. It may be argued, therefore, that
Carlo's confessions, rather than celebrating and prolonging his
life, serve to enclose and bury it, sealing it off for evermore
from making contact with the Other.
The confessional mode adopted by the narrator serves to
locate his life within a specific literary mode. His life,
therefore, becomes a literary event, bound by conventions which
are not of his making. The nature of these conventions are
clearly spelled out by Romberg and we shall examine them more
fully when we come to discuss Pavese's La 1 una e i fal6. We have
chosen Nievo's work as a classical example of first person
narrative, for it seems to expound most clearly the concept of
the technique as a life transformed retrospectively into
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narrative. In our opening chapter, we noted, however, that first
person narrative seems to be precariously situated between two
antithetical modes of language, and although Nievo does not seek
to exploit their possible sites of contradiction, his text does
open up gaps which will be explored by later writers. He
emphasises questions of identity and draws attention to the act
of memory as a major structural device within the narrative. He
broaches the problematics of a self which is caught between
historical determination and the desire for transcendence,
indicating also the self's quest for recognition by the other.
The thrust of the narrative is grounded in the desire for
possession both of the past and of the text in order to establish
the self as its own point of origin. All of these features will
reappear in the works which we shall go on to study, yet none
will permit the seemingly conciliatory conclusion suggested by
Nievo's work. The idea of entombment, which we have proposed as
a consequence of the narrator's design to construct a self in
language, will be more acutely felt in these later texts which
all enact the struggle of the self to gain recognition in the
symbolic order.
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Notes to Chapter Two
1 Dorrit Cohn, Transparent Minds, p.38
2 M. Antonietta Cortini, L'autore, il narratore, 1'eroe, (Rome,
1983) p.78
3 Cortini refers to the narrator as '1'eroe-osservatore', p.96
and underlines his function as a witness to history.
4 Nievo, pp.228-235
5 G. Carsaniga, 'Realism in Italy' in The Age of Realism,
F W J Hemmings (ed) (Sussex, 1978), pp.323-355 (p.335)
6 See Cortini p.48
7 Paul de Man writes: 'The power of memory does not reside in
its capacity to resurrect a situation that actually existed,
but it is a constitutive act of the mind bound to its own
present and oriented toward the future of its own
elaboration.' In Blindness and Insight, (London, 1983), p.92
8 See Nievo, p.402
9 Carsaniga argues that Nievo's work appears too novellesque to
be regarded as a 'genuine' autobiography. He writes 'the
novel occasionally shows too clearly the shaping hand of the
author to qualify as realistic; there are too many contrived
meetings, recognition scenes and coups de theatre' (p.336).
It is to counter these extravagant narrative displays that
Carlo makes such overt claims to truth.
10 See Nievo, p.330 and p.477
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CHAPTER THREE
Naming the Narrator in La 1 una e i fal6
'Dans le rdcit & la premiere personne, le narrateur raconte
ce qu'il sait de lui-meme et uniquement ce qu'il en sait.'i
Butor's statement is a simple formulation of the idea that the
first-person narrator should, and indeed must, limit himself to
the telling of things which he can be honestly said to know, or
have known. The demands made on a narrator who tells his own
tale are not grounded in the realm of fiction, but in that of
'real life'. His narrative function is submerged beneath the
weight of his persona as the I becomes the indicator of a
corporal, sentient presence, and as a result of which, first
person narrative would seem to owe more to autobiography than to
narrative fiction.
Percy Lubbock in The Craft of Fiction would appear to
espouse this notion of first-person narrative. Despite his
marked preference for the technique of 'showing' over that of
'telling', and the fact that he views first-person narrative in
terms of its limitations, his assessment of it is not entirely
negative - he writes: 'The loss of freedom is more than repaid by
the more salient effect of the picture. Precision, individuality
is given to it by this pair of eyes, known and named, through
which the reader sees it.'2 Three elements emerge from this
statement. Firstly, Lubbock underlines the visual component of
first-person narrative, the fixed centre of vision. Secondly,
he ascribes an identity to the pronoun, an identity which is
again fixed, while finally, he alludes to the relationship with
the reader, a relationship which would seem to involve a
secondary process of identification or of symbiosis. The essence
of first person narrative seems to lie in the individuality of
the narrator. The I assumes authority through its very
knowability, and this authority endows the narrative with its
"saliency and precision". The 'loss of freedom' to which Lubbock
refers, is the loss of omniscience which characterises third
person narrative, the so-called 'stronger method'. (145). His
approach is based on a humanist conception of the uniqueness of
the self, but his subsequent remarks serve to undermine the
notion of the I as a repository of truth. He writes: 'when the
man in the book is expected to make a picture of himself, a
searching and elaborate portrait, then the limit of his capacity
is touched and passed' (140). Thus the first person narrator is
exposed. The I by means of which a presence was established in
the narrative, now signals an empty space, an absence. The I
cannot represent itself in discourse, no longer its own
discourse, for the I can only tell of the other. It can only
appear as a product of this telling as the converse of otherness.
I is always negatively defined.
Two further comments by Lubbock reinforce the idea of the I
as negative space. Of David Copperfield, a first person
narrative, he writes: 'It is the story of what happened around
him, not within. David offers a pair of eyes and a memory,
nothing further is demanded of him' (129-130). Structurally,
David is posited as the subject of this sentence, but as a
narrator he is not valued as a subject, but merely as a witness,
a recorder of all that occurs near to him, but not inside him.
This is paralleled with Lubbock's remarks on Strether in The
Ambassadors, a third person narrative: 'He is enough to prove
finally how far the intricate performance of thought is beyond
the power of man to record in his own language' (145). The I
which was initially defined in terms of its fullness, its
solidity, is ultimately defined by its lack, its inability to
represent itself in language.
Lubbock's panoramic account of literary technique does not
dwell at length on first person narrative nor on the possible
contradictions inherent in his discourse. He has done enough to
focus our attention on problematic areas relating to first person
narrative. The I is both privileged as a locus of authenticity,
meaning and authority, and denigrated as an area of non-
signification. The I is there in order to bear witness, but in
his testimony, the self is shrouded in silence. The I with its
unchallenged powers of knowledge, vision and memory is at once
the origin of the text's meaning, but also the limit of its
expression. Lubbock consigns the I to the very margins of the
text, while, at the same time, the existence of the I is the
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central feature of his discussion of first person narrative. Its
presence defines the status of the text, but the text defies it
to represent itself.
We already noted that similar ambiguities occur in the work
of Hamburger. The 'I' of first person narrative, she argues,
does not indicate the subjectivity of the form, but rather the
'objective' nature of the narrative, given that it is grounded in
an 'historical' context. While on the one hand, external reality
is objectified by the discourse of the 'I', on the other, this
idea has important ramifications for the status of the 'I'
itself.
The past life, that former world of people,
things and events overshadows the statement-
subject, even if he does portray himself as
being present in every moment of this past life
in the form of his earlier self - as indeed he
must if the first person narrative form is to
be maintained. (325-326)
Thus by Hamburger's own definition, the I, whose status had
previously been consecrated as a privileged locus of
signification on account of its historical identity, is now
reduced to a reality which is merely linguistic. First person
narrative is considered to be essentially fictive autobiography,
but here the project of the roman-mdmoires form i.e. the writing
of one's life in retrospect, collapses as the narrating I is
radically isolated from the narrated I which forms part of an
objectified discourse, and undermines the authority of the
discourse which had been based on the authenticating presence of
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the I.
Bertil Romberg places the emphasis firmly on the
autobiographical element of first person narrative.* The
creation of a narrative persona by the author serves the purpose,
according to Romberg, of strengthening the novel's 'illusion of
reality', but significantly he also notes: 'The distinguishing
characteristic of the first-person novel is the author's device
of creating a fictive narrator...a narrator, whom the author
interposes between himself and the reader and who is given the
authority for the whole story' (9). The question of authority
permeates all of Romberg's work, but is curiously textured, based
on a juxtaposition of the fictive and the real. Authority is
granted by the inclusion in the text of an extensive amount of
biographical detail:- 'The perfect fictional memoir is that
which seeks to reproduce a whole life experienced in recollection
and which begins as far back as the memory can reach - and if
possible still earlier' (38-39). David Copperfield would seem to
be an excellent example of this, its first chapter being entitled
'I am born', and in which the hero finds himself detailing the
tombstones of his family in order to verify the need to prove
f i 1iation.
Nevertheless, in his quest for verisimilitude Romberg, seems
to be pushing back the boundaries of the verisimilar, for he does
not call into question what he refers to as the 'perspective of
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recollection1, nor the certainty of the narrator's knowledge.
Biographical detail seems to create a framework around which the
narrator can weave his life story. In reference to narratorial
self-depiction Romberg writes: 'In these depictions the reader
is given an artless and direct introduction to the narrator;
right from the beginning the latter sets his birth certificate
before us and admits to having a local habitation and a name. It
is not some vague and insubstantial "I" that is speaking. A
pronoun has been made flesh' (84). Thus the reader's impression
that he is face to face with a 'real person' is not grounded in
the appearance of the 'I', but in the weight of extraneous
information which accompanies its appearance. 'I' alone would
not appear to signify, it has no inherent properties and is a
signifier without a signified. When such biographical detail is
missing and, in particular, when the narrator remains unnamed,
Romberg is dismissive of the author's intent: 'the boundary
between narrator and author is no longer intact; the author no
longer builds up the individual physiognomy of his spokesman, and
we are thereby deprived of the most important characteristic of
the first person novel. Authenticity and the illusion of reality
are no longer vested in the narrator; there is no longer any
question of a role-narrative' (88).
That the corporal entity should vanish in the absence of the
name and be reduced to a mere textual construct, suggests the
importance of the act of naming in the structuring of first
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person narrative. The I is to attain plenitude through the act
of naming itself, but, paradoxically, before naming oneself, one
is named by others. The very act which would endow the I with
subjectivity does not originate in the discourse of the self, but
in the discourse of the other. Presence and absence are both
inexorably inscribed in the choice to name. The emphasis placed
by Romberg on the proper name indicates that the roman-m6moires
form is not a celebration of the I as a unique repository of
meaning, but of the named-self as a symbolic representation
defined by the other. The I can only signify as part of a
discourse that is already given and pre-exists the 11s entry into
it. It is a discourse which invalidates the self by objectifying
it by means of the patronym.
The position adopted by Lubbock, Hamburger and Romberg can
be elucidated by reference to Belsey's remarks on the 'common
sense1 mode of literary criticism:
Common sense proposes a humanism based on an
empiricist-idealist interpretation of the
world. In other words, common sense urges that
'man' is the origin and source of meaning, of
action and of history (humanism). Our concepts
and our knowledge are held to be the product of
experience (empiricism) and this experience is
preceded and interpreted by the mind, reason or
thought, the property of a transcendent human
nature whose essence is the attribute of each
individual (idealism).5
Humanism, empiricism and idealism, the three pillars of common
sense confer a unique identity on to the subject. The man and
his meaning precede the entry into language which is merely a
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vehicle for transmission of the self's ineluctable message. This
view informs the perspective of these three critics who initially
grant first person narrative (albeit fictive) a position of
privilege as a truth-bearing document on account of the fact that
it is an 'embodiment' of one individual's unique experience (the
text's status as 'fiction' is irrelevant here). This position is
consistently undermined, however, as they testify to the
incapacity of the self to represent itself in language and to
signify on its own account. In order to allay the insidious
doubt that, after all, the I does not signify, a process of
recuperation is set in motion. They attempt to retrieve the
first person pronoun from the abyss of non-signification by
trying to forge an historical subject based on circumstantial
data. The recourse to history culminates in the elevation of the
proper name to the status of totem, in which the final residue of
the self is to be recovered. Names, however, fulfil an
ideological function and the name is a construct of discourse not
of the self. If we accept language as a system of signs, with
the signifier inevitably denoting the absence of the signified,
the retreat into the proper name, rather than saving the first
person pronoun from anonymity, signals the I as the locus of
absence and loss. The I is a product not a producer of
discourse. To identify the self with the name is to misrepresent
the self, for the name indicates the locus of an ideological
construct not a transcendental ego.
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Leaving behind the notion of the particularity of the
subject in language, Benveniste demonstrates the very anonymity
of the first person pronoun as an essential fact of language. He
refers to the first person pronoun as a 'signe unique mais
mobile1 - 'unique' in that it can only refer to the emitter of
discourse, but 'mobile' in that it belongs to anyone who chooses
to occupy that role.6 For Benveniste, this represents the
essential paradox of the relationship between language and the
subject. The subject can only be constituted as such by entering
language and adopting the role of speaker, while the very act of
doing so places the I in a role not of its own making: "C'est
dans et par le langage que l'homme se constitue comme sujet;
parce que le langage seul fonde en rdality, dans sa rdalitd qui
est celle de 1'etre, le concept d'"ego". La "subjectivity" dont
nous traitons ici est la capacity du locuteur h se poser comme
"sujet"' (259). Thus for Benveniste, reality is the reality
bestowed by language. Language is convention, as is form, and
therefore the attempt of the I to construct itself, its
autobiography, in language is concerned more with the possibility
of adhering to a pre-existing form than to the ability to give
expression to a unique self.
Philippe Lejeune, while largely agreeing with Benveniste's
thesis, finds in the use of the name, a means of retrieving the
first person pronoun from the abyss of anonymity. He writes:
'Nature!!ement, ce n'est pas un aspect de la
conjugaison du verbe, et Benveniste a raison de
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souligner la fcmcticm dconomique du "je":
mais, en oubliant d'articuler sur la catdgorie
lexicale des noms de personne, il rend
incomprdhensibl e le fait que chacun, utilisant
le "je", ne se perd pas pour autant dans
1'anonymat, et est toujours capable d'enoncer
ce qu'il y a d1 irrdductible en se noTnmant' and
goes on to state 'C'est dans le nom propre que
personne et discours s'articulent avant meme de
s'articuler dans la premidre personne'.7
Without recourse to the name, the 'authenticity' of first person
narrative cannot be guaranteed. Authority which the first person
text has as history, initially is posited as being a product of
the I, but, subsequently, is seen to depend on the revealing of
an identity formally conferred by the other. Like Lubbock,
Lejeune prefers to deal with 'a pair of eyes known and named',
for the refusal or the inability to name, not only subverts the
text, but also the humanist ideology of the self which is seen to
be the foundation of first person narrative. The system of
values which had claimed iconic status for the I, but which, in
fact, sought refuge in the socially determined patronym, is laid
bare. Authority no longer lies with the self, but with the
other. The ideology which would uphold the supremacy of the
subject, ultimately, validates the subject only when it has
become securely objectified within the social order. Lejeune's
assertion that 'le sujet profond de 1'autobiographie, c'est le
nom propre' (33) is revealing for it encapsulates the schism
implicit in this ideology. Autobiography becomes not the history
of an I, but of the name as the final repository of identity, of
meaning. Names, however, are not directly motivated signs and
are in themselves arbitrary designations, functioning only as
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part of a larger system. They can only 'stand for1, and as such
draw attention to the absence of their object. To designate the
name as locus of the self, is to assert the power of the social
over the private, while paradoxically claiming to value the self
as the origin of subjectivity.
The ambivalence created by this fetishistic attachment to
the name is examined by Barthes in 'Proust et les noms'.s He
details the three properties which supposedly adhere to the name:
'le pouvoir d'essentialisation (puisqu'il ne ddsigne qu'un seul
referent), le pouvoir de citation (puisqu'on peut appeler h
discretion toute 1'essence enfermde dans le nom, en le
profdrant), le pouvoir d'exploration (puisque 1'on "ddplie" un
nom propre exactement comme on fait d'un souvenir)'. He goes on:
'Le Nom propre est en quel que sorte la forme linguistique de la
reminiscence' (124). Barthes underlines notions of power and of
plenitude which are attached to the name. It is to be argued
however that the power and plenitude by means of which the name
assumes its authority are not properties of the named, but of the
namer. He who names has power over discourse. To be named is to
be recognised by that power and to be permitted entry into the
discursive space; the I becomes anchored as a socially
constituted referent. Subsequently, to name oneself in
discourse, is to repeat the process of naming by the other, and
to acquiesce to its power. The failure or incapacity to name
oneself may be interpreted as an act of subversion by refusing
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the authority of the other's discourse, or it may reflect the
fact that discourse has not recognised the subject in the first
place and, consequently, the subject is unable to occupy
discursive space. Unrecognised by discourse, the unnamed
'subject' cannot be spoken about and his status as an emitter of
discourse (the function of the I) is provisional and sporadic.
Once named, the subject is allowed entry into the economic
system of discourse. As a unit of exchange, the named subject
forms part of its system of signs. As a unit of value, however,
its nature is of a different order. Its value is not a
reflection of the self, but of the self as it is constituted by
that which lies outside. For the I to become more than just the
paradigm of its linguistic traits, it must be established as a
signifier within the prevailing order of values, and it is this
order which is the determinant of the self as meaning. The name
may be seen as a bridge between the self and the other, but it is
a bridge built by the other and governed by it. This dimension
is concealed by a humanist view of the self. For Barthes, the
name is the illusory locus of the identification of the self. He
writes:
Ce qui donne 1'illusion que la somme [i.e. the
sum total of the semic traits apportioned to
the 'subject'] est supplements d'un reste
pr6cieux (quelquechose comme 1'individuali te,
en ce que qualitative, ineffable, elle
echapperait a la vulgaire comptabilitd des
characteres composants), c'est le Norn Propre,
la difference remplie de son propre... Des
lors qu'il existe un Norn (fut-ce un prenom)
vers quoi affluer et sur quoi se fixer, les
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s&mes deviennent des pr^dicats, inducteurs de
v6rite et le Nom devient sujet.9
The notion of the name becoming the subject is radically
different to the common sense view that, conversely, the subject
is endowed with a name. It follows on that the novel, the most
bourgeois of genres, should incorporate the fetish of the name
into its structure. Barthes continues: 'On peut dire que le
propre du r<§cit n'est pas 1'action, mais le personnage comme Nom
propre' (197). The fiction of the 'well-rounded' character rests
on the presence of the name which conceals the status of the
subject as a property of discourse. As long as the subject
remains unnamed, it cannot exist. To be named, is to submit to
the power of a pre-existing order which calls the subject into
being, and the myth of the self as unique essence is destroyed.
The result of this is conveyed by Barthes in his remarks on the
narrator of A la recherche du temps perdu: 'Toute subversion ou
toute soumission romanesque commence done par le Nom propre; si
precise - si bien pr6cis<§e - que soit la situation sociale du
narrateur proustien, son absence de nom, peri 11eusement
entretenue, provoque une deflation capitale de 1'illusion
r^aliste' (102).
The ambivalent status which the first person pronoun enjoyed
in the work of Lubbock, Hamburger and Romberg is sought out and
pursued by Benveniste and Barthes. To use Hamburger's metaphor,
the first person pronoun is 'overshadowed' by the narrative and,
paradoxically, it is the narrative and its code which afford
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status to the first person rather than the converse being true.
Discourse and narrative are social, ideological constructs which
engender the subject, and the relationship of the subject to
narrative is inevitably defined by the latter. In order to
secure the I's place in discourse, there appears to be an eternal
forestalling taking place. The supplement of biographical detail
and, in particular, the name exist a priori to the emergence of
the subject. First person narrative is a narrative of constant
loss and attempted retrieval of 'la difference remplie de son
propre1, a difference dependent on and constructed by that which
lies outside the self. The conflict seems to fuse in the
symbolic function attributed to the name which would give the I a
unique referent, embedding it within discourse, yet offering
connotations of individual specificity. The symbolic dimension
of the name, however, constitutes an extra-text with which a
dialogue must be instigated if the I is to signify.
In his brief introduction to Dialoqhi con Leuc6, Pavese
alludes to the act of naming in a way which preempts that which
Barthes was to say: 'Quando ripetiamo un nome proprio, un gesto,
un prodigio mitico, esprimiamo in mezza riga, in poche sillabe,
un fatto sintetico e comprensivo, un mi dollo di realty che
vivifica e nutre tutto un organismo di passione, di stato umano,
tutto un complesso concettuale. Se poi questo nome, questo gesto
ci k familiare fin dal11infanzia, dalla scuola - tanto
megliol'.io The three forms of power (essentialisation,
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citation, exploration) said by Barthes to adhere to the name are
evoked, but also through the use of the verb 'ripetere1, Pavese
links the act of naming to the act of reminiscence, as Barthes
had done. For the traditional critic, these two factors (the
name and memory) were essentially unproblematic, abuses of them
serving only to undermine the authority of the text. In Pavese's
La 1 una e i fal6, however, the unproblematic nature of these
factors is put into question, to demonstrate the way in which any
first person text is centred round the absence of the I as
subject rather than a projection of the fullness of subjectivity.
The narrator of La 1 una e i fal6 does not present his
autobiography to the reader as a totalizing life experience. His
return to Gaminella may be interpreted as an attempt to seek out
such a biography, but it proves to be an attempt doomed to
failure, for the narrator is unable to construct the vital
framework for his life by furnishing himself, and the reader,
with the necessary factual information surrounding his origins,
the 'birth certificate1 of which Romberg speaks. The narrator's
omission in not naming himself does not aim to secure anonymity,
but represents the failure of the narrator to attain the fullness
implicit in the autobiographical form. He aspires to this notion
of fullness in his search, but the discourse of society works to
confound his aim. The anxiety and alienation experienced by the
I resulting from this incapacity is the major feature of this
novel, structured round the omission of the name.
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The search for a coherent entity or self is presented not in
the form of an end product, but as an ongoing process.
Chronological oscillations of the narrative which contradict the
traditional notions of the form as a life unfolding, demonstrate
not only the fragmentary nature of the past as it is filtered
through memory, but determine a narrative logic which is of a
spatial rather than of a temporal nature. The narrator of the
text does not strive to achieve the status of a paper I by trying
to conceal his persona within the text, but instead offers an
extensive amount of information concerning his past. Indeed his
apparent fascination for naming people and places belonging to
his past, renders the absence of his own name more significant.
However to claim, as Heiney does, that the narrator of La 1 una e
i fal6 is 'unnamed' is to overlook the fact that in spite of
lacking the solidity of a patronym, the narrator is referred to
by three 'nicknames' which correspond to three different stages
of his life and to different geographical locations.n All of
these names, in some way, allude to his position as an outsider,
and are connected to the economic role which he occupies in
society.
On his return from the United States, he is known as
'L'Americano', a term which owes much more to his recently
acquired wealth than to the fact that he has visited the USA.
His attitude to this is ambivalent, for he says: 'Per uno che e
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parti to senza nemmeno averci un nome, dovrebbe piacermi, e
infatti mi pi ace. Ma non basta' (10). His search is riot
identified with the accumulation of wealth, but with the need for
an original signifier which will transcend the limitations of an
externally defined system of values.
As a child he is known as 1i1 bastardo', a name which goes
beyond his illegitimacy to highlight the fact that his adoptive
parents are paid by the 'municipio' to maintain him, and he is
thus reduced to a unit of currency in the family economy. His
initial feelings of worth are transformed upon realising that
only the very lowest classes partake of this transaction, and
that he has, in fact, been rejected by the rest of society.12
The narrator's attitude towards his illegitimacy is ambiguous.
On the one hand, it would appear to destine him to a rootless
existence, pushing him forward in his impossible quest, while at
other times, he seems to exalt (albeit with a hint of bitterness)
in his status as a foundling.
Tuo padre - mi disse(Nuto) - sei tu.
- In America - dissi - c'& di bello che sono
tutti bastardi.
- Anche questa - fece Nuto - & una cosa da
aggiustare. Perche ci dev'essere chi non ha
nome n£ casa? Non siamo tutti uomini?
- Lascia le cose come sono. Io ce I'ho fatta
anche senza nome. (12)
The myth of the foundling is of dual dimensions. While it
offers the individual the potential of self creation, the self-
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begotten man, it also creates a void which can be determined as
an area of non-meaning, affording the self only indeterminate
social status. In La Luna e i fald, the possession of a name is
inextricably linked to material factors which in turn confer the
sense of the fullness of belonging. Reflecting on the past
causes the narrator to remark: 'Se mi mettevo a pensare a queste
cose non la finivo piu perchd mi tornavano in mente tanti fatti,
tante voglie, tanti smacchi passati e le volte che avevo creduto
di essermi fatta una sponda, di avere degli amici e una casa, di
potere addirittura metter su nome e piantare un giardino1 (41).
In this society, personal identity as a construct is dependent on
status within the economic order. Of il Cavaliere, the narrator
writes: 'mi raccontd che per molte ragioni non poteva vendere la
vigna - perchd era 1'ultima terra che portasse il suo nome,
perch& altrimenti sarebbe finito in casa d'altri' (35). In this
society status and name are hereditary, and as a bastard, the
narrator lacks both.
The name with which the narrator most closely identifies, is
however 'Anguilla', coined during his stay at La Mora. It has
its origins in the place where the narrator first attained an
independent role in his society: 'In Garninella non ero niente,
alia Mora imparai un mestiere. Qui piu nessuno mi pari6 delle
cinque lire del municipio, 1'anno dopo non pensavo gid piu a
Cossano - ero Anguilla e mi guadagnavo la pagnotta' (61). This
name is not the narrator's by right but is bestowed by others
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upon him. Through the act of naming is recognised the existence
of another, but the recognition remains ever provisional, for
what has been given, can be taken away. On his return from the
U.S.A., the narrator's anxiety to address himself by this name,
represents his anxiety to be again recognised by that society.
By repeating this name, he seeks to repeat the bestowal of
identity, the ritual of naming which had taken place in time
past, but since which time, has lost its value as a signifier.
By means of this name, he tries to evoke a wealth of past
significations, but is engulfed by silence and emptiness. Those
for whom he had once signified, are now dead, and unlike David
Copperfield, the narrator has no tombstones on which to seek
confirmation of their existence, and of his.
The following remarks by Dale Spender seem to highlight the
issue:
Names which cannot draw on past meanings are
meaningless. New names, then, have their
origins in the perspective of those doing the
naming rather than in the object or event that
is being named, and that perspective is the
product of the prefigured patterns of language
and thought. New names systematically
subscribe to old beliefs, they are locked into
principles that already exist and there seems
no way out of this even if those principles are
inadequate or false.13
Anguilla is thus trapped. Named by the 'old beliefs', he is
dependent on these beliefs for a continuing identity, but those
very beliefs had originally marginalised him on account of his
illegitimacy. Illegitimacy is regarded as a form of
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transgression which is punished, by pushing the transgressor to
the margins of discourse through which identity is constructed.
Culler writes, 'Even the idea of personal identity emerges
through the discourse of a culture: the "I" is not something
given but comes to exist as that which is addressed by and
relates to others1.14 Within the parameters of the narrator's
cultural baggage, the physical space occupied by the self is not
construed as the locus of a transcendental ego, but as the
embodiment of a function, dependent on the materialist order of
society.
While it has been argued here that in La luna e i fald, the
narrator's search for identity hangs on his identification with
the name, Fernandez in L'echec de Pavese puts forward an
alternative view.is Rather than accepting that the I is in
search of a name, he maintains that the I is, in fact, in flight
from the authority of the name. He writes: 'La tyrannie du nom
gate 1'euphorie du vagabondage' (252). In the work of Pavese,
the escape from the tyranny of the name, is associated with the
figure of the 'ragazzo'. For Fernandez, the boy is essentially
trying to flee his society, in order to assert his identity, and
in order to achieve this, the renunciation of the name is of
paramount importance: 'Rien d'dtonnant, done, si parmi 1es
m^canismes de fuite mis en oeuvre par le jeune gargon, un des
plus importants consiste h fuir son nom propre, h le perdre'
(253). As an example of this Fernandez, cites the flight of
Cinto in La Luna e i fa!6 from the female voices which call him
in vain. By thus refusing to accept the name, the boy is
refusing to accept the order or the discourse through which he is
named. This order is, however, according to Fernandez not a
patriarchal one, the law of the father, but instead is
constituted around the voice of the mother. A name which no
longer functions as a sign is referred to by Fernandez as 'un nom
consumd', and of this phenomenon he writes, 'un nom "consume",
c'est un nom qui ne correspond plus a rien, un nom vidd de son
contenu qui n'a plus de proprietaire, une depouille morte;
symbole de la victoire du ragazzo sur le despotisme des voix
maternelles' (253).
Fernandez draws attention to the area of sexual difference
in the writing of Pavese which is undoubtedly problematic, but it
is questionable to argue that the origins of and solutions to
this problem are to be uncovered in the realm of matriarchal
power. In La 1 una e i fal6 there is no suggestion that the
narrator is in flight from maternal oppression, and Cinto's
flight can better be seen as a flight from the poverty and
violence of a family disenfranchised, rather than as an attempt
to escape the sway of women's power. Indeed in La 1 una e i fal6,
mother figures seem all but absent, nevertheless, it must be
conceded that there is a polarisation of female gender roles.
Fernandez himself states: 'Le ragazzo ne se changerait pas en
uomo sans la violence exercde du dehors par 1'autre sexe' (328).
The passage from boyhood to manhood seems to involve a
confrontation with the sexuality of women, a confrontation which
is seen by Fernandez at least, as an act of violence performed by
women on men. A reading of La luna e i fa!6 would seem to belie
this conclusion.
Initially, the narrator seems to posit a dual categorisation
of women. On the one hand, there are the 'positive' female
characters of Gaminella and la Mora who are associated with
values such as love, warmth, the-family, and work, forming a
network of meaning related to the narrator's childhood and early
adolescence. Conversely, there are the prostitutes of Canel1i
who would appear to represent a different order of things. They
are objects of desire to which the narrator is increasingly
attracted. They are one of the lures which lead him first to
Genova, and then to America, but contact with the initially
unobtainable object of desire leads, inevitably, to disillusion
and frustration. The frustration culminates in his relationships
with American women whose own seemingly rootless existence
parallels the narrator's own, thereby denying him the
satisfaction which he seeks. Satisfaction denied, the hierarchy
of sexual desire is reversed. Man is no longer the desiring
subject, but the desired object. Woman is predatory: - 'cerca la
sua soddisfazione davanti alle amiche, cerca l'uomo' (14) - and
also conspiratorial.
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The so-called 'violence exercee du dehors par 1'autre sexe'
seems to consist in the destruction of the androcentric division
of the female subject which would have her as a symbol of
absolute purity or of absolute evil. The narrator's
retrospective assessment: 'La cosa che non mi capacitava a quei
tempi, era che tutte le donne sono fatte in un modo, tutte
cercano un uomo' (72), suggests the triumph of the whore over the
mother. The problem is made more complex, however, as he
expresses his stupefaction at the fact that the sexual act might
be pleasing to all women, 'anche le piu signore' (72). By
introducing the dimension of social class into the debate, the
narrator has focussed on the true locus of the regulation of
female sexuality - the function which it has in the economic
system.
That female sexuality does not express itself in, but
through, the ideology of society may be seen if the 'fate' of the
three sisters of 'La Mora' is examined. It is said that 'sor
Matteo aveva avuto la mania delle donne' (63), and Nuto and the
narrator speculate on the number of children with which they
might have furnished the world. Both these facts are viewed
positively. The 'promiscuity' of the sisters is treated very
differently. The textual representation of the three sisters is
based on antithesis. On the one hand, they are characterised by
their beauty, aloofness and refinement, but early in the novel,
we also learn that Silvia 'era una scema che cascava con tutti'
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(56), and that later, Santa 'teneva allegre le brigate nere'. It
is within these parameters that the text delineates their demise.
For the narrator, the wealth of La Mora provides a sharp
contrast with the poverty he had previously known. What has been
imagined by the narrator as a state of satisfaction is shown only
to create greater dissatisfaction. This is the first glimpse by
the narrator of the universal state of desire. The status and
well-being enjoyed by Silvia and Irene are not enough. Like the
narrator, they wish to escape, and for them, greater social
status and man are symbols of this desire. Because of the fact
that sor Matteo has no direct male descendants, the dual values
of family and property are threatened. In order to secure these
values, marriage must be their goal. Female sexuality is thus
subservient to the demands of reproduction and of ownership.
This is where the value of woman lies and where her position in
the discourse of society is constructed. All three women,
however, refuse to accept this articulation of their value, and
their subsequent conduct signifies an act of transgression of
this code.
The 'moral1 decay of Silvia is followed by a period of
mental and physical decay for her and her family. Her
transgression of society's values is treated punitively, and the
text inscribes the inevitable end of the subject who refuses to
be subject to society's discourse i.e. death, the final locus of
101
non-meaning. The assertion of female sexuality subverts the
ideology of patriarchy which must assume control of sexuality in
order to ensure the survival of its values. It is through the
figure of Santa that this ideology and its limits are most
clearly articulated. Again she is characterised by her beauty
and, therefore, is both an object of desire and of value for men.
She rejects her assigned role and is castigated by Nuto as 'la
cagnetta e la spia' (56). She betrays man twice over, both
sexually and politically, refusing to take sides in man's war.
Her punishment for this violation is, therefore, twofold, as she
is shot and then burned in the novel's final annihilatory image
of non-meaning, a symbol of the conflict between the would-be
subject and the authority of discourse. As Fernandez states 'i1
ne faut pas moins de deux morts successives pour lui faire payer
la faute d'etre une femme' (346). The text articulates the
ultimate sanction imposed on the transgressor of the authority of
the father, signifying the final erasure of the self from
discourse. As signifiers in the discourse of authority, the
names of Silvia and Santa do not signify a full historical
identity, but point to an absence which, in turn, points to the
site of transgression.
It might be concluded that Fernandez is right in attesting
to 'la tyrannie du nom propre', but it is for reasons other than
those suggested by him. Tyranny is not exercised by 'les voix
maternelles', but by the law of patriarchy which may authorise or
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proscribe the attribution of the name, or of its signification in
discourse. The narrator must remain nameless because of his
illegitimacy which excludes him from the rights of property on
which the discourse of authority is grounded. He will forever be
motivated by 'la rabbi a di non essere nessuno1 because,
effectively, he can never occupy full discursive space. Subjects
who have been positively defined e.g. Silvia, Irene, Santa and
the cavaliere's son lose their power of signification when they
violate the boundaries of authority, and this loss of meaning is
symbolised by death.
It should not be supposed, however, that only those who
transgress the limits of authority are denied full subjectivity.
The figure of Nuto illustrates the paradox of the self as subject
in and subject to discourse. Initially, Nuto is seen as a
potentially subversive figure. Politically aware of the
exploitative nature of society, he earns his living as a musician
on the margins of that society. On his father's death, he
abandons a marginal position and adopts the role of his father in
order to enter the dominant discourse. Of his decision Nuto
says: 'prima cosa suonando se ne portano a casa pochi, e poi che
tutto quello spreco e non sapere mai bene chi paga, alia fine
disgusta' (13). He, at first, indicates the marginal nature of
his position by the fact that it does not bring wealth, but then
expresses disgust at the fact that the economic origins of the
life he enjoyed were so ill-defined. The need is to make money,
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to exert paternity and thus Nuto becomes intricated in the values
of society, a subject to, not a subject in its discourse.
In order to give any meaning to himself and to the world,
the statement-subject must construct a narrative. Paradoxically,
it is the narrative which in turn works to engender the subject
in its discourse, as it defines positions of meaning,
identification and desire. If the subject is to subvert this
process of definition by the other, he must forge an alternative
set of symbolic meanings. The narrator of La 1 una e i fal6
adopts this strategy to combat the meanings of authority and to
try to construct his own discursive space.
The retrieval of the self from the miasma of meaning/non-
meaning must, of necessity, be accomplished through the use of
language which already is a tool of the other and not of the
self. Power is exerted through naming. The I, therefore, in
order to create new meanings, is obliged to name, albeit with
names already worn from constant use. In order to achieve a
private order of meaning, the narrator chooses to reverse that
order and meaning of things which he had known as a child. As
will be seen, this reversal is necessarily based on the pre¬
existing terms of the other whose strength is demonstrated by the
narrator's failure to rename things other than they were.
The complexity of the symbolism of La 1 una e i fal6 is a
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result of the fact that it represents the locus of the conflict
between private and public meaning. The moon of the title is
endowed with a symbolic, cultural meaning which associates it
with permanency, cyclical time and the supernatural. The
narrator rejects these meanings, but they are defended by Nuto
who values them as a symbolic link between the earth and the
community, an embodiment of a shared culture. For the narrator,
however, the moon is more importantly a symbol of his desire to
escape from the confines of his poverty. It is, nevertheless, a
symbol which reflects both illusion and subsequent disillusion, a
symbol of desire itself more than a symbol of a desired object.
The symbolism of the bonfires, too, functions in a similar
manner. The annual ritual promises fertility, and also
symbolises the cyclical continuity of the seasons. This process
serves to suggest the inclusion of the individual and the
community within the natural order, whereas for the narrator, the
bonfires represent his exclusion from the world of adults, but
also act as a focal point for the channelling of his desire. The
impossibility of desire is inscribed in its insatiability, the
only cessation of desire being found in death. The conflicting
image of the bonfire renders complex any interpretation of the
deaths by fire of II Valino and Santa. It may be possible that
they represent the destruction of the share-cropping system and
the corrupt political order, thus symbolising the birth of a
brighter future, but such an interpretation ignores the cost to
the individual. The reading of the bonfire as a symbol of
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fertility overpowers and cancels out the struggle to create new
meaning.
The narrator's struggle to articulate alternative meanings
to those already present in discourse is founded on the attempted
articulation of desire. The desire for the other is developed by
means of an internalised metonymic chain of imagery; 'I noccioli
e la capra', il fischio del treno', 1i grilli e i rospi1 and
Nuto's 'clarino' serve as mediators between the desiring subject
and the desired object. The mobility of these signifiers,
invested only with a private signification, is subject to
constant displacement and revision. They are signifiers of a
desire which is itself founded on the displacement of the subject
within discourse, and as such, have no power to fix meaning.
That which does not signify, does not exist and its status as a
signifier can only be illusory. Nuto's abandonment of the
clarinet is a clear example of the way in which the symbols of a
marginalised discourse must be laid aside, if the self is to be
recognised as subject.
The attempt to locate meaning outside of discourse is
exemplified by the narrator's mythification of geographical
space. The narrator's past 'self' had created a hierarchy of
location which had placed Garninella as the site of non-meaning,
ascending via La Mora, Canel1i and Genova until finally
culminating in the myth of America which is posited as the space
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of full signification for the desiring subject. Desire and
reality, inevitably, fail to coincide as the farther the narrator
travels from the site of his original confrontation with the
other, the less able he is to construct a meaningful space for
his self. Significantly, the partial identity which he had
secured in Gaminella and La Mora as 'i 1 bastardo' and 'Anguilla'
is completely negated in America where he is not named at all,
except as a 'wop1. Asked by Rosanne why he chooses not to become
an American citizen, he replies 'Perchd non lo sono... because
I'm a wop1 (86). Once again the self finds itself negatively
defined.
In order to retrieve the self from the anonymity of
discourse, the narrator must reverse this self-constructed
hierarchy, recognising that whatever meaning the self may have,
is constituted at the original point of entry into discourse.
Thus America becomes the symbol of absolute alienation, of non-
meaning, and Gaminella and La Mora are posited as the sites of
original plenitude as the narrator returns, in order to
reconstruct, to repeat his entry into discourse. His attempted
reintegration is structured around his identification with the
name - 'sono Anguilla' - but in order to regain this position, he
must also reconstruct the space and conditions on the basis of
which his identity was recognised. It is a struggle to restore
'le nom consume' to a position of meaning, to revive 'la
ddpouille morte'. Indeed it is a fight against death itself, for
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the text decrees death as the logical extension of the descent
into non-meaning, of the failure to signify within the ideology
upon which discourse is constructed.
Heiney states that for Pavese's characters 'death is less a
result of disease or common human mortality than a conscious
renegation, a failure to belong to life or find a place in it'.is
While this argument may be valid up to a point, the suggestion of
the heroic suicide implied by the phrase 'conscious renegation'
belies the fact that death is not elected, but comes to signify
the absence of the self and its alienation from a valid position
of statement - subject. It represents the inevitable erasure of
the self by the other. The 'death' of the narrator is pre-empted
by the decay of la Mora and by the conflagration which engulfs il
Valino's farm. The destruction of these places which were the
sites from which the narrator first entered discourse represents
the final eradication of the self as meaning. Gaminella and La
Mora no longer occupy the same position as sigm'fiers within the
discourse of society and, therefore, the process of renaming
cannot be accomplished.
The parallel function of the name and of memory posited by
Barthes is echoed in other writings on the subject of first
person narrative. Lubbock stresses this in his remarks on David
Copperfield while Romberg, as we have seen, notes the importance
of memory in the construction of the 'perfect fictional memoir'.
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He also writes 'The perspective of recollection and an epic
situation long after the events are two important elements in a
first person novel that has the character of a memoir. The
narrator knows how the narrative will end when he begins to give
a sketch and account of his life.1 (43) Genette in his 'Discours
du r^cit' characterises 'narration ult^rieure' i.e. retrospective
narration, as being typical of the first person form. In the
same way that the name was to form a continuum linking the past
and present selves, so too the act of memory serves to gather
together all the narrator's Is which are scattered through the
unfolding of time. Dorrit Cohn, too, lays stress on the
empirical continuity which binds past and present selves, while
Pavese also has written: 'Se si racconta in prima persona &
evidente che il protagonista deve sapere fin dall'inizio come la
sua avventura andr& a finire.'i7 Once again we find that we have
left the realm of literature for that of real life.
The difficulty with this approach is highlighted by Ulla
Musarra Schroeder: - 'caract£ristiquement 1'activite mdmorative
n'est presque jamais th£matis6e et le h6ros-narrateur dirige son
attention, non sur le processus memoratif et ses possibles
r^ussites ou tehees mais directement sur 1'action k raconter'.io
Retrospective self-narration thus eschews the problem of
verisimilar recollection, and adopts a form which owes more to
the demands of narrative than to those of real life. Musarra
Schroeder goes on; 'la logique des dv^nements racontds prddomine
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sur la logique d'une m^moire en activitd' (29). Narrative thus
constructs its own sequence which overrides the priorities of
memory, therefore, constructing the subject according to its
demands, and not according to the expression of subjectivity.
Cohn herself points to another paradox of retrospective self-
narration when she alludes to 'the present, verbal act that can
never recapture the non-verbal reality of past experience1.19
The past retold is, necessarily, a past transformed according to
a narrative structure which in some way imposes its ideology in
order to mould a meaning which was not understood at the moment
of happening.
A radical splitting between the experiencing I and the
narrating I is established as the latter strives to contain the
former within a closed system of meaning. To remember is to
narrate and to narrate is to try to recuperate a fixity of
meaning which will establish the self as a given of discourse.
The I is posited a priori to the writing of the text, but
paradoxically, it is the writing and the subsequent reading of
the text which will apportion meaning to the self. To remember
the past is, in a sense, to read past events and erect a logic of
narrative structuring these events. However, reading is a
hazardous activity, for the text constantly conceals meaning and
is recalcitrant to imprisonment. Charles Kemnitz writes: 'Like
Lot's wife, personal narrators look back and usually are changed
by the very act of looking. Fortunately, the fate of the
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personal narrator is not one of eternal silence; rather looking
back allows an exploration and articulation of the foreignness of
the past by freezing the reality, into something that "will never
change".'20 He would seem to assert that the construction of a
narrative of the self somehow arrests the movement of time, the
flux of non-being through the establishment of a discourse of the
self. Like Romberg and his concept of a static epic situation,
Kemnitz seems to underestimate the fact that narrative is process
rather than product. Narrative not only engages time past, but
is also a time consuming activity, and a memory is as much a
phenomenon of the present as an encapsulation of the past. To
achieve signification, memory must be verbalised, and this
process necessitates a confrontation with the ideology of the
other. Like the name, it, therefore, becomes a property of
discourse and its three properties (essentialisation, citation,
exploration) rest dependent on it.
Implicitin the traditional concept of memory narrative as
the account of a life unfolding is the idea that an older, wiser
narrator looks back on his younger naiver self, secure in the
knowledge of what will happen next, and able to reflect on the
limited knowledge of his younger self. Life is considered to be
essentially a learning experience, wisdom and knowledge being
acquired with age. This is recognised by the narrator of La luna
e i fa!6, but is immediately problematised in the following
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passage:
'Un paese vuol dire non essere soli, sapere che
nella gerite, rielle pi ante, nella terra c'&
qualcosa di tuo, che anche quando non ci sei
resta ad aspettarti. Ma non & facile starci
tranquillo. Da un anno che lo tengo d'occhio e
quando posso ci scappo da Genova, mi sfugge di
mano. Queste cose si capiscono col tempo e
11esperienza. Possibile che a quarant'anni, e,
con tutto il mondo che ho visto, non sappia
ancora che cos'& il mio paese?1 (9)
Here the idea of memory as knowledge is put into question. The
first chapter of the novel in many ways serves as an ending, for
the failure of the narrator's search to find 'himself' is clearly
stated. The narrator may well 'know' the sequence of events
which go together to form his life, but he is not able to
attribute meaning to them. The benefit of his hindsight is of
only a partial nature. From his present standpoint, he is able
to reinterpret past positions - 'Adesso sapevo che eravamo dei
miserabili' (9) - but he also must admit that there are things
which he had forgotten.
"Io sono scemo - dicevo - da vent'anni me ne
sto via e questi paesi mi aspettano." Mi
ricordai la delusione ch'era stata camminare la
prima volta per le strade di Genova - ci
camminavo nel mezzo e cercavo un po' d'erba.
Cera il porto, questo si, c'erano le facce
delle ragazze, c'erano i negozi e le banche, ma
un canneto, un odor di fascina, un pezzo di
vigna, dov'erano? Anche la storia del la 1 una e
dei fald la sapevo. Soltanto m'ero accorto,
che non sapevo piu di saperla. (40)
The recognition that one has forgotten opens a gap in the
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narrative constructed by memory. The gap evokes loss and absence
thus threatening the wholeness which the narrative would
construct, undermining the status of the narrative as a product
of this wholeness. The passage quoted also illustrates the fact
that it is not, in fact, the present I of the narrator who is
remembering, but the I of 'l'altro anno quando tornai la prima
volta in paese' (8). The narrator narrates, but is not
remembering. This privilege belongs to an other I who acts as a
mediator between the narrator and the past. This past I is, in
fact, only one of the prisms by means of which the narrator tries
to gain access to the past. Memory in La 1 una e i fal6 is not a
privileged means of recuperating the past. It functions not as
an internal subjective phenomenon, but is activated when the
subject comes into contact with the real. Discussing his
relationship with the past the narrator remarks: 'Bisogna averci
fatto le ossa, averla nelle ossa come il vino e la polenta,
allora la conosci senza bisogno di parlarne, e tutto quello che
per tanti anni ti sei portato dentro senza saperlo si sveglia
adesso al tintinnio di una martinicca, al colpo di coda di un
bue, al gusto di una minestra, a una voce che senti sulla piazza
di notte1 (41).
The physical contingency which evokes the past self escapes
the confines of narrative recollection, for the relationship is
not expressed in language. That which is established through
this contact is not a refound self which would signify outside of
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time and of discourse but an I which is specified as an other.
'Per tanti anni mi era bastata una ventata di tiglio la sera, e
mi sentivo un altro, mi sentivo davvero io, non sapevo nemmeno
bene perch&.' (103). Involuntary memory provokes a rupture in
the narrative through which the narrator tries to bind together
his former selves. It escapes the meaning which the narrator
seeks to discover, forcing a gap which demonstrates the absence
of wholeness and plenitude: 'E un caldo che mi pi ace, sa un
odore: ci sono dentro anch'io a quest'odore, ci sono dentro tante
vendemmie e fienagioni e sfogliature, tanti sapori e tante voglie
che non sapevo piu d'avere addosso' (22). To belong to a world
of things again suggests the domination of place over time.
Subjectivity becomes objectified and dispersed through a series
of metonymic relationships which defy the process of unification
which the act of recollection pursues. The narrator asks:
'potevo spiegare a qualcuno che quel che cercavo, era soltanto di
vedere qualcosa che avevo gict visto?' (42). Memory is an
activity of the present involving the setting up of a narrative
between the present and the past, but to 'see again' is to try to
instigate the conditions of the original confrontation with the
real through which the subject was defined in the first place.
Fernandez claims that 'conoscere d riconoscere, vedere d
rivedere, le cose non si scoprono, se non attraverso i ricordi
che di esse si hanno', but the narrator's memory is too
fragmented for such a project to meet with success.2i
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The repetition of the past is not adequately accomplished
through memory but necessitates a physical confrontation; herein
lies the sense of the narrator's (physical) return to Gaminella,
through which he tries to reconstruct a text of the past not
about the past. A full reconstruction would require the
landscape through which the narrator identifies himself to be
populated, not only by things, but also by the people who had
constructed the identity of the past self. Those people are,
however, dead and with them has died the discourse through which
the narrator had his subjectivity (albeit partial and limited)
articulated. Thwarted by this, the narrator must try to erect a
homologous structure in the present. In order to achieve this
end, he initiates a process of self-identification with other
characters. The figure of Cinto is particularly important in
this respect. The process begins on the narrator's first
sighting of the boy: 'Avr& avuto dieci anni, e vederlo su
quell'aia era come vedere me stesso' (24). The association of
Cinto with Gaminella augments the parallel as the narrator
attempts to discern a repetition of the structures of his own
early life in those of Cinto. The position he adopts, becomes
contradictory however when he asserts: 'Mi sembrd essere un
altro. Parlavo con lui [Cinto] come Nuto aveva fatto con me'
(38). He is repeating the structures of the past but by changing
his position as subject within these structures his identity is
defined otherwise. Identity is not a position of subjectivity,
but is subject to the role which acts as the signifier. The
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notion of repetition also adheres to the notion of time as a
cyclical, seasonal phenomenon as represented in the symbolism of
the moon and the bonfires. Having failed to find a position as a
full subject within a linear historical conception of time, the
narrator adopts the notion of cyclical time as a kind of
transcendental signifier. The paradox here is that he must
accept a system of meaning based on the patriarchal law of the
father in order to achieve signification, when in fact, it was
this very order which had first denied him a position of full
subjectivity. To identify Cinto as past self, and to create the
conditions through which his subjectivity was expressed,
necessitates urging Cinto to reject life as inevitable and
cyclical and instil in him the desire to change. For cyclical
time to function as a transcendental signifier, the subject must
take on Nuto's role which does function within that order. For
the narrator, however, to repeat is to identify with the position
of Cinto, a position which obliges the subject to remain in a
marginal position in relation to that order of meaning. Given
this untenable position of the subject, time becomes the
dimension through which the individual experiences lack and
absence rather than full subjectivity.
The gap which is discerned by Fernandez between the boy and
the man seems to relate less to the problematics of sexuality
than to the realisation of the subject's lack of self. Childhood
which seems to occupy a privileged position within the narrator's
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discourse does so, not on account of any idyllic dimensions which
it may have possessed, but because it is the realm in which the
self had not recognised its lack of fullness, it is the realm of
'non-sapere1.22 In retrospect, the narrator recognises the
marginal status which he occupied there, but his terminology is
ambiguous: 'Capivo che da ragazzo, anche quando facevo correre
la capra, quando d'inverno rompevo con rabbi a le fascine
mettendoci il piede sopra, o giocavo, chiudevo gli occhi per
provare se riaprendoli la collina era scomparsa - anche allora mi
preparavo al mio destino, a vivere senza una casa, a sperare che
di 1& dalle col line ci fosse un paese piu bello e pi Ci ricco'
(33). To interpret one's life in terms of a personal destiny is
again to construct a narrative in order to attribute meaning, but
to do so, intimates a failure to recognise 'destiny' as a result
of historical forces. It is another aspect of the myth of the
self which proffers again the notion of individual specificity.
Only Nuto recognises the historical forces which shape
'destinies', but perhaps, for an already marginalised self, the
acceptance of such an ideology is too high a price to pay.
Another aspect of La 1 una e i fal6 goes to undermine the
concept of memory and the individual subject. To remember one's
past is to relate the past in terms of a personal mythology which
must remain consistent and whole, if it is to gain meaning. The
mythology created by the narrator is undermined by the discourse
of Nuto which acts as a dangerous supplement to the discourse of
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the narrator, splintering the surface of meaning which he had
sought to create. Just as the pattern of memory is disturbed by
that which the narrator confesses to having forgotten, so too, is
it further disrupted by the addition of that which he had never
known. Neri sees La 1 una e i fal6 as falling into two sections -
chapters 1-13 as 111evocazione del ricordo1 and chapters 14-32 as
11'attualizzazione del ricordo1.23 in fact much of the novel
does not consist of the narrator's memories at all, but rather
consists of Nuto's narration or the narrator's second-hand
narration of what Nuto said. Neri continues 'ci6 che era passato
diviene presente, vivo e attuale nella mente del narratore'.
This statement can only be accepted up to a point, for the past
which does become present for the narrator, is a past in the
process of a radical revision. It is a past strewn with death as
Nuto retells the grim fates of Padrino and his daughters and of
the family at La Mora. The past can no longer be identified as a
landscape of fullness, but is seen to be a wasteland of absence
and of loss. The supplement added by Nuto to the discourse of
the narrator alters the myth which the narrator tried to
construct, leaving him with a discourse populated by barren
symbols and emptiness. As Heiney says albeit in a different
context 'the bonfire of La 1 una e i fal6 and the ashes it leaves
behind are the narrator's final and annihilating image of
himself'.24 The novel effectively ends on the dual image of
silence and of death, for it is Nuto who has the last word and
his telling of Santa's fate negates the alternative symbolic
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discourse of the narrator. The performance of memory in La 1 una
e i fal6 does not resolve the quest of the I for a position of
full subjectivity. The process of retrieval destabilises and
decentres the I in a continual series of revision, supplements
and reversals.
To found a theory of first person narrative solely on
humanist principles is to avoid tackling the problematics of
narrative itself. A name and a memory cannot secure an identity
outside of language, for they can only function as part of
discourse. They cannot occupy the position of transcendental
signifiers for they are grounded in the very discourse which they
would stand outside.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Self, Discourse and History: a narratological
approach to II qiardino dei Finzi-Contini
In the previous two chapters, we examined the manner in
which identity was supposedly constructed through the unifying
effect of the first person pronoun with its attendant
constituents the name and, particularly, memory. We noted,
however, the fact that the I, in spite of its apparent unicity,
was ultimately determined by its relation to the other and by the
space constructed for it within that domaine of discourse. While
Nievo's narrator was found to be an historical object, dependent
on a referent external to itself in order to achieve
signification, Pavese's narrator, who has recourse to a personal
mythology in an attempt to flee history, discovers that he is
robbed of this personal mythology on account of its inevitable
definition in terms of the other. So far, we have treated the
issue in mainly thematic terms, but now our purpose is to examine
the ways in which the authority of the I might be said to be
undermined linguistically, by looking at the possibility of
discovering other voices, competing at the level of the text
itself. We shall try to discover the relationship between the I
and the words which are (re)produced by it in order to know more
regarding the manner in which a text may be mediated, or how the
raw material of 'life' is transcribed into language.
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In the first chapter of our study, we noted the importance
of Lubbock's statement that 'point of view' revolves essentially
around 'the question of the relation in which the narrator stands
to the story'.i For Lubbock, the difference between third and
first person narrative is crucial in that omniscience is forever
denied to a first person narrator owing to the demands of
verisimilitude and that, consequently, his task must be viewed
as, fundamentally, a reportorial one. His function is that of a
witness who can only recount events at which he was present or
alternatively account for his sources of information. The only
perspective available to a first person narrator is that of his
casting a retrospective glance on to the past. The narrative
function which the first person narrator embodies, is
inextricably linked to the notion of the first person narrator as
a real person and any infringement of the restrictions placed on
this limited 'point of view' serves only to violate, and hence,
reenforce the realist code on which such narratives are founded.
The only distinction perceived by Lubbock within this category,
is between the I who appears as the centre of interest, and the I
who serves as a witness of great events.2 His preference for the
second of these two modes is due to his belief in the
impossibility of self-representation, an avenue which he declines
to explore, but which is resonant with possibility.
As we have noted, the duality highlighted by Lubbock is
upheld by subsequent theorists. Friedman, Romberg and Genette
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al1 tend to the idea that there is a distinction to be made
between whether or not the focus of the narrative is on the
teller or the tale.3 However, merely to allude to this
distinction is not in itself sufficient, for it tells us nothing
of significance regarding the text. What we shall seek to do in
this chapter is to argue that the relation in which the narrator
stands to the story is a significant ideological feature, and
also that the manner in which the tale is told, bears a
significance beyond that of the purely narratological. We shall
contest the notion of the I as a "fixed centre' contending that
the I must be regarded, not only as the producer of the text, but
also as a product of it, and consequently, is as liable to
fragmentation, displacement and reversal as any other textual
signifier. It will be seen to have no privilege. The
coincidence in first person narrative of the I as narrator and
the I as character obscures the fact that the first person
pronoun is not inevitably the same, but can enjoy a multiplicity
of roles and of meaning. In order, therefore, to establish the
relation in which the narrator does stand to the story, it is
necessary to distinguish the various meanings of this signifier,
drawing attention to the differences inscribed within the text
and attempting to reconcile or contrast them with the idea of the
I as "fixed centre".
Firstly, we shall look more closely at the typologies of
Genette and to a lesser extent Stanzel , in order to ascertain the
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boundaries and value of broaching the question within a
narratological framework. Subsequently, we shall turn our
attention to a particular text, Bassani's II giardino dei Finzi-
Contini, with the aim of testing our findings and attempting to
go beyond them.
In 1Discours du rdcit', Genette offers an extensive analysis
of the relationship between the narrator and the text. His book
is divided into sections on Time, Mood and Voice, but it is the
latter two which interest us particularly, for it is here that he
insists on distinguishing between 'qui voit1 in a text and 'qui
parle', for, as he points out, the two are not necessarily
commensurate and an awareness of the distinction will prove
critical for an understanding of the way in which narrative
works.
In the section of his book entitled 'Voix', Genette probes
the relationship between the narrator and the narrative, a
relationship which involves a spatial and temporal dimension as
well as one of identification. Here Genette seeks to isolate
what he calls the 'instance narrative' by clarifying the link
between the act of narration and the 'histoire' i.e. the story in
its pre-narrativised state which appears to us as the 'rdcit',
through which our access to both is mediated.4 He begins by
discussing the 'temps de la narration' i.e. the temporal
relationship between the telling and the events recounted. He
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recognises four types: 1 u"lt£riore' , 'anterieure1 , 'simultande'
and 1intercal6e'. The first of these, where events are firmly
located in a time past, is obviously most common. The second
refers to a limited field of narratives told in the future tense
such as predictions. 'Narration simultan^e' occurs in the
present tense where the events related and the act of telling
take place simultaneously, while the fourth category refers to
instances where narrating and action are interspersed or layered,
as may be found in the diary or the epistolary genres. Genette
considers the first type to be almost inevitable in first person
narrative, but does not necessarily preclude the existence of the
others and examples are not difficult to find.s The actual gap,
however, in 'narration ult^riore' between the time of narration
and the time of the events narrated may often be left unstated,
and the fiction that the narrative act itself is of no duration
may be retained. It is also important to note that the temporal
relationship between narrator and events is common to all
narrative and no aspect can specifically be ascribed as
characteristic of narrative in the first person.
Genette's second category of classification seeks to
establish the 'niveaux narratifs' i.e. the level at which a tale
is told whether it be external or internal to the 'r^cit
primaire', the main narrative. If the telling lies outwith the
'r£cit primaire', Genette defines it as 'extradidgetique',
whereas a teller within the tale, operates at an
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1interdidgdtique' level. Again the point to stress is that there
is no inherent difference between first and third person texts
within this category, for both employ an extradiegetic narrator
whose performative narrative act is external to the events
themsel ves.
The final category posited by Genette is that of 'personne*
where, as has already been noted, he disputes the value of the
terms first and third person narrator on the grounds that, in
effect, any narrator can intervene in the narrative in the first
person.6 The distinction which he does draw, however, is whether
or not the narrator participates in the narrated events or, at
least, shares the same world. He coins the terms
1 hdt^rodi<§g6tique1 and 1 homodi6g6tique1 to express this
distinction before making a further subdivision within the latter
category to account for narratives in which the narrator is his
own subject. This form is referred to as 1autodi6getique'.
The main, and perhaps sole, advantage of Genette's method is
that it enables us to locate and define more precisely the
situation of the narrator, suggesting differences, but more
importantly, similarities between the narrator and his act in
first and in third person texts. Such similarities have been
overlooked by theorists who stress first person narrative as an
element of content.
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Having established the position of the narrator in relation
to the narrated events, it is now necessary to examine the means
by which event is transformed into narrative. The visual and
cognitive aspect of 'point of view1 is treated by Genette under
the category of 'Mode1.7 He discusses the channels through which
events are conveyed at the level of the 'rdcit', stressing that
this is indeed a variable factor. While pointing out that he is
stretching his grammatical metaphor, conceding that a narrative
can only be told in the indicative mood, he correctly notes that
all narrative is told relatively and that the degree of
affirmation or knowledge invoked is not the same in every text.
He divides the category of 'Mode' into 'distance' and
'perspective', the former dealing with the verbal means by which
events are related while the latter examines the angle from which
events are perceived.
He begins by dismantling the traditional dichotomy between
mimesis and diegesis, or the Jamesian variants of showing and
telling, demonstrating that they are variables which can be found
in any type of narrative.8 He does consider significant,
however, the means by which speech and thoughts may be reported,
for they represent the only element of 'histoire' which is
overtly linguistic, and consequently, their transposition to
1r^cit' is indicative of a given narrative stance on the part of
the narrator. He notes three means by which this transposition
may be made. Direct speech or 'discours rapportd' is the least
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mediated form, for it retains the structure of the original
utterance. Conversely, indirect speech or 1discours racontd' is
integrated into the narrative and only the content of the
original utterance remains. Between the two lies 'discours
transpose1 or free indirect speech, which incorporates the speech
act into the narrative while rendering the idiom of the speaker
distinct from the narrative itself.
In terms of the regulation of perception, Genette again
delineates three categories. The field of perception in a
'recit' can be completely unrestricted which Genette calls 1 non-
focal is<§'. Alternatively, it can be '& focal isati on interne'
where the perspective can be identified as belonging to one or
more of the characters in the narrative, or it can be
focalisation externe' where the characters are always perceived
from outside.9 He concedes that these restrictions need not
remain constant throughout a narrative and that they are, in
essence, always a narrative feint. Knowledge may be relative but
for Genette the narrator will inevitably know more that his
characters:
Le narrateur en 'sait' presque toujours pi usque
le hdros, meme si le heros c'est 1ui, et done
la focalisation sur le h£ros est pour le
narrateur une restriction de champ tout aussi
artificielle & la premidre personne qu'& la
troisidme.io (210-211)
It appears axiomatic that the narrator has authority over the
narrative, and that any dropping of this authority represents a
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narrative choice.
Genette's method which proceeds largely through the
construction of binary oppositions is, as we have noted,
contested by the work of Stanzel. He seeks to eradicate the
distinctions made by Genette by merging elements which Genette
had placed in separate camps. By introducing the notion of the
reflector-character who may be deemed to hold responsibility for
the narrative, Stanzel challenges the hegemonic position granted
to the narrating voice by Genette, and suggests a more complex
interpretation of narrative voice. While disputing the relevance
of the simple first person/third person dichotomy, Stanzel,
nevertheless, has recourse to binary categories within the
tripartite division of his typological circle. He writes:
What determines the nature of a particular
narrative situation is, above all, the first
person as a character in the novel in the first
person narrative situation, external
perspective in the authorial narrative
situation, and reflector-mode in the figural
narrative situation. (5)
His categories of person, mode and perspective do not, at
first sight, seem radically different from those of Genette, but
whereas Genette seeks simply to isolate elements of narrative
function, Stanzel aims to privilege particular factors in given
situations without admitting their specificity.
The efficacy of these two approaches will be examined later,
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for we shall attempt to make use of aspects of their typologies
in order to challenge the notion of the 'I as a fixed centre1.
We have already taken account of the fact that the 'I' is
inevitably split upon entering language, and it is an interesting
feature of first person discourse that a trace of the
'6nonciation' is borne in the '6nonc6' on account of the
coincidental merging of the two Is in the first person pronoun,
and consequently, the self's entry into language and its
subsequent erasure is constantly recorded. Yet, before going on
to discuss the linguistic dispersal of the "I1, we should perhaps
note the functions which Genette attributes to the 'I' as a
narrator and which seem to cross over narratological boundaries,
indicating the ideologically determined moment of the narrative
act. Whether or not the narrator may be posited as a textual
object, he nevertheless always fulfils certain functions.
Primarily, he has a 'fonction narrative' i.e. the task of telling
the tale.ii Secondly, there is the 'fonction de r6gie' which
concerns the internal organisation of the narrative and to which
the narrator may or may not make direct reference. Thirdly,
there is a 'fonction de communication' whereby a relationship is
instigated by the narrator with his audience. Genette also
underlines the 'fonction testimoniale' by means of which the
narrator seeks to establish a relationship with the events
narrated, a feature which we have already noted as particularly
significant in first person narrative. Finally, Genette
identifies a 'fonction iddologique' which serves to construct a
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value system which will regulate the context of the narrative.
Not all of these functions will be present to an equal
degree in any given text, but nor are they mutually exclusive.
Their existence, however, suggests that Genette acknowledges that
there is more to narration than his typology indicates.i3 All of
the functions identified by Genette add a deeper dimension to the
question of 'qui parle?1, for they allude to a difference between
narrative positions, and offer the possibility of viewing
narrative position as subject position which will vary depending
on the manner in which the subject addresses and is addressed by
language, the language of the Other. Genette's narrative
functions retain again the notion of authority, for they imply
that the narrator enacts these roles without exploring the
possibility that he is also enacted by them. This authority will
be contested by our discussion. Rather than viewing the first
person pronoun as a static signifier, we shall strive to identify
its moments of dislocation within the text which will then put
into question the authority of a no-longer stable signifier over
the text which it would produce. Firstly, we shall isolate the
"instance narrative1 of Bassani's novel, which we have chosen to
focus on here, by identifying the signs within the text which
draw attention to its own production. Subsequently, we should
examine the relationship between the narrator and the events
which form his tale. This will involve a study of the means by
which events are perceived and conveyed to the reader, taking due
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account of visual, cognitive and temporal perspectives. We shall
try to demonstrate that the variety of focalisation within a
first person text may not be consistent and consonant with the
idea of a unique narrating voice, attributable to one person.
In Bassani's II qiardino dei Finzi-Contini, the 'instance
narrative1 can be defined thus:
a) as 'narration ultdrieure' - the narrative act is posterior to
the events narrated
b) the narrator functions like all narrators of the 1r£cit
primaire' on an extradiegetic level
c) the narrator appears as a character within his own narrative
and therefore can be classified as a homodiegetic narrator.
This final point may warrant further discussion, for it may
be argued that the narrator is, in fact, autodiegetic but it is
not certain if the novel's centre of interest can be said to lie
with the narrator. At the beginning of the novel, the narrator
states that his wish is to write 'dei Finzi-Contini - di Micdl e
di Alberto, del professor Ermanno e del la signora 01ga-, e di
quanti altri abitavano o come me frequentavano la casa di Corso
Ercole I d'Este, a Ferrara poco prima che scoppiasse 1'ultima
guerra' (3) and the novel ends when the narrator's involvement
with the Finzi-Contini ceases. The narrator's life story is thus
not the novel's subject which instead is defined by a particular,
restricted, spacio-temporal context, focussing on those who
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populated this dimension. It may be argued that the main
protagonist of the novel is the narrator, for he can only tell
and does tell of his relationship with the people and place he
mentions. We shall return to this question later, but for the
moment it is enough to establish the shared world connection.
Before going on to highlight traces of the 'instance
narrative1 in the novel, it is worth making some brief remarks on
the question of temporality in narrative. While it may seem
self-evident that the use of past tenses in narrative indicates a
state of time past, some theorists argue persuasively against
this. Hamburger puts forward the thesis that in narrative
fiction, the past tense functions less as a temporal referent to
past events, than as a figure denoting the fictional nature of
these events, for from the reader's point of view, narrative is
read as an unfolding present.13 she finds an exception to this,
however, in the case of first person narrative which as we have
already noted is granted a different status in her work. Here,
she contends, past tenses must be understood as referring to time
past, for their significance is derived from the present of the
narrating subject whose textual presence concludes a positive
distinction between the here and now of narration and the then
and there of narrated events. The coincidence of an I-narrator
and an I-protagonist results in the forging of an existential
link between two temporal planes, a link which is absent in third
person narrative where the source of narration does not feature
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as a factor of content.i* Her distinction is not dissimilar to
that made by Benveniste between the tenses of 'histoire' and
1discours' which we have already alluded to. First person
narrative, located uneasily between the two systems, evokes the
participation of the speaker at the level of the 'dnonciation',
but confirms his erasure at the level of the ' <§nonc<§'. Here he
partakes of the dimension of 'non-personne' which Benveniste
characterises as constitutive of the third person role in
language.is The traces of the act of narration, which we aim to
uncover, index inevitably the act of 1enonciation1 which are
incompatible with the signs of 'histoire1, and thus a dual
temporality is made evident. Narrative and narration are both
construed as temporal processes, yet their dimensions are not of
the same order. The temporal limits of narrative are contained
within the narrative itself whereas those of narration last as
long as the narrative itself, but may appear to be without
duration. These two orders are fully independent of each other,
and are perceived as such within third person narrative.
Retrospective narration in the first person, however, makes
visible the link between these two orders and somehow
existentially relevant, the link between two contrasting orders
of discourse.
Not every narrative betrays overt traces of the
extradiegetic level of narration, for to do so, displays a degree
of self-consciousness which is often considered antithetical to
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realist modes of writing. II qiardino dei Finzi-Contini is self-
conscious to the extent that the narrative act which produces the
text is openly alluded to. We shall now attempt to identify the
traces of this act before later going on to consider their
function in relation to the narrative itself.
The opening line of the novel immediately draws attention to
the moment of '6nonciation' and, consequently, to the temporal
production of the narrative. The narrator remarks 'da molti anni
desideravo scrivere dei Finzi-Contini1, alluding both to the
narrative as artefact and to the temporal situation of the
narrative act. This is stressed as he points out that the
'spinta' to write was felt only 'un anno fa1, a temporal locution
deriving its significance from the time of the '6nonciation' and
not of the 'dnoncd'. A contrast is therefore felt with the
opening 'fu' of the following paragraph which instigates a
section of narrative conceived of as taking place in the past and
where the succession of preterite and pluperfect tenses and the
accompanying adverbs of time and place achieve significance, not
according to the moment of 'dnonciation', but to that of the
'6noncd'. This sequence is disrupted by the phrase 'sprovvisti
del permesso scritto di non so quale istituto romano di credito1
where the present tense again takes us back to the present time
of the narrating I. The narrator's avowal of ignorance in the
present may be contrasted to the later phrase 'poichd era stato
deciso di rientrare immediatamente a Roma, non dubitavo che si
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tirasse dritto1, where the imperfect consigns the narrator's
doubts to his past self, for we learn that these doubts would be
disabused shortly afterwards. It may be argued that because the
moment of 16nonciation1 is represented so strongly within the
text, all past tenses must be understood with reference to the
time of utterance. Hamburger's thesis would at once seem to
hold, but what we shall go on to stress, is the mixed nature of
the verbal systems and the implications of their consequences.
The extradiegetic presence in the novel is most securely
felt within the framework i.e. the prologue and epilogue, which
encompasses the narrative. Part IV Chapter X ends with the
sentence 'E, date le spalle alia Hiitte, mi allontanai fra le
pi ante, dalla parte opposta' while the epilogue begins 'La mi a
storia con Micdl Finzi-Contini termina qui'. The narrative
proper has ended, and this is signalled by the return from the
past historic to the present tense, or alternatively, from the
tenses of 'histoire' to those of 'discours'. In effect, the
content of the epilogue's opening sentence is merely an echo of
its grammatical structure and is thus redundant.
Evidence of an extradiegetic presence is, however, not
restricted to the framework. The opening section of Part I
Chapter VI is a long section of 'discours' where the narrating I
offers a lengthy analysis of his relationship with the Finzi-
Contini, interrupting an account of an early meeting with Mi col
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and indicating a higher level of narratorial presence. This
level may also appear minimally in sentences such as 'Credo che
1'adozione anche da parte mi a dell a pi pa risaiga proprio a quell'
epoca' (170), or 'Come ho gi& accennato, i suoi [Alberto]
interventi nelle nostre discussioni erano rari e sempre
irrelevant!'' (179). Similarly, the narrator's remarks on his
relatives who were later to die in the Nazi concentration camps
'gia allora mi apparivano avvolti nella stessa aura di misteriosa
fatal itci statuaria che li avvolge adesso nella memoria' (202)
betrays his presence through the use of the temporal adverbs
'allora' and 'adesso' which indicate a temporal relationship with
the time of writing.
From what has so far been said, it becomes apparent that any
reference to the extradiegetic level of narration is
characterised by 'shifters' i.e. those forms of language (present
and perfect tenses, adverbs such as here/there and then/now,
personal pronouns which refer to a interlocutive situation) which
only signify by virtue of their relationship to the moment of
'^nonciation' and which, in fact, combine to constitute the
singularity of the moment of '<§nonciation' . It might be added
that these 'shifters' can be manipulated to construct an illusory
narrative situation, for the one which is created in narrative
fiction, is purely a feint, a pale shadow of the author's work of
language. They are characteristic of 'discours', but not
necessarily of what is habitually called first person narrative,
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for the narrator of a third person text can call on these
devices, if alluding to his own epic situation.
The presence of a homo-diegetic narrator, however, posits a
relationship between the levels of 'narration' and 'histoire'
absent from third person narrative. The nature of this
relationship is, nevertheless, only conceivable through the
*r£cit', where the narrating voice becomes textualised, and it is
this textualisation which serves as the mediating factor between
past and present selves. The levels of 'narration' and
'histoire' which can both be considered historical and
performative are inaccessible by means other than that of
narrative. The question of identity between past and present
selves must be treated as a textual and not an existential
construct, and we must now attempt to analyse the relationship
between the extradiegetic and intradiegetic Is. We must attempt
to establish the means by which the I of 'histoire' is mediated
by the narrative act and the means by which information may be
regulated within a first person text. As Genette points out this
can be done either through the transcription of language or
through the adoption of a visual perspective.
The textual reproduction of speech can, as we have noted,
occur in three forms:- direct speech, indirect speech and free
indirect speech. All three would seem to incorporate, in some
way, the voice of another into the narrator's text. In direct
speech, the statement of the other is reproduced in its original
form, thus it may be argued that in this instance an event of the
'histoire' is transcribed without mediation in the 'r^cit', and
that the other voice interrupts the narrator's monotone.
Nevertheless, it can be asserted that direct speech is ultimately
subordinate to the narrative context in which it is reproduced,
for its reproduction is dependent on a narrative choice which
erases the original performance of the utterance. If it is
introduced by an interlocutive verb, the guiding hand of a
narratorial presence is apparent, but even when this is lacking,
the mere fact of repetition or re-creation signals the return
from a different source.
The reproduction of language in the form of indirect speech
subordinates the utterance to its narrative context to an even
larger degree. The idiom of the speaker is no longer retained
and the performative nature of the utterance is absorbed into the
text. The original utterance is described rather than
reproduced, for the moment of 'dnonciation' is lost, even if the
sense of the '£nonc<§' remains. It might be concluded, at this
stage, that neither direct nor indirect speech impinge upon nor
interfere with the authority of the narratorial voice, and their
presence may be ascribed simply to what Genette has termed the
narrator's 'fonction de r<§gie' i.e. his role in handling the
internal organisation of the narrative.
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The use of free indirect speech raises questions of a
different order intimated by Genette who writes, 'dans le
discours indirect libre, le narrateur assume le discours du
personnage, ou si 1'on pr^fere le personnage parle par la voix du
narrateur et les deux instances sont alors confondues' (194).
Genette barely goes into the problematics of indirect free
speech, but his remarks are suggestive of the potential confusion
of voices which the technique may present. This confusion of
voices proposes an element of disruption which the other two
forms did not instigate, a disruption which may undermine the
concept of the 'fixed centre'.
In what is still the most authoritative and complete work on
this subject, Marguerite Lips in Le style indirect libre compares
this technique with the two other modes of speech (and thought)
rendition and locates it as lying somewhere between the two.ie
She sees it as a purely literary form, impossible in speech, and
as something reserved for the domain of third person narrative.17
When the original utterance is transposed into indirect free
speech, Lips notes the following alterations: there is a change
of tense identical to that which occurs in the transformation
from direct to indirect speech, and there is also a similar
change in pronominal forms. However, when the utterance is
rendered into free indirect speech, Lips notes that adverbs of
time and place i.e. the here and now of utterance, remain
unaltered and significantly that the performative nature of the
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utterance remains. Cohn was later to summarise the process as
follows: 'It (free indirect style) may be most succinctly
defined as the technique for rendering a character's thought in
his own idiom while maintaining the third person reference and
the basic tense of narration1.is
In the case of first person narrative, one difficulty is
immediately apparent. There can be no pronominal change in the
utterance of an I-character if it is transposed from direct to
free indirect speech. The I inevitably retains the first person
signifier, and therefore, the referent of the sign can remain
ambiguous i.e. whether the I denotes the narrating I or his
experiencing counterpart. Lips had noted that even in a third
person narrative, a characteristic of the technique was that the
source of the statement may be obscured by the pronominal
vacillation as it is integrated into the narrative. This problem
may be resolved by the insertion of an interlocutive verb, but
such verbs are not always present. Dependent thus on context for
its recognition, Lips concludes that free indirect speech cannot
be seen as purely a grammatical phenomenon.19 She argues that
the technique can best be considered a 'figure', and like other
tropes, its existence will depend less on itself as metaphor than
the constitution of a metonymic relationship with contingent
parts. A similar conclusion is reached by Cohn who states that
'the narrated monologue is thus an essentially evanescent form,
dependent on the narrative voice that mediates and surrounds it
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and is therefore peculiarly dependent on tone and context1 (116).
Cohn devotes a great deal of attention to "narrated
monologue" in both third and first person narrative. Beyond its
grammatical features, Cohn notes that it may be employed either
in a 'consonant' or in a 'dissonant' mode, the former indicating
sympathy between voices while the latter serves to ironise the
gap between the voices.so it is a commonly held proposition that
this technique can be used sympathetically or ironically, but
again this recognition is reliant on context.2i This dependence
on context which posits the technique as a trope, albeit
recalcitrant to easy interpretation, makes it difficult to assert
that the technique might sufficiently disrupt the surface level
of the narrative to produce an alternative narrative voice. Cohn
has remarked in the context of consonant self-narrated monologue,
that although 'the narrator momentarily identifies with his past
self, giving up his temporally distanced vantage point and
cognitive privilege for his past time bound bewilderments and
vacillations' (167), her conclusion is that 'consonant
presentation of a past consciousness is dependent on the self-
effacement of the narrating voice and few authors of
autobiographical fiction have been willing or able to silence
this voice completely' (171). For Cohn, the alternative voice
has but a transitory existence and is perpetually subject to the
authoritative perspective of the narrating I.
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Conversely, Stanzel apportions a more substantial role to
the possibilities of free indirect speech in narrative. His
rejection of a simple dichotomy between third and first person
narratives and the introduction of the character-ref1ector as a
narrative agent lay greater stress on the significance of mediacy
of representation. In the case of first person narrative,
Stanzel argues that if events are filtered through the
consciousness of the experiencing I, the narrative moves from
first person to figural narration. Characteristic of this change
are the absence of the signs of an extradiegetic presence and the
abandonment of hindsight.22 The withdrawal of the narrator and
the subsequent liberation of the past self is achieved mainly by
a continued use of indirect free style. He writes:
Free indirect style as a form for rendering
thought in a first person narrative situation
creates a latitude of expression for the
subjectivity of experience of the experiencing
self in which it can develop undisturbed,
although often only temporarily so, by the
other 'persona' of its person, the narrating
self.' (224)
Although again highlighting the temporal limitations of the
alternative voice, Stanzel is suggesting that indirect free style
is much more than a trope, for the form is not necessarily closed
by the context proffered by the narratorial presence. We shall
now turn our attention to how the technique is employed in II
qiardino dei Finzi-Contini to discover the viability of an
alternative voice.
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The work of Bassani has long been noted for the extensive
use made of free indirect style, and in II giardino dei Finzi-
Contini it seems possible to identify three different voices
which find expression through the employment of this technique.23
Firstly, the mode is used to convey the speech and thoughts of
the narrator's past self. Secondly, it is used to reproduce the
speech of other characters in the novel (the demands of
verisimilitude in first person narrative prohibit forays into the
inner life of others) while, finally, it is used to communicate
the voice of a social grouping or express a general consciousness
which cannot be traced directly to a single person, but which
informs the perceptions of the entire community. Although free
indirect style is used in each case, its manifestations are
noticeably diverse.
The following two passages may be regarded as indicative of
the form when used to convey the discourse of the past I. The
first deals with a letter written to Micdl by the narrator which,
as we shall see, is not quoted verbatim but is reproduced in free
indirect style.
Dopo aver accennato alia mi a prima visita a
casa sua, tacendo su quanto di delusivo essa
aveva avuto per me, e promettendo che 1'avrei
ben presto ripetuta, mi tenm' stretto
prudentemente alia letteratura. Stupenda la
poesia dell a Dickinson - scrissi -, ma ottima
anche la traduzione che lei ne aveva fatto. Mi
interessava proprio perche d'un gusto un po1
sorpassato, carducciano Intendiamoci -
seguitai anche alio stato attuale la sua
traduzione funzionava benissimo, in questa
materia essendo sempre da preferirsi una be!la
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infedelt^ a una bruttezza pedissequa. Ad ogni
modo, il difetto che le segnalavo era
rimediabi1issimo... (168-169)
The verbal forms 'scrissi' and 'seguitai' avert the reader of the
fact that the contents of the letter are being represented. That
the passage may be interpreted as an example of free indirect
rather than indirect style, is signalled by the fact that
although there is a pronominal change from the 'tu' of direct
address to the 'lei' of reported discourse, and a change in the
tense system from that of 'discours' to that of 'histoire1,
certain performative features of the original utterance are
retained. The phrase 'l'avrei ben presto ripetuta' and the
active force of 'intendiamoci1 evoke the original spirit of the
past narrator's intention, as do the inclusion of the adjectives
and adverbs 'stupenda', 'ottima', 'rimediabilissimo' and
'benissimo'. These locutions are not only characteristics of the
text reproduced, but index the potency of a text which has not
been fully integrated into and tamed by the discourse of the
narrator at the moment of writing. This feature emerges once
more in our second example.
The narrator has been unexpectedly summoned to the house of
the Finzi-Contini and his anticipation and surprise as he
approaches the house are conveyed thus:
Andavo in fretta, senza paura di sbandare.
Intanto pensavo alia sorpresa che, secondo le
parole di Alberto, avrebbe dovuto aspettarmi a
casa Finzi-Contini. Cos'era: tornata hicdl,
forse? Strano, pero. Per qual motivo non era
venuta lei, al telefono? E perch£, prima di
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cena, non si era fatta vedere al Tempio? Se al
Tempio ci fosse stata, lo avrei gi& saputo.
Mio padre, a tavola, facendo la solita rassegria
dei presenti alia funzione (1'aveva fatta anche
per me: per rimproverarmi indirettamente di non
essere intervenuto), non si sarebbe certo
dimenticato di nominarla. Li aveva nominati
tutti, Finzi-Contini e Herrera, ma lei no.
Possibile che fosse arrivata per conto suo
all'ultimo momento, col direttissimo delle nove
e un quarto?(205-206)
The most salient features of this passage which determine
the existence of free indirect style are the retention of a
colloquial syntax in phrases such as '1i aveva nominati tutti,
Finzi-Contini e Herrera, ma lei no1 and the presence of the past-
I's questions in the interrogative form. Although we are later
informed of the nature of Alberto's surprise, the insistency of
the interrogative disrupts the narrative of the narrating I. The
corrective benefit of hindsight is unable to quench the original
desire to know, and the anxiety of the past-I secures a
temporarily autonomous space within the discourse of the
narrator, suggesting a potentially antagonistic element. Later
in this chapter, we shall return to consider the prevalence of
the interrogative mode in the discourse of both the past and
present Is.24 For the moment, we might suggest that, unlike in
the traditional fictive autobiography where questions asked by
the past-I are essentially rhetorical feints on the part of the
narrator, in Bassani's novel, they are indicative of the
impossibility of effecting a reconciliation between past and
present selves, creating an openness or fragmentation of
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perspective which questions the unicity of the subject in
language through the attenuation of the speaker's authority.
If, however, we turn our attention to the use of indirect
free style in reporting the speech of others, one further
stylistic feature emerges. Towards the beginning of the novel,
the narrator reports the opinions of his father on the family of
Micdl and Alberto:
Che idea da nuovi ricchi, che idea bislacca! -
soleva ripetere mio padre stesso, con una
specie di appassionato rancore, ogni volta che
gli capitava di affrontare I'argomento. Certo,
certo - ammetteva gli ex proprietari del
luogo, i marchesi Avogli, avevano nelle vene
sangue 'bluissimo1; orto e rovine inalberavano
ab antiquo il molto decorativo nome di
Barchetto del Duca.... (19-20)
Again we can perceive the transposition from the tenses of
'discours' to those of 'histoire', yet the idiom of the
narrator's father is retained, as is the performative nature of
the original utterance in locutions such as 'come no!',
'figuriamoci allora'. Also we may note that the temporal adverb
'oggi' takes its significance from the time of the father's
'dnonciation', rather than from the narrator's 'enonce'. The
most significant features, however, of the father's discourse
are, firstly, that its peculiarities are underlined by the use of
the iterative 'soleva', and secondly, that they are highlighted
graphically within the text. While the iterative mode serves to
underline the essentially limited psychological perspective of
the narrator's father, the graphic isolation, by means of
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italicisation or parenthesis, of phrases such as 'bluissimo', 'ab
antiquo1, 'al matt mugnciga' functions not only to reproduce a
static idiom but to underline its difference.2 5 Later in the
novel, we find the same technique used to characterise certain
features of the discourse of Micdl. The locutions 'tenuto
banco1, 'concionando per dritto e per traverso1, 'comoda comoda1
which all appear in parenthesis, occur in an extended passage of
free indirect style and as such do not need to be highlighted
graphically in order to recall the original discourse of the
speaker.26 The employment of such graphic indicators changes the
very nature of the word as sign for the word made different, in
turn, points to the difference of the speaking subject. The
reification of the word is extended to imply and identify the
immobility of the speaking subject.
Graphic means are generally exploited to indicate the
otherness of Micol's 'finzi-continico', words which are of
hebraic origin and those which are part of the vocabulary of
dialect.27 Instances of the half-spanish, half-venetian
idiolect of Micol's uncles are also reproduced in italics:
"Cossa xd che stas meldando? Su, Giuglio, alevantate ajde! E
procura da far star in pid anca il chico' (38). The narrator
also refers directly to the otherness of speech in his own
discourse. He mentions that the grandmother of the Finzi-Contini
speaks in 'il gergo di casa' and that the Fascist henchman,
Poledrelli, was 'incapace di mettere insieme due parole che non
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fossero in dialetto' (182). He also exhibits an interest not
only in the vocabulary of otherness but its tone and intonation.
Of the voices of Alberto and hicbl, he writes:
Parlavano ambedue nello stesso modo:
lentamente, in genere, sottolineando certi
vocaboli di poco rilievo, di cui essi soli
sembravano conoscere il vero senso, il vero
peso, e invece sorvolando in modo bizzarro su
altri, che uno avrebbe detto di importanza
molto maggiore. La consideravano, questa, la
loro vera lingua: la loro parti col are,
inimitabile, tutta privata deformazione
dell 1italiano. Ad essa davano perfino un nome:
il finzi-continico. (50)
The identity of brother and sister is inextricably linked to
the nature of their language and is indissociable from it. Of
Micdl's choice to name fruit only in dialect, the narrator
remarks:
Non c'era che il dialetto per pari are di queste
cose. Soltanto la parol a dialettale le
permetteva, nominando alberi e frutti, di
piegare le labbra nella smorfia fra intenerita
e sprezzante che il cuore suggeriva. (116)
This idea which posits an essential relationship between
language and object opens up a field of interesting ramifications
in the question of the relationship between language and the
speaking subject, for it suggests the objectification of the
subject through language. The following quotation which alludes
to the speech of Micbl's father is illuminating in this respect:
La sua voce era esile e canti1enante,
intonatissima; la sua pronuncia ebraica,
raddoppiando di frequente le consonanti, e con
le zeta, le esse, e le acca molto piu toscane
che ferraresi, si sentiva filtrata attraverso
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la duplice distinzione dell a cultura e del
ceto. (42)
This passage indicates that the linguistic diversity of the
narrative cannot be ascribed to any 'godimento' of the richness
of language, but is a testament to the fact that language
positions the speaking subject in a context determined by class,
culture and race. The peculiarities of language reproduced are
not merely idiosyncratic, but constitutive of a subjectivity
expressed not in language, but by language.
The erudite, cultivated speech of the professor contrasts
with that of the narrator's father whose language is punctuated
by hebraic expressions, but 'che dell'ebraico non conosceva piu
d'una ventina di vocaboli, i soliti del la conversazione
famigliare' (41). The limitations of his knowledge of Hebrew not
only represent a more restricted cultural experience, but also
attest to the degree of his assimilation into the gentile
community, demonstrated by his adherence to the Fascist party.
His language is not solely individual, however, for, as Adriano
Bon points out, his mode of expression indicates to us 'la
smarrita volont^i d'illusione di un'intera classe sociale che
troppo tardi ha aperto gli occhi sulla realty del fascismo'. The
hypostastization of language is consequent to the subject
position of the speaker, determined by a network of social
implication through which the subject is ultimately expressed.
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Language does not permit the subject self-expression, but is the
vehicle through which subject position is represented.
Unlike the other speakers in the novel, the I-character
bears no traces of a marked discourse. The lack of
differentiation in his language, rather than indicating a higher,
purer level of Italian, suggests instead a locus of non-identity.
The ambiguity of the narrator's subject position is demonstrated
by the following passage. While describing the ornamental,
baroque nature of the Finzi-Contini1s family tomb, he compares it
to the kind of temple which was to be found 'nei nostri teatri
d'opera fino a pochi anni fa' (13). He goes on:
In qualsiasi altro cimitero, l'attiguo
Camposanto Comunale compreso, un sepolcro di
tali pretese non avrebbe affatto stupito, ed
anzi confuso nella massa sarebbe forse passato
inosservato. Ma nel nostro era I'unico.1
In this passage there is a significant conflict in the
semantics of the possessive pronoun, 'nostro'. In the first
instance, it serves to include the narrator in a national,
Italian context, whereas in reference to the cemetery, its field
of meaning is restricted to that of the Jewish community. Both
Jewish and Italian, the narrator's subject position is
constituted at the intersection of two antagonistic vectors. The
impossibility of the narrator attaining a full subject position
is underlined by the development of the narrative. In the
precise socio-historic context in which the novel is situated, it
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is as a Jew which the narrator signifies and as the meaning of
jewishness alters, he is forced into an increasingly marginal
position. The elimination from his own discourse of marked,
Jewish elements may be interpreted as an attempted retrieval of a
position defined as Italian, but it is the discourse of the other
which will constitute this position, and in it, he is recognised
as a Jew despite cultural aspirations which again would seek to
reaffirm his assimilation into the dominant group. The only
occasion on which the narrator assumes a Jewish identity by
adopting a marked mode of speech is when he inwardly rebukes
Malnate's manner as being 'un po1 troppo da goi 1. In this
instance, his momentary assumption of otherness serves to
distance him from the catholic flalnate, his rival, but he refuses
to continue this process of identification. His subsequent
denial of otherness consigns him to the position of non-subject
for his otherness is still made to signify by the dominant
discourse of the gentile.
While the narrator's insistence on the linguistic
peculiarities of other characters serves to reify their
utterances presenting their selves as the sum of their linguistic
parts and indicating the partial and isolated nature of the
subject as defined by the dominant discourse, the idiolect of the
narrator might be said to represent a zero-degree of language.
The elimination of marked elements does not and cannot intimate
the adoption of a full subject position for the narrator remains
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irredeemably other and unless he accepts the marginal position
offered to him, fails to signify at all. For the narrator,
subjectivity can only be negatively defined. His unmarked
discourse delineates an alienation from language, and
consequently, a denial of subjectivity. The 'adoption' of
language is commented upon by Barthes in 'Le degre zero de
l'dcriture'. He writes:
Au 1ieu qu'un 1angage iddalement 1ibre ne
pourrait jamais signaler ma personne et
laisserait tout ignorer de mon histoire,
1'dcriture & laquelle je me confie est ddja
tout institution; elle decouvre mon passe et
mon choix, elle me donne une histoire, elle
affiche ma situation, elle m'engage sans que
j'aie h le dire. La Forme devient ainsi plus
que jamais un objet autonome, destind a
signifier une propriete collective et defendue,
et cet objet a une valeur d'dpargne, il
fonctionne comme un signal economique grace
auquel le scripteur impose sans cesse sa
conversion, sans en retracer jamais
1'histoire.28
The narrator's attachment to his own discourse functions as
a form of self-immolation as his desire for the other turns
against itself and consumes him at the locus of its enactment.
It is a commonly held view that Bassani's use of free
indirect style reproduces the ideological perspective of
Ferrara's middle-class Jewish community, although the insistence
on linguistic forms characteristic of this group may suggest an
ironic detachment on the part of the on-looking narrator as he
alternates between positions of inclusion and exclusion with
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regard to the group.29 The extended use of the iterative mode
dislodges the individual utterance from its immediate
performative context, but affords it an ideological impetus which
takes it beyond the moment of actuation. Initially, free
indirect style is used to communicate the ideology of this
limited, yet powerful community whose structures underline a
desire for oneness with the gentile, fascist community and the
rejection of the isolationist stance of the Finzi-Contini.
Nevertheless, the continued political, geographical, social and
also religious isolation of the Finzi-Contini from the jewish
community highlights with an increasing acuteness the otherness
of the Jews within a dominant anti-semitic, fascist discourse
upon the introduction and implementation of the discriminatory
race laws. The use of free indirect style in the novel to
present a group perspective diminishes as the narrative
progresses and the jewish community becomes ever more oppressed
and marginalised under the Fascist regime. Gradually, the
isolation of the Finzi-Contini from their co-religionists becomes
less as the isolation of the jewish community intensifies. The
tomb of the Finzi-Contini which had represented the gulf betwen
the family and their fellows, becomes a symbol of the destination
of the entire community as only the prematurely deceased Alberto
is buried there with his forefathers while the rest of his family
perish in the holocaust. It is this obliteration of the Jewish
community which effects the narrator's empathy with the Etruscans
in the novel's prologue:
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1'eternity non doveva piu sembrare
un'illusione, una favola di sacerdoti. IT
futuro avrebbe stravolto il mondo a suo
piacere...in quel 1'angolo di mondo difeso,
riparato...almeno li nulla sarebbe mai
cambiato.(8)
The relationship between historical and eternal time in the
novel will be examined at a later stage, but already it seems
possible to discern an acute historical dimension in the work of
Bassani. The alteration and uncertainty of the narrator's
subjectivity is brought about by a change in historical
circumstance. It is this dynamic notion of history which signals
the impossibility of constructing a fixed subject. If the
narrator's primary identification is with the dead, it is because
history has not permitted the subject to be constructed as a
unified signifier, for he is constructed at the intersection of
potentially antagonistic ideological forces whose relationship is
constantly susceptible to modification which in turn modifies the
position of the subject.
Free indirect speech which is noted for the way in which it
disrupts perspective in narrative through the creation of an
uncertain distance between language and the subject, seems a
particularly suitable vehicle for conveying the shifting position
of the subject. Language is not a value-free, transparent medium
and the language of II giardino dei Finzi-Contini clearly
demonstrates a dynamic relationship with history and
subjectivity. In an interview with Stelio Cro, Bassani
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acknowledges, in particular, the function of free indirect style
in evoking the past through the superimposing of one temporal
level on to that of another.30 The truth of language would
appear to reside in its existence as historical artefact. The
anonymity of the narrator's discourse does not, however, permit
him to escape this historical dimension, for his identity does
not fail to signify in the discourse of the other.
The significance of examining the manner in which language
is reported is the focus of Volosinov's work: 'Toward a history
of forms of utterance in language constructions.'3i Volosinov
argues that speech reception is determined by the socio-political
context in which it is produced and re-produced. Language cannot
be simply regarded as being directed towards an extra-linguistic
referent, but as something which points also to the position of
the speaker in discourse. He stresses the fact that words are
historical entities and that their usage is also historically
contrived. He writes:
a word is not an expression of inner
personality; rather inner personality is an
expressed or inwardly impelled word. And the
word is an expression of social intercourse, of
the social interaction of material
personalities, of producers. (153)
Words cannot be seen as expressions of subjectivity, but as
the very means by which subjectivity is afforded on a secondary
level. For Volosinov, quasi-direct discourse (free indirect
style) disrupts the notion of language as a vehicle for
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expressing meaning through its content, by the juxtaposition of
meanings which derive significance from two contrasting
historical perspectives. Thus in Bassani's novel, we can contend
that the extended use of free indirect style serves to open up
the gap between utterances, making explicit difference, and
underlining the fragmentation of the subjectivity of the speaker
in language. The narrating I is unable to assimilate other
language into a single, all-encompassing perspective for the
other voice speaks back. Words are subject to historical change
and consequently, determine change in the speaking subject.
Under the Fascist regime, the word 'ebreo' undergoes a
significant alteration of meaning with the introduction of the
race laws, and as a result, those whose identities are jewish are
also changed. The speaker cannot tame this difference and the
narrator's conflict as an Italian Jew cannot be resolved on a
personal level. The presence of other voices in his discourse
articulates the dissonance created by language in history. As a
speaker, he enters into language, but is subsequently constituted
by it. Volosinov concludes:
The word as the ideological phenomenon par
excellence exists in continuous generation and
change; it sensitively reflects all social
shifts and alterations. In the vicissitudes of
the word are the vicissitudes of the society of
word-users. (157)
The manner in which speech is reproduced is thus not
insignificant. The narrator's ceding of authority through the
use of free indirect style is an avowal of the incompleteness of
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a subjectivity constructed by a medium itself constantly in flux.
The first person pronoun cannot secure a permanent space in which
to construct a stable identity for the response to the question
'who speaks?1 is not simply 'me', but the product of socio-
historic factors which dominate and determine the status and the
authority of the subject's platform.
In 1Discours du r6cit', Genette notes that the events which
go to compose the 'histoire' are not only told, but are
necessarily 'seen' also. In his later work, Nouveau discours du
recit, Genette rightly underplays the purely visual aspect of
this issue and argues that the concept might be better
understood, if the term 'foyer de perception' were employed, for
it would encompass a cognitive dimension which he contends, is an
essential feature of the relationship between the narrator and
his narrative.32 Of the three types of possible focalisations
identified by Genette, it would seem that only one i.e. 'le rdcit
ct focal i sati on interne' could be obviously applicable to first
person or homodiegetic narrative. Indeed, in Nouveau discours du
rdcit, Genette suggests that the very fact that a narrative is
written in the first person imposes this specific form of
focalisation.33 if the centre of perception is located within
the text, the narrative must inevitably be subject to this
restriction of information. He also notes, elsewhere, that while
first person narrative is ostensibly 'h focalisation interne',
this restriction serves to create simultaneously a narrative '&
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focalisation externe' as far as the representation of other
characters is concerned.34 The consciousness of others remains
forever closed to the narrating subject, and the zone of
uncertainty created delineates the I's struggle to elucidate the
past. The narrator of a retrospective first-person fiction may
know more than his past self, yet unlike the omniscient third-
person narrator, he cannot know absolutely, for his perspective
bears the restrictions placed on that of a real person (again
first-person narrative is cast into the domaine of 'real life1).
It seems, therefore, that first person narrative cannot be 'non-
focal i si1 without seriously infringing the code of verisimilitude
on which it is based, for the presence of the narrator in the
text is a constant reminder of the place where the 'foyer de
perception' is located. Although Genette insists that
focalisation should not be regarded as a personalised attribute,
for it is a narrative and not existential feature, he does
specifically place limitations on the situation of the 'foyer de
perception' within a homodiegetic text. Again this takes us back
to the notion of the fixed centre in first-person narrative. We
have determined, however, that, in terms of the verbal
construction of the narrative, the narrator cannot be said to
represent a fixed centre, and it is to be argued that in terms of
perception, he cannot be fixed either.
It is assumed that in retrospective first-person narrative,
the narrating I 'knows' more than the past, experiencing I. Time
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is the dimension through which man experiences his fullness of
being and effects a reconciliation between himself and the
tumultuous events of the past.35 Consequently, in II qiardino
dei Finzi-Contini, it would seem inevitable that the dominant
perspective belong to the narrating I as he casts a corrective
glance at the uncertainties of his past self, secure in the
knowledge of what happened next. This perspective is closely
connected to what Genette cal1s the narrator1s 1fonction de
rdgie' for the act of narration itself entails the structural
organisation of the raw material of 'histoire' as it is
transformed into 'rdcit1. The question which remains to be
examined is, however, whether or not this form is necessarily
closed by the retrospective knowledge of the narrator, thus
permitting us to identify a single position of authority within
the text.
The supremacy of the narrating I over the experiencing I is
perhaps most clearly appreciated in the use made of the
interrogative. We have already commented upon the reproduction
of the interrogative in free indirect speech as one of the
performative aspects of the original utterance which is retained,
hence, signalling the presence of another voice. In the example
which we have discussed, where the questions of the past I
concerning the surprise awaiting him at the house of the Finzi-
Contini are reproduced in their original urgency, the narrating
I, nevertheless, constitutes the final locus of meaning for the
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unfolding narrative reveals the exact nature of the surprise,
relegating the questioning of the experiencing I to a partial,
time-bound perspective. Likewise, earlier in the novel when the
narrator recounts his flight on discovering his failure to pass
an examination in mathematics he hears a voice calling to him:
A1zai lentamente il capo, girandolo a sinistra,
contro sole. Chi mi chiamava? Otello non
poteva essere. E allora? (48)
The narrating I knows that it was Micdl calling to him, and
therefore, the retention of the interrogative can be seen as
nothing more than a narrative feint. However, later in the
novel, it becomes increasingly difficult to ascertain a clear-cut
distinction between the perspectives of the two Is, and it cannot
be easily determined which, if either, of these perspectives
holds sway.
As the narrator's relationship with flicdl becomes more
problematic, the perspective of the experiencing I comes to
dominate larger sections of the text. Hindsight is no longer
beneficial, for although the narrating I may know the manner in
which events developped, time has not allowed him any greater
understanding of the reasons for their development. In the final
chapter of the novel, the narrator considers whether or not he
should secretly enter the grounds of the 'magna domus'. He asks:
E se fossi entrato nel parco di nascosto,
scalando il muro? Da ragazzo, in un
lontanissimo pomeriggio di giugno, non avevo
osato farlo, avevo avuto paura. Ma adesso? Di
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che cosa potevo aver mai paura, adesso? (314)
He does enter the grounds, but his questions never find an
answer.
Cohn argues that her contrasting concepts of 'dissonant' and
'consonant' self-narration indicate the degree of identification
between the narrator and his past self, but it appears that in II
giardino dei Finzi-Contini, the move from dissonant to consonant
self-narration bears a more profound significance. If the
narrating I does not know more than his past self, this
undermines the fundamental notion of time as a positive,
epistemological factor in the human experience, and consequently,
undermines the status of narrative itself which is a process
taking place in time. At the beginning of the epilogue, the
narrator states:
La mi a storia con hicdl Finzi-Contini termina
qui. E allora e bene che anche questo racconto
abbia termine, ormai, se 6 vero che tutto
quello che potrei aggiungervi non riguarderebbe
piu lei, ma, nel caso, soltanto me stesso.
(321)
This indicates not only the end of the tale, but also testifies
to the failure of the narrative to elucidate the past and,
therefore, also the present. The narrator's inability to know in
the absolute destabilises the structure of first person narrative
and its openness declares invalid the proposition that the past
may be grasped through its revision in narrative.
The latter sections of Bassani's novel are characterised by
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a shift from first person narration to a figural narrative
situation as defined by Stanzel. Like Cohn, Stanzel believes
that the change permits a greater feeling of empathy between
narrator, character and reader through allowing direct access to
the consciousness of the character.36 Yet, the effacement of the
teller-character involves an abdication of the functions of the
narrator and, subsequently, the authority of the narrative is
brought into question. The refusal of the teller-character to
assume the role of narrator is indicative of a rejection of the
value-system which would grant the narrating subject authority on
the basis of a specific relationship between the self and time
i.e. time as a cumulative, totalising life-experience and the
self as a direct product of it.
The status of the narrator does, however, remain ambivalent
for if, at times, his perspective is restricted to that of his
past self, at others he adopts a position more akin to that which
Stanzel refers to as the authorial narrative situation. As he
tells of the circumstances surrounding the death of Guido, the
eldest son of the Finzi-Contini, he relates events which he could
not have witnessed, and the final excursion into the mind of Eli a
Corcos marks a stark infringement of the restrictions placed on
the narrator in a narrative focalisation interne'.37
Similarly, in the opening pages of the novel, the narrator's
presence is revealed only minimally, betrayed by the occasional
first person reference.38 what he narrates is considered true
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for the accuracy of his statements does not depend on him as a
witness (hence partial) but on him as a narrator (hence
authoritative).
Like all narrators, the narrator of a first person narrative
is responsible for the chronological ordering of the narrative,
summarising, relating durative and habitual actions and events,
synthesis, analysis and interpretation. In short, he is thought
to be the ideological centre of the text.39 in fulfilling this
explicitative function, however, the narrator of II giardino dei
Finzi-Contini is denied the privileges afforded to an authorial
voice. General statements made by him such as his comment on the
early years of Fascism; 1erano gli anni folli ma a loro modo
generosi del primo fascismo. Ogni azione, ogni comportamento
venivano giudicati...attraverso il rozzo vaglio del patriot
tismo o del disfattismo' (28), are immediately ironised by his
position as marginalised subject. Made different on account of
his jewishness, he signifies as a character and not a narrator,
and as such, he can never attain authorial authority. This can,
of course, be said to apply to any personalised narrator for
every first-person narrator is seen as representing a partial
viewpoint and some are given more credence than others.40 in
Bassani's text, it is an interesting feature that as the
narrator's jewishness becomes more relevant to his
marginalisation as a subject, so the narrative moves away from a
quasi-authorial narrative situation to that of a figural
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narrative situation. By the end of the novel, the narrator's
presence as an authoritative voice is hardly felt at all.
Just as the language of the jewish community is
narrativised, so too is their evaluative presence felt within the
visual perspective of the text. The manner in which the house of
the Finzi-Contini is described, reflects the perspective of an
outsider looking in. The house is seen from the 'muro di cinta1
or alternatively from the 'Mura degli Angeli1, the only vantage
points offered to those excluded from more intimate contact with
the 'magna domus'. The description is rounded off with the
words: 'ed ecco che 1'antico sgarbo del di sconoscimento e dell a
separazione tornava ancora a far male, a bruciare quasi come da
principio' (19). Here, the point of view cannot be attributed to
that of a dispassionate, authorial reporter or spectator, but
emanates from the commonly held group position of the Ferrarese,
jewish community. Likewise, the description of the family tomb
of the Finzi-Contini is conditioned by a common perspective which
berates the exclusiveness and the aristocratic disdain of the
family, symbolised by this outlandish monument. Once again, we
must recognise a situation in which the subject of the
'^nonciation' is split from his utterance through the imposition
of another perspective, undermining the notion of the subject as
origin of discourse. The subject speaks, yet his voice is
interrupted by those whose words he may seek to appropriate or
make ironically different, but who cannot be silenced. The
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subject is overwhelmed by his discourse which reveals itself
profoundly historical in its implications.
Before going on to discuss this point further, we may say a
final word regarding the narratological categories which we have
exploited. Genette's typology had appeared to have had the
advantage of setting out the divergent aspects of the 'instance
narrative1 and permitting a structured investigation of its
operations. It has become apparent, however, that the situation
is more complex and fluid than a rigid application of his
typology would allow. Nevertheless, it is through using this
typology that the notion of first-person narrative as a 'fixed
centre' may be most effectively challenged. Rather than a
universal perspective, it seems possible to identify and isolate
the following positions:-
1) that of the extradiegetic narrator whose presence is
revealed through the invasion of 'discours' into the
text and who offers a perspective on the act of
narration itself.
2) that of the retrospective narrator, the traditional
'fixed centre' whose eye is trained firmly on the past,
and who is responsible for the ordering of the
narrative - Stanzel's first person narrator.
3) that of the experiencing I whose demands impinge on the
hindsight of his retrospective counterpart and who
commands sections of the narrative through what Stanzel
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terms 1figural narration 1.
4) that of the narrator as author whose statements and
perceptions depend on his authority as a producer of
text and not on a residual, existential presence
In addition to these positions which can be attributed to
the narrator, it is essential also to note how each has been
historically determined by his place in a marginalised community
at a time of intense crisis. Through the narrator's discourse,
the jewish community both speaks and is spoken, and its
articulation affects, in turn, the manner in which the narrator
may instigate his address. It is worth reiterating that point of
view is historically determined as may be demonstrated by the
move from quasi-authorial perspective to first-person to figural
as the narrative unfolds, and the position of the I becomes less
authoritative on account of his increased and intensified
marginalisation. Point of view must be seen as an ideological
construct for the relationship between the narrator and the text
is essentially historical. As history invades and overwhelms
both the subject and his narrative, so too, are his modes of
articulation altered and, consequently, historicised.
In the context of these conclusions, it seems necessary to
engage with certain positions which critics have adopted,
regarding Bassani's work, particularly those who decline to
acknowledge the historical consciousness which operates within
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it. The principal criticism, which finds expression in various
guises, is that Bassani's concept of history is only grasped in
terms of a personal destiny. The tragic fate of the Jews is seen
almost as a pretext for the melancholy dissection of the past,
dwelling on private griefs and mythologies which only
incidentally take place in time, for the privileged medium is
space i.e. the garden itself. Ferretti, a not unsympathetic
critic of Bassani, writes:
Quanto piu lo scrittore, muovendosi nel grande
labirinto dei Finzi-Contini, cerca di attingere
ad una pregnanza storica, ad una visione
critica, tanto piu I'elegia e i miti del
passato lo riaccolgono nel loro mondo
consolatorio. *i
Ferretti does not satisfactorily broach the question of the
implied masochism in his interpretation of Bassani's work. He
assumes that there exists a nostalgic desire for the original
wound by means of which the marginalised identity (the only
identity) was constructed and that this desire holds sway over
the development of a political consciousness. That the personal
is inevitably political is a factor which he chooses to ignore.
The flight into the garden of the Finzi-Contini is considered to
be a masochistic choice and due concern is not attributed to the
historic events which provoke this flight and their effect on the
events which take place in this supposed mythical realm.
Pasolini's critique of Bassani is rather more searing, but
not without insight.42 He distrusts the tendency which he
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perceives in Bassani to eternalise the world in terms of a
lyrical perspective and thus fail to historicise the past in a
more concrete manner. The revocation of the past becomes its own
consolation. He writes, however, of the 'dolorosa, grandiosa
realtd' in the work of Bassani and draws attention to what he
believes are its two major aspects i.e. 'la ristrettezza numerica
e mentale dell a borghesia ebrea di Ferrara e la grandiosita che
le viene conferita dalla 'diaspora' e dalla tragedia del la
persecuzione'. He concludes that the motivating force remains
'i1 rimpianto del piccolo-borghese ebreo di non essere un piccolo
borghese qualsiasi, e il suo sforzo terribile per sembrare tale'.
Without wishing to dwell on the implied anti-semitism of
Pasolini's position, it may nevertheless be argued that he is
correct in perceiving a purely bourgeois feeling of indignation
in the isolation of what were otherwise solid, card-carrying
adherents of the Fascist middle-class. However, his own
political position prevents him seeing that even the middle-
classes have a history and that the absence of an historical
perspective based on class struggle is not in itself ahistorical.
Perhaps the most accurate assessment of the political nature
of Bassani's work comes from a more recent critic, Giusi Oddo de
Stefanis.43 She does not deny that Bassani emphasises the
personal dimension, but notes that the personal experience of his
characters 'e sempre il riflesso d'un esperienza collettiva
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poichd essi fanno parte di uno specifico gruppo sociale che
condivide una situazione comune'.(17) She continues:
Nel personaggio di Bassani, c'd dunque un
profondo legame fra individuo e personality
sociale. Ed d in questo che pud identificarsi
1'autenticitd storica dell a sua opera, in
quanto essa rappresenta uno specifico momento
di crisi attraverso personaggi che diventano
1tipici1.(17) 44
The exploration of the past does not signify either a
refusal of the present or a nostalgia return. Conversely it
demonstrates that:
per gli ebrei d sempre stato cosi, e non c'd
socialismo e fascismo con cui possono
identificarsi, perchd entrambi sono pure
sempre rappresentanti degli altri e
rappresentati dagli altri. (66)
As Oddo de Stefanis intuites, the politics espoused by
Bassani are the politics of difference. The impossibility of
acceding to a full political consciousness is due to the
marginalisation of the subject within that very discourse.
Micdl's refusal to engage with the future and the narrator's
supposed dwelling nostalgically on the past directly result from
their marginalisation from the dominant order and their inability
to combat their marginalisation.
The inability of the protagonists to affect their own
destiny is again played out by means of the narrative itself.
Douglas Radcliff-Umstead has written that:
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The object of the recording narrator is to
exact redress against time by restoring
through memory the lost paradise of the Finzi-
Contini: the novel as monument wi11
accomplish the labor of consolation which was
originally intended for the tomb.45
While the object of the narrator may well be to exact
redress against time, his narrative bears testament to his
failure. Memory, here, is not restorative nor consolatory for it
does not bring the past within the control of the narrator, but
remains forever beyond him. The decay of the house of the Finzi-
Contini symbolises his inability to freeze the past into an
eternal, everlasting moment, and the narrative which would effect
this transformation in its 'labor of consolation1 serves rather
to emtomb the narrator. The narrative results in a kind of self-
immolation of the narrator whose call to the other is constantly
thrown back at him. In the course of the novel, the narrator
tells of his brief communications with il professor Ermanno as
they work in adjoining rooms and alludes briefly to his own
subsequent incarceration, a period which he refers to only here:
Attraverso la porta, quando era aperta, ci
scambiavamo perfino qualche frase.... Qualche
anno piu tardi, durante la primavera del '43,
in carcere, le frasi che avrei scambiato con
un ignoto vicino di cell a, gridandole in alto,
verso lo spiraglio del la bocca di lupo,
sarebbero state di questo tipo: dette cosi,
soprattutto per il bisogno di sentire la
propria voce, di sentirsi vivi. (199)
The urgency of the anonymous call to the other is indicative
of the loneliness of the speaking subject as he attempts to seek
172
an impossible self-confirmation through addressing whatever lies
on the other side of the abyss.46
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Notes to Chapter 4
1 See p.7
2 See Lubbock, The Craft of Fiction Ch IX, pp.124-141. Lubbock
draws a comparison between Dickens's David Copperfield and
Meredith's Harry Richmond, criticising the adoption of the first
person in the latter on account of the fact that the narrative
focuses on the narrator and so betrays the limits of self-
representation in language. Dickens's work is acceptable
because the focus of events lies outside of the hero.
3 See chapter 1, pp.11-14
4 In 'Discours du r£cit', Genette notes that the word 'r6cit' can
be used to express three distinct aspects of narrative and
consequently proposes an alternative set of terms in order to
isolate clearly each meaning. He decides 'de nommer histoire
le signifi£ ou contenu narratif (meme si ce contenu se trouve
etre, en 1'occurence, d'une faible intensity dramatique ou
teneur 6v<§nementiel 1 e), r£cit proprement dit le signifiant,
6nonce ou discours ou texte narratif lui-meme, et narration
1'acte narratif producteur et par extension, 1'ensemble de la
situation r^elle ou fictive dans laquelle il prend place'
(p.72). In our discussion of Genette's work, the French
terminology will be retained. It should be noted, however,
that the meaning attributed by him to 'histoire' is quite
different from that used by Benveniste
5 Genette acknowledges that predictive narratives are rare but as
examples of the other categories we might suggest Oriana
Fallaci's Lettera ad un bambino mai nato and Guido Piovene's
Lettere da una novizia. Both are written in the first person
6 See chapter 1, p.5
7 Genette justifies his decision to adopt this grammatical term
stating that 'la "representation" ou plus exactement
1 ' information narrative a ses degr^s; le recit peut fournir au
lecteur plus ou moins de details, et de fagon plus ou moins
directe, et sembler...se tenir h plus ou moins grande distance
de ce qu'il raconte (p.183)
8 See Genette, pp.186-189
9 For a critique of Genette's typology see Mi eke Bal, Narratoloqie
(Paris, 1977) esp. Chapter 1 pp.19-58. Genette responds in
Nouveau di scours du r£cit (Paris, 1983) pp.48-52)
10 This is an aspect of the 'fictional paradox' referred to by
Michael Glowinski in 'On the first person novel'
174
11 See Gertette pp.261-265
12 Genette himself uses his typology in order to demonstrate the
ways in which A la recherche du temps perdu is anomalous
13 Kate Hamburger, The Logic of Literature p.319
14 Romberg disputes Hamburger's thesis, arguing that from the
point of view of the reader, all preterite tenses may give the
impression of present time. As we have sustained the notion
that the I of the first person narrator inevitably indexes the
epic situation of the narrator, we shall uphold Hamburger's
standpoint. For Romberg's critique see Studies in the narrative
techniques of the first person novel pp.30-31
15 See Benveniste p.230
16 Marguerite Lips, Le style indirect libre (Paris, 1926)
17 This point has been revised by both Cohn and Stanzel as well as
Roy Pascal in The Dual Voice (Manchester 1977) and by W.J.M.
Bronzwaer in Tense in the Novel, (Groningen, 1970)
18 Dorrit Cohn, Transparent Minds p.100
19 Giulio Herczeg in Lo stile indiretto libero in italiano
(Florence, 1963) insists even more heavily on free indirect
style as a stylistic rather than as a solely grammatical choice
20 See Cohn pp.160
21 That free indirect style create either a feeling of empathy or
distance is noted also by Stanzel, Lips, Herczeg and Pascal in
their respective works
22 Stanzel notes that 'the embodiement of the narratorial "I"
decreases in importance for the motivation of the narrative
process, but not as a physical basis for the state of mind of
the experiencing self. The narrative act is no longer overt,
the reader or listener is addressed less and less' (p.211)
23 This point is dealt with by Maria Cicione in 'Insiders and
Outsiders in Giorgio Bassani's G1i occhiali d'oro' in Italian
Studies vol.XLI (1986) 101-115.
24 See pp.159-162
25 See Adriano Bon, Come 1eggere'i1 qiardino dei Finzi-Contini'
di Giorgio Bassani (Milan 1979) p.32
26 Bassani p.208
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27 For a discussion of the varieties of Micdl's language see
Ilvano Caliaro, 'Del "Giardino" di Giorgio Bassani. II
"Finzicontinico" di Mic61: tra dignity e stile1 in Forum
Italicum, Volume 15 no.l (Spring 1981), pp.52-57
28 Roland Barthes, Le deqrd z£ro de 1'ecriture (Paris, 1953) p.23.
Here, Barthes is commenting upon the manner in which the
adoption of a certain type of 'dcriture' may be expressive of a
collectivity rather than subjectivity
29 An example of this is the narrator's description of the house
of the Finzi-Contini which is given from the point of view of
the 'excluded' Jewish community looking in. See Bassani p.19
30 In Stelio Cro 'Intervista con Giorgio Bassani' in Canadian
Journal of Italian Studies Volume 1 (Fall 1977), pp.37-45
31 In V.N. Volosinov, Marxism and the philosophy of language,
translated by L. Matejka and R. Titunik (London, 1986) pp.109-
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32 G. Genette, Nouveau discours du r£cit p.43. This is also taken
up by Ulla Mursala-Schr<?der who stresses the importance of the
narrator's 'savoir' in the relaying of narrative information.
See Ulla Mursala-Schrdder, Le roman-memoires modernes
33 G. Genette, Nouveau discours du r£cit p.52
34 G. Genette, 'Discours du recit' p.219
35 Stanzel notes that this resolution is the determinant of the
classical form of first person narrative. See Stanzel p.210
36 See Stanzel p.189
37 Bassani pp.26-27. Genette terms this type of infringement
'paralepse'. See 'Discours du recit' pp.211-213
38 Example of such minimal traces are 'nel nostro' (p.13), 'mia
madre' (p.17) and 'ho saputo' (p.18). A stronger narratorial
presence does not emerge until chapter IV.
39 The ideological function of the narrator is a particular
concern of Wayne Booth in The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago,
1961)
40 This is one of the main contentions of Lanser's work. See
Lanser The Narrative Act
41 Gian Carlo Ferretti, Letteratura e ideoloqia (Rome, 1964) p.59
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42 Pier Paolo Pasolini, Descrizioni di descrizioni (Turin, 1979)
pp.262-266
43 Giusi Oddo de Stefanis, Bassani entro il cerchio delle sue mure
(Ravenna, 1981)
44 In an earlier version of this 'Evoluzione e involuzione nella
parabola narrativa di Bassani1 in The Canadian Journal of
Italian Studies Vol.no.1 (Fall 1977) pp.7-22, she makes this
point more forcefully. She writes that the historical
authenticity of Bassani's work 'rappresenta un momento storico
attraverso personaggi che diventano 1tipici1 e che sono validi
come rappresentanti di una crisi storica1 (p.14)
45 Douglas Radcliff Umstead, 'Transformation in Bassani's garden
in The Canadian Journal of Italian Studies Vol no.2 (Winter
1978) pp.135-145 (p.143)
46 The issues which we have dealt with here have been raised also
by Harry Davis in a recent article which unfortunately it has
not been possible to incorporate into our discussion. Davis
focusses particularly on the relations between memory and
history and makes use of the work of Genette and Cohn to produce
valuable insights into the problem. See Harry Davis, 'Narrated
and Narrating I in II qiardino dei Finzi-Contini' in Italian
Studies, vol.XLIII (1988) 117-129.
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CHAPTER FIVE
First Person Narration and the Literature of
Fantasy in I nostri antenati
Both La 1 una e i fal6 and II qiardino dei Finzi-Contini are
examples of the fictive autobiography, but in both the self is a
problematical construct whose meaning and status are not fixed,
but are dependent on the complex and shifting relationship
between the subject and discourse. An essential part of the
fictional structure of both novels is that the narrative is an a
posteriori reconstruction of events whose priority to the act of
narration is a given of the text. The authority attributed to
the narrating I comes by virtue of lived, historical experience,
which forges an existential link between the narrative construct
and the 'real' events of the past. The I becomes his own
historian, engaged in reconstructing his own chronicle.
In an interview with Anna Dolfi, Bassani has asserted that
in his work, he has tried to 'dar fondo all'io e al tempo stesso
di collocare I'io in una dimensione oggettiva, storica,
storicista1, recognising and attempting to reconcile the tension
between subjectivity and its historical condition.i He writes
that II giardino dei Finzi-Contini 'parte da un proemio che
colloca subito, immediatamente, l'io scrivente e I'io vivente'
(85), a statement which would seem to indicate an awareness of
the duality implicit in first person narrative between the
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narrating I who inhabits a seemingly timeless, despatialised zone
in which nothing happens or can happen outside the act of
narration itself, and the experiencing I whose existence does
take place in time and space and whose experience of history is
disordered until structured by the literary form. Bassani
insists on the existential link between the two, relying heavily
on the testimonial authority of the narrating I as a guarantor of
history. First person narrative is grounded in the
authenticating relationship posited between the creative,
narrative act and the fictively real world. The narrator of a
first person text occupies a peculiar position, midway between
the realms of fiction and reality, and his existence depends upon
the imposition of the constraints of the latter on the former.
The first person narrator may be his own historian, but he is not
seen to be his own author, therefore while the 1io scrivente'
constitutes the centre of textual authority, it is the 'io
vivente' who, in fact, regulates the limits of such authority on
account of his existence in the 'real' world.
Therefore, although we have seen that the authority of the I
is constantly being undermined, for the I is shifting and various
in its manifestations, its conditions of existence have
nevertheless been conceived of as bearing an extratextual
referent. The discourse through which the subject is
constructed, exceeds the text itself, for it refers to a lived
experience beyond the confines of narrative, doing so by virtue
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of its first person properties. It is interesting to note also
that Bassani refers to an 1io scrivente1 rather than an 1io
narrante1, a difference which indicates the materially different
aspects of the two related activities. To insist on an 'io
scrivente1 is to insist upon the literary qualities of the
narrative, and also to evoke notions of an authorial presence
rather than a narratorial one. Again images of authority are
evoked through the collocation of the figure of the author and
his extratextual position in the real world with the idea of the
narrative as literary property. The 1io' and the narrative merge
in a curious form of symbiosis, each dependent on the other to
guarantee their status as historical objects. The presence of
the I is dependent on the discourse of narrative for its
realisation, while narrative benefits from the presence of the I
through the first person pronoun's historical relation to the
real world, the world which precedes discourse.
A problem arises, however, in the case of first person
narratives which appear to eschew this referential aspect on
which their authority depends. What happens to the I when the
conventions of verisimilitude are discredited by its own
narrative discourse? How does the status of the first person
pronoun change when this mutual support system is challenged and
overtly undermined? These are the questions which must now be
addressed.
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In his note to the trilogy I nostri antenati, Calvino
asserts that the three stories, 'hanno in comune il fatto di
essere inverosimili e di svolgersi in epoche lontane e in paesi
immaginari'.2 Nevertheless, he refutes the charge that the tales
might be read solely as escapist fantasies, claiming that they
represent, in some way, the relationship between the subject and
society. He begins from the premise: 'Dimidiato, mutilato,
incompleto, nemico a se stesso e 11uomo contemporaneo' (355),
concluding that his aim in writing the three stories was to
'fame una trilogia d'esperienze sul come realizzarsi esseri
umani: nel Cavaliere inesistente la conquista dell'essere, nel
Visconte dimezzato 1'aspirazione a una completezza al di la delle
mutilazioni imposte dalla societd, nel Barone rampante una via
verso una completezza non individualistica da raggiungere
attraverso la fedelta a un'autodeterminazione individuale: tre
gradi d'approccio alia liberta' (360). Calvino's statements are
interesting, for he maps out the project of the narrators of La
1 una e i falo and II qiardino dei Finzi-Contini who aspire to a
state of wholeness, but who fail to perceive themselves as split
subjects, although this split is revealed through their
discourse. It is interesting that their desire for wholeness
ultimately fails, while Calvino suggests that in his fantastic
narratives, this desire is satisfied.
Rosemary Jackson in Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion
181
defines fantasy in a way akin to Calvino. She writes: 'fantasy
characteristically attempts to compensate for a lack resulting
from cultural constraints. It is a literature of desire which
seeks that which is experienced as absence and loss'.3 More than
just compensatory, fantasy is seen to be the very ground on which
the subject's quest is articulated. This is not to suggest that
fantasy abandons all referentiality to the real world, for its
difference constantly demands comparison with reality, and can
only be read in terms of its otherness to a previous construct.
Fantasy does not make good the loss, and Jackson continues:
'Fantasy becomes a literature of separation, of discourse without
an object, foreshadowing that explicit focus upon problems of
literature's signifying activity found in modern anti-realist
texts' (40). The function of fantasy therefore would be to
foreground the difference between the subject and the other, but
by denying the hierarchy in which literature is subordinate to
life, it becomes its own object i.e. a discursive object, through
which the subject's struggle to attain wholeness is constituted
as a struggle with discourse rather than as a struggle with the
abstract conception of history.
In an interview with Ferdinando Camon, Calvino offers a view
of discourse which would seem to support this idea:- 'Solo se il
discorso 4 figurato, indiretto, non riducibile a termini
generici, a facilonerie concettuali, cosciente delle proprie
imp!icazioni, ambiguitd, esclusioni, solo allora dice veramente
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qualcosa, non mente'.4 Thus fantasy through the very nature of
its oblique relationship to reality is able to construct a truer
form of representation.5 Stripped of its referentiality, the
language of fantasy becomes its own point of reference, but
tropes on its own indirect nature to articulate the language of
the desiring subject.
Another feature common to the trilogy is the fact that each
story is told in the first person. Of this Calvino writes: 'ho
avuto bisogno di un personaggio che dicesse "io" forse per
correggere la freddezza oggettiva propria del raccontare favoloso
con quest1 elemento ravvicinatore e lirico1 (360). It is
interesting that Calvino has sought to tame the otherness of the
fantastic mode through the insertion of an I who is perceived as
somehow comforting, a point of identification for the reader. He
goes on to say that each time he chose 'un personaggio marginale
o comunque senza una funzione nell'intreccio', which indicates a
separation between the spheres of narration and of action,
drawing attention to the narrative as a construct. (The idea of
the marginalised narrator, however, must have a direct bearing on
the validity of the conciliatory solutions proposed by Calvino in
the Trilogy and this point shall be developed later.) Calvino
then explains the way in which the presence of this '"io"
narratore-commentatore1 took his attention away from the events
being recounted, particularly in II cava!iere inesistente, fixing
it upon the act of writing itself, and the 'rapporto tra la
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complessitcL dell a vita e il foglio su cui questa complessita si
dispone sotto forma di segni alfabetici'. Whereas in the novels
of Bassani and Pavese, the 'story' was the story of the
experiencing I, here the 'story' is in the writing not in the
1iving.
The shift in emphasis from the idea of narrated life to life
as narration leads Calvino to express his identification with the
narrative act itself: 'mi accorgevo intanto, andando avanti ,
come tutti i personaggi del racconto s'assomigliassero, mossi
com'erano dalla stessa trepidazione, e anche la monaca, la penna
d'oca, la mi a stilografica, io stesso, tutti eravamo la stessa
persona, la stessa cosa, la stessa ansia, lo stesso insoddisfatto
cercare'. Here the 'biographical' relationship posited with the
narrator is not conceived of in terms of lived experience, but is
located in the experience of narrating, in narration as desire.
Calvino seems to suggest that the split subject can, in some way,
achieve wholeness through the act of narration itself, or rather
through the performance of narration instead of through an
intended reconciliation, effected by the narrative between the
past and present selves. He stresses the activity of the subject
of the enonciation thus insisting on reversing the
narration/histoire hierarchy, to offer precedence to the
performative act of narration. He, consequently, posits the
subject of the enonciation as a full desiring subject whose
desire creates the narrative as a product of its wholeness.
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Hence the reality of the subject is to be found in the material
performance of narration rather than in the story which is told.
Narrative is thus a guarantee of physical presence on account of
the conditions which permit its existence. Reality becomes the
presence of the performative narrative act. However as Rimmon-
Kenan has rightly pointed out 'narration' and 'histoire' only
exist as metonymic extensions of the 'rdcit'; thus the force of
the argument is lessened, for the presence of narration can only
be discerned as a refraction of the 'rdcit', its supposed
product.6
In his note to I nostri antenati, Calvino seems to exhibit a
strong proprietorial instinct over the three tales as if to
pronounce that, after all, the author is not dead. Having
seemingly accepted that art or language cannot reproduce life, he
appears to adopt the notion that life is art/language and
retrieve his authority by this means. The relationship between
subjectivity and writing is further discussed by Calvino in the
essay 'Cibernetica e fantasmi'J Calvino discusses the idea of
narrative as a combinatory process and the constraints which the
consequent narrative grammar has on the writer. The realisation
of such constraints is manifested by the Tel Quel group whose way
out of this impasse is expressed thus:
lo scrivere non consiste piu nel raccontare ma
nel dire che si racconta, e quello che si dice
viene a identificarsi con l'atto stesso del
dire, la persona psicologica viene sostituita
da una persona linguistica o addirittura
grammaticale, definita solo dal suo posto nel
185
discorso. (167)
Subjectivity having been banished from the work, the I is no
longer representative of a single identifiable self:
la persona io, esplicita o implicita, si
frammenta in figure diverse, in un io che sta
scrivendo e in un io che 4 scritto, in un io
empirico che sta alle spal1e dell'io che sta
scrivendo e in un io mitico che fa modello
all'io che d scritto. L'io dell'autore nello
scrivere si dissolve: la cosidetta
'personality1 dello scrittore d interna
all'atto dello scrivere, h un prodotto e un
modo dell a scrittura. (172)
From this apparent despair at his own situation, Calvino
comes to view the writer as a depersonalised 'macchina
scrivente1. Having arrived at this conclusion, one perhaps might
think that Calvino would renounce all claims to writing as a
vehicle for the expression and representation of subjectivity,
but in a positively phoenix-like manner, Calvino goes on:
'scompaia dunque 1'autore - questo enfant gate
del 1'inconsapevolezza - per lasciare il suo posto a un uomo piu
cosciente, che saprd che 1'autore e una macchina e sapra come
questa macchina funziona' (173). So the self comes to rescue the
author from his dilemma through the assertion of its self-
awareness, and authority is restored to the author at the
controls of the machine. The literary machine no longer controls
the man. Calvino concludes his essay by arguing that although
all narrative has the same structural composition, not all
combinations have the same effect, and it is this potential
semantic diversity which allows the modern writer to explore the
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unconscious, say the unsaid, and challenge the ways of society.
Once more Calvino's project is one which seeks to retrieve the
self as a significant entity from its dissolution in the quagmire
of post-structuralist thought. 'Cibernetica e fantasmi' was
first published in 1967, some years after the Trilogy, yet even
in his later theoretical writings such as 'I livelli dell a realta
in letteratura' and the posthumous Lezioni americane, Calvino
returns to the same themes. At this stage, however, we can use
these ideas to examine the Trilogy and see that a continual
process of loss and retrieval of the self is in operation.
The conflict between the self and modern society which is
said to be the main theme of the Trilogy is articulated through
narrative both fantastic and written in the first person.8
Through fantasy, the struggle is lifted out of an everyday
context into a dimension which would repudiate the everyday by
making explicit its difference, a difference which again is
highlighted by a first person narrator who not only does not tell
his/her own story, but is also figured as other i.e. the child
narrator, the unheroic brother and the nun.9 Calvino has stated
that he chose the first person form in order to implant the
narrative discourse into the discourse of someone else, creating
a distance between author and work.io Indeed fantasy produces a
similar effect, for if one might be tempted to seek correlations
between the plots of La 1 una e i fa!o and II giardino dei Finzi-
Contim' and the lives of their respective authors, the
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otherworldness of fantasy prevents any such simplistic form of
identification.il Because the work of fantasy has no direct
referentiality outside itself, attention is drawn to its own
artifice and to its construction. What we must question here, is
the potential change in the function of the first person pronoun
in fantastic narrative, for if in realist works it stood as a
guarantor of authenticity, linking the narrative with the real
world, the refusal of that real world must necessarily entail a
restructuring of the I. A dialectic is set up between two
apparently antithetical modes, the result of which would seem
inevitably to lead to a revaluation of the two not only as they
function in the Trilogy, but also in our perception of them as
separate entities.
We have already examined the ways in which the subject is
constructed in first person narrative and how the subject
position is defined through and by the other. This has been
analysed as a cultural, historical phenomenon dependent on a
specific conception of the self. The setting of II visconte
dimezzato in an imaginary spatial and temporal dimension would
seem to make such an analysis impossible in this case.
Nevertheless, it can be established that the workings of
narrative create a subject which is not dependent on the
verisimilitude of the narrative, but on its function within
narrative.
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The first person referent appears in the opening paragraph
where the narrator refers to 'i1 visconte Medardo di Terra!ba mio
zio1 (9), creating a link between the subject of the enonciation
and the content of the enoncd. The narrator does not actually
appear as a character, however, until the beginning of the third
chapter, by which time he has informed the reader of his uncle's
part in the war with the Turks, and made excursions into the
minds of the characters of the narrative with no attempt to
justify his sources of information. Realistically, this can be
seen as an infringement of the reader's genre expectations, but
it is not necessarily perceived as such. A minimal degree of
narratorial presence appears to permit such transgression, as in
the case of Madame Bovary, where the brief initial appearance of
a minimally characterised first person narrator does not limit
the development of the narrative. When Calvino's narrator does
appear as a character, it is in the figure of a small boy. It is
generally assumed that the narrator is still a child at the time
of narration, although there is nothing to indicate the extent of
time elapsed between the 'histoire' and the 'narration'. Indeed
sentences such as: 'Per fortuna da noi a quei tempi, i parti
erano faccende da levatrici e non da medici, se no chissa come si
sarebbe tratto d'impegno' (29) where the temporal reference makes
a clear distinction between the then and now, suggest a greater
divergence than has been proposed. It is true, however, that
events are seen through the eyes of the child, and in this sense
the story is told from a fixed perspective.
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The 'naivety' of this perspective is made apparent in the
narrator's interpretation of events such as the lepers' orgy
scene: 'Non capii bene cosa successe poi; uomini e donne si
buttarono gli uni addosso agli altri e iniziarono quello che poi
appresi doveva essere un'orgia' (45). However, the astute use of
the semi-colon suggests a gap between the narrative act and the
text which is not irrelevant to our discussion, but which shall
be dealt with later when we examine II cava!iere inesistente. It
does, nevertheless, indicate the difficulty of reconciling the
subject of the narrative act and the construction of the text.
The narrator is constantly contradicted by the very text which we
read, he becomes incredible. The recurrent phrase 'Quel bambino
ero io' (21, 42) places the narrator in the position of textual
object, suggesting the alienation between speaker and discourse.
Although the narrator fulfils a testimonial function, the events
which he relates are not rendered believable on account of this,
nor are they made unbelievable on account of his 'unreliability'.
The narrator is irrelevant, and it is the structure and logic of
narrative itself which makes the story 'credible'. The
credibility adheres not to a referential link with the real
world, but to an internal logic whose consistency is its own
authority. It is this narrative logic which makes the tales
readable. The splitting of tledardo is not plausible, but is
credible due to the consistency with which the idea, the quality
is maintained. Thus the narrative triumphs over the speaking
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subject. Authority is seen to adhere to the text and not to the
narrator.
The subjugation of the narrator to the narrative is
interesting if it is compared to Calvino's claim that the major
theme of II Visconte dimezzato is 11'aspirazione a una
completezza al di la delle mutilazioni imposte dalla societa'.
Our previous narrators were perceived as historical subjects, but
the purely literary dimension of this novel suggests that its
narrator cannot be identified in such a directly referential
manner. Yet, unlike the narrator of Le cosmicomiche, the
narrator is not only an 'embodiment' of the narrative function,
but is determined by the network of social relations, defined
within the narrative.12 At first, he seems to escape from the
confines of these relations through which the subject is
constructed:- 'io ero libero come 1'aria, non avevo genitori e
non appartenevo alia categoria dei servi ne a quell a dei padroni.
Facevo parte del la famiglia dei Terralba solo per tardivo
riconoscimento, ma non portavo il loro nome e nessuno era tenuto
ad educarmi' (24). Thus the narrator is neither an insider nor
an outsider. He both belongs to, and is divorced from the family
and from social stratification, and hence would seem to be free
of the mutilations caused by society. We have already seen that
in the works of Pavese and Bassani, family and social identity
are crucial to the structuring of the self, and indeed the idea
of mutilation could be suitably applied to the concept of the
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self within these works.
The narrator of II visconte dimezzato is also free from the
plot of the novel itself, existing only on the sidelines of
events. He seems to enjoy a certain degree of ubiquity,
appearing almost at random at various points of the story's
unwinding, and entering into the company of a vast collection of
groups and individuals. At times, he also adopts the role of
spokesman for these apparently heterogeneous groupings,
commenting for example "cosi passavano i giorni a Terralba, e i
nostri sentimenti si facevano incolori e ottusi, poich£ ci
sentivamo come perduti tra malvagitd e virtu ugualmente disumane1
(64). Does the narrator therefore serve as an image of
wholeness? His response to the reunification of Medardo would
suggest not. He remarks:- 1Io invece, in mezzo a tanto fervore
d'interezza mi sentivo sempre piu triste e manchevole. Alle
volte uno si crede incompleto ed e soltanto giovane1 (70). The
conclusion seems to undermine Calvino's project, for it seems to
suggest that the universal condition is one of 'incompletezza'.
The splitting of Medardo serves as a metaphor for the
divided self.i3 His splitting into a good half and an evil half
does not indicate the manichean struggle, but is used to
highlight the partial nature of man's experience. When Medardo
is divided in two, each half becomes a whole, for each is devoid
of conflict. The benefit of this new perspective is expounded by
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both halves, for it demands a recognition of the split in man's
nature. The evil Medardo's mania for splitting everything in two
aims to force every man from 'la sua ottusa e ignorante
interezza'. He goes on: 'Ero intero e tutte le cose erano per me
naturali e confuse, stupide come 1'aria: credevo di veder tutto
e non era che la scorza...perche bellezza e sapienza e giustizia
ci sono solo in ci6 che k fatto a brani' (37). A similar
realisation is made by the good half:- 'questo & il bene
dell'esser dimezzato: il capire d'ogni persona e cosa al mondo
la pena che ognuno e ognuna ha per la propria incompletezza. Io
ero intero e non capivo, e mi muovevo sordo e incomunicabile tra
i dolori e le ferite seminati dovunque, la dove meno da intero
uno osa credere. Non io solo, Pamela, sono un essere spaccato e
divelto, ma tu pure e tutti.' (52-3)
The effects on the people of Terralba of the good and evil
Medardos are equally devastating. Their wholeness is completely
at odds with the incompleteness of the rest of the world. This
incompleteness is underlined by the other characters in the
novel. In the figures of Mastro Pietrochiodo e il dottor
Trelawney, it is exemplified by the lack of awareness which they
exhibit of the relationship between their science and the lives
of people. The lepers and the Huguenots represent, on the one
hand, the flight from reality and, on the other hand, the
destructive nature of a false sense of morality imposed on
reality.*4 The other characters, Calvino claims, have only a
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functional role in the narrative, the only exception being Pamela
who is 1uno schematico ideogramma di concretezza femminile in
contrasto con la disumanit& del dimezzato1 (356) which perhaps
suggest that the female subject is spared this dilemma. This
duality which has been established between the complete and the
incomplete subject knows no solution, for as the narrator
concludes after his uncle has been sewn back together, 'ma e
chiaro che non basta un visconte completo perche diventi completo
tutto il mondo1 (70). The 'aspirazione a una completezza' of
which Calvino wrote can be seen as no more than an aspiration,
for the narrative itself defies a conciliatory solution to the
question of the split itself.
We have already seen that the relationship between the
narrator and narrative is one of mutual self-definition, and it
is within this context that the role of the narrator of II
visconte dimezzato must be evaluated. He is, at most, a
spectator of events and it can perhaps be argued that this is
necessarily the role which the self must adopt in relation to the
world. It is an estranged self which cannot be defined solely in
relation to itself, but which must engage with that which is
external to it, although no reconciliation can be effected in
this confrontation. As a child, the narrator is perceived to be
and perceives himself as other, but in turn this otherness is
merely a metaphor for the inevitability of being other. Locating
the narrative in an all but ahistorical setting does not
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decontextualise the position of the subject in narrative, but
only makes more obviously explicit the relations between the
subject and narrative. In II visconte dimezzato this is
reflected mainly on the level of content, but in the later
sections of the trilogy, the structure of the narrative is thrown
into question, and this, in turn, bears heavily on the
relationship between the subject and the narrative.
The narrator of II barone rampante is one who remains
marginal to events. He tells of the life of his brother, going
back to the time of his decision to make his life in the trees
and ending with his death. We know little of the narrator
himself except that he is Cosimo's younger brother, he married,
had children and spent a certain amount of time abroad. He is a
self-conscious narrator, and in keeping with the demands of
verisimilitude accounts for his knowledge of events which he
could not have known of directly: 'quello che ora dird, come
molte delle cose di questo racconto dell a sua [Cosimo's] vita, mi
furono riferite da 1ui in seguito oppure fui io a ricavarle da
sparse testimonianze ed induzioni1 (86), is how he begins his
narrative. Thus what we read is, in effect, a narrative of
Cosimo's life told for a second time and hence twice transformed.
He is conscious not only of narrating, but more particularly of
writing. He concludes his story in a manner not dissimilar to
the nineteenth century type of first person narrative where an
elderly narrator looks back and makes his peace with the past,
195
but the outcome of Biagio's narrative is not so conciliatory:
'Io confido i miei pensieri a questo quaderno ne saprei
altrimenti esprimerli: sono stato sempre un uomo posato, senza
grandi slanci o smanie, padre di famiglia, nobile di casato,
illuminato di idee, ossequiente alle leggi. G1i eccessi dell a
politica non m'hanno dato mai scrolloni troppo forti, e spero che
cosi continui. Ma dentro, che tristezza1 (258). 'Tutto &
cenere1 is his ultimate conclusion.
As we have said, the narrator and the narrative are mutually
self-defining, and if the figure of the narrator is only
reflected marginally in this text, narrative £nonce itself takes
on a more prominent role. Unlike II visconte dimezzato, II
barone rampante has a more precise historical setting. Cosimo's
stay begins on June 15th 1767 and the eighteenth century is
evoked through historical events and customs, but especially
through reference to literary figures of the time and their
books. Rousseau, Voltaire and other figures of the Enlightenment
populate the novel, creating the intellectual backdrop to
Cosimo's exploits, and, in particular, it is the Enc.yclopedie
which acts as the inspiration for Cosimo's enlightened attitude
to his fellows and completes the rejection of his feudal
heritage. It is through contact with books that Cosimo first
enters into history and develops a conception of himself as a
historical protagonist.
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Cosimo is riot the only character whose life is changed
through reading, however. His tutor, l'Abbe Fauchelafleur, is
imprisoned for possessing proscribed texts which Cosimo had
encouraged him to purchase, and more strikingly, the bandit, Gian
dei Brughi, having abandoned his life of crime and action to
dedicate himself to the pleasures of the novel, is finally
captured and hanged. Cosimo contrives to satisfy his obsession
by continuing to read to him during his imprisonment and,
finally, as he is led to his death, he discovers that the fate of
Fielding's hero, Jonathan Wild, is about to parallel his own.
This passive renunciation of life and yielding to the pleasures
of narrative are rejected by Cosimo, who not only acts on what he
has read, but also begins to write and publish himself. The
importance of an active notion of the value of literature is
suggested by Cosimo's 'quaderni' in which the villagers could
write their pleasures and sorrows: 1Ne venne un bel quaderno, e
Cosimo lo intitolo "Quaderno del la doglianza e del la
contentezza". Ma quando fu riempito non c'era nessuna assemblea
a cui mandarlo, percib rimase li, appeso all'albero con uno spago
e quando piovve resto a cancellarsi e a infradiciarsi, e questa
vista faceva stringere i cuori degli Ombrosotti per la miseria
presente e li riempiva di desiderio di rivolta1 (239). Here the
power of the literary medium is evoked, but the need for a
responsive audience is also stressed. The rain-sodden book may
well symbolise feelings of revolt amongst the people of Ombrosa,
but it is ineffective without an audience to carry its meaning
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beyond itself.
Before beginning to write, however, Cosimo had come to know
the joy and power of narrating, of creating a story. Biagio
consistently demonstrates a high regard for the verisimilitude of
narration and warns the reader against the excesses of Cosimo:-
'la storia che ora referiro, fu narrata da Cosimo in molte
versioni differenti: mi terro a quel la piu ricca di parti colari e
meno illogica. Se pur 6 certo che mio fratello raccontando le
sue avventure ci aggiungeva molto di sua testa, io, in mancanza
d'altre fonti, cerco sempre di tenermi alia lettera di quel che
1ui diceva' (167-8). Cosimo is more responsive to the demands of
his audience and would transform his narrative 'sotto le
soilecitazioni del suo uditorio plebeo1 (177). This is
interesting, for it demonstrates also Calvino's interest in the
reader/recipient of the narrative and the way in which their
expectations can control the narrative and hence the narrator.
The effect of this is that through the tale told, the teller is
also transformed, and Cosimo's growing image as folk hero depends
as much on what he says, as on what he does. Narrative is shown
to be a significant performative medium. The narrator notes
moreover that while an increasing degree of fictionality appears
to distance the narrator from reality, fiction in turn spawns a
genuine return to reality by way of its excesses:
Insomma, gli [Cosimo] era presa quel la smania
di chi racconta storie e non sa mai se sono piu
belle quelle che gli sono veramente accadute e
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che a rievocarle riportano con se tutto un mare
d'ore passate, di sentimenti minuti, tedii,
felicitd, incertezze, vanaglorie, nausee di s6,
oppure quelle che ci s'inventa, in cui si
taglia giu di grosso, e tutto appare facile, ma
poi piu si svaria piu ci s'accorge che si torna
a pari are delle cose che s1e avuto e capito in
realta vivendo. (178)
Not content merely to narrate his life, Cosimo intersperses
his stories with periods of action which in time he returns to
relate, but again the paradoxical relationship between life and
literature re-emerges. Biagio writes that on his return, Cosimo
'raccontava agli Ombrosotti nuove storie che da vere,
raccontandole, diventavano inventate, e da inventate, vere1
(178). Thus Cosimo1s self comes to be revealed through the act
of narration, but it is a self which emerges obliquely through
language, and is not expressed directly by it. Cosimo's life
develops through his contact with books and through narrative,
and experience of one becomes experience of the other. This idea
is expressed by Calvino in his preface to II sentiero dei nidi di
ragno,
Le letture e l'esperienza di vita non sono due
universi ma uno. Ogni esperienza di vita per
essere interpretata chiama certe letture e si
fonde con esse. Che i 1ibri nascano sempre da
altri libri & una verity solo apparentemente in
contraddizione con l'altra; che i libri
nascano dalla vita pratica e dai rapporti tra
gli uomini.15
This merging of life and literature in II barone rampante is
further compounded by the appearance of Tolstoy's Prince Andrei
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late in the novel. If the imaginary Cosimo can instigate
correspondence with the real historical figures of his time,
surely his world can accommodate another character from the world
of fiction.
Just as the narrators of Pavese and Bassani aimed to achieve
wholeness through narrative, so too, does Cosimo. Life and
narrative are similar in that they are both motivated by desire,
by the need to effect a reconciliation, even when this task
proves impossible. Biagio perceives that in Cosimo's desire to
narrate 'c'era un1insoddisfazione piu profonda, una mancanza, in
quel cercare gente che l'ascoltasse c'era una ricerca diversa.
Cosimo non conosceva ancora 1'amore, e ogni esperienza, senza
quell a, che &?' (178-9). Woman as object of desire is always
problematic in the work of Calvino. In the introduction to ^
nostri antenati, Viola, the object of Cosimo's desire, is posited
as antithetical to Calvino's hero, for she represents 'a
contrasto con la determinatezza illuminista, la spinta barocca e
poi romantica verso il tutto che rischia sempre di diventare
spinta distruttiva, corsa verso il nulla' (357). Consequently
Cosimo's desire has no possibility of satisfying itself and must
flounder in the abyss. Viola, the object of Cosimo's desire is
constantly in flight. Unlike Cosimo who is constrained by his
self-imposed rule not to descend from the trees and whose sense
of self comes to depend on the maintenance of this law, Viola is
defined by her mobility and, therefore, by her elusiveness.
200
Cosimo's desire is to arrest this movement and to possess the
object, but Viola's excursions into his arboreal domain are brief
and provisional, for she refuses to accept Cosimo's law as her
own. Consequently, through her refusal to abide by this male
stricture, through her refusal to be possessed, she becomes an
impossible object. Cosimo seeks a reconfirmation of his
subjectivity through the attempted reconciliation of it with the
other, represented by Viola. Viola, as subject, however, resists
this attempt to redefine her in terms of another's authority.
Cosimo's world can be seen as a realm of pure subjectivity,
a totally autonomous construct. Having rejected the 'real'
world, Cosimo's flight is initially characterised by a
proprietorial desire:- 'Quelle prime giornate di Cosimo sugli
alberi non avevano scopi o programmi ma erano dominate soltanto
dal desiderio di conoscere e possedere quel suo regno' (112). It
is not enough for Cosimo to possess this dimension of pure
subjectivity, for he must be seen to possess it by others.
Consequently, this relationship with others redefines the nature
of this realm which can no longer be said to be autonomous. A
dialectical process of identification is set in motion, but it is
a process which can never result in a material product, for its
relationships are constantly being modified. In order to
overcome this dilemma which prevents the subject's full
recognition by the other, Cosimo must somehow integrate the Other
into this imaginary domaine. The Other resents such enforced
enclosure and indeed cannot be thus enclosed. The object refuses
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to supplement the loss, hence the subject remains prey to an
unfulfilled, unfulfiliable desire.
The connection between sexual desire and narrative desire
has already been noted. Does the impossible conquest and
possession of the former therefore entail a similar defeat for
the latter? A reading of II barone rampante would seem to lead
to such a conclusion. The narrator of the novel indicates the
destructive power of language over the subject when he remarks:
11e imprese che si basano su di una tenacia interiore devono
essere mute e oscure, per poco uno le dichiari o se ne glori,
tutto appare fatuo, senza senso o addirittura meschino' (109).
It has also been seen how the act of narrating itself falsifies
life, and how, at best, life can only be refracted indirectly
through the narrative. The final pages of the novel, however,
demonstrate an awareness of the annihilatory power of language at
an even more acute level. The loss felt by the narrator after
the death of Cosimo cannot be restored through the construction
of his biography. The physical presence of the word cannot
accommodate a presence other than its own. Attention is drawn to
the materiality of the text by the narrator who writes: 'ogni
tanto scrivendo m'interrompo e vado alia finestra1 (260), and in
the end it seems that the only material presence which the text
can recall is itself as a graphic sign pointing to nothing but
itself:-
Ombrosa non c'e piu. Guardando il cielo
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sgombro, mi domando se davvero e esistita.
Quel frastaglio di rami e foglie, biforcazioni,
lobi, spiumii, minuto e senza fine, e il cielo
solo a sprazzi irregolari e ritagli, forse
c'era solo perch<§ ci passasse mio fratello col
suo leggero passo di codibugnolo, era un ricamo
fatto sul nulla che assomiglia a questo filo
d1inchiostro, come 11 ho lasciato correre per
pagine a pagine, zeppo di cancel 1ature, di
rimandi, di sgorbi nervosi, di macchie, di
lacune, che a momenti si sgrana in grossi acini
chiari a momenti si infittisce in segni
minuscoli come semi puntiformi, ora si ritorce
su se stesso, ora si biforca, ora collega grumi
di frasi con contorni di foglie o di nuvole, e
poi s'intoppa, e poi ripiglia a attorcigliarsi,
e corre e corre e si sdipana e avvolge un
ultimo grappolo insensato di parole idee sogni
ed & finito. (261)
All that language can offer is the presence of the word.
The object of narrative becomes the subject, and it is the desire
to make present the subject which motivates narrative. The
failure to achieve this aim results in narrative being forced to
address itself and its own material image. Language and
narrative are no longer the media through which the subject is
(mis)represented, but come to signify an absolute dislocation
between subject and textual identity. The only escape is perhaps
through the resemblance which the trees of Ombrosa bear to the
graphic presence of the narrative, although paradoxically both
are (mis)represented through discourse. Oust as we do not see
the trees, neither too, do we see the actual smudges and lines of
the narrator's text. The final section of the novel consists of
a self-reflexive discourse which points only to itself. Having
testified to the failure of narrative to evoke the presence of
anything other than itself, is the only solution recourse to a
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metanarrative which might seek to re-establish the presence of
the subject through the overt avowal of its own structures? Can
the link between life and literature be located through the
storytelling rather than through the story told?
Linda Hutcheon in Narcissistic Narrative argues that the
modern tendency towards metafiction constitutes a reworking of
the mimetic tradition rather than a rejection of it.is By
exposing its own artifice, metafiction may undermine the Realist
intent, but it assures for itself a mimetic impulse by insisting
on the fact that writing and, consequently, reading belong to
life as much as to art. She writes 'The novel is not a copy of
the empirical world nor does it stand in opposition to it. It is
rather a continuation of that ordering, fiction-making process
that is part of our normal coming to terms with experience' (89).
By insisting on the idea of process rather than product to
encapsulate the notion of narrative and life, Hutcheon
demonstrates how metanarrative can, and does, possess a mimetic
intention. The destruction of the relationship between fiction
and an extratextual referent does not impede the identification
between art and life at the level of storytelling. Language
becomes both the means and the end of metafictional narrative.
We can only make sense of life through language, a process which
mirrors the literary project of reading and writing. This idea
which had been figured mainly on the level of content in II
barone rampante appears in II cava!iere inesistente as a major
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structural device.i7
The third part of Calvino's trilogy may not be considered a
first person text within the typology of traditional critics such
as Romberg. Suor Teodora, the narrator, does not share the
fictive universe of her characters and, therefore, her role would
be seen as authorial rather than narratorial. This claim can be
refuted on two points. The ending of the novel in which Suor
Teodora is revealed to be Bradamante introduces the narrator into
the world of her characters, but more importantly, it can be
argued that the main interest of II cavaliere inesistente lies
not with Agilulfo and the other knights, but with Suor Teodora's
act of narration itself. She posits an existential link between
herself and her narrative by virtue of being its creator.is
The story of Agilulfo and the knights of Charlemagne has
already been well developed by the time Suor Teodora first
intervenes directly in the narrative. The quasi-historical
setting has been undermined by the existence of the non-existent
knight and the narrative's authority lies in its own internal
consistency and logic, rather than in its reference to 'real
life'. It is, as we later learn, a world in which life had not
yet been entirely encoded by language:- 'ancora confuso era lo
stato delle cose del mondo, nell'Evo in cui questa storia si
svolge. Non era raro imbattersi in nomi e pensieri e forme e
istituzioni cui non corri spondeva nulla d'esistente.' (284) This
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suggests the notion of a pre-1inguistic Arcadia where life is
greater than linguistic form.i9
Suor Teodora's intervention at the beginning of the fourth
chapter disrupts the narrative in the same way in which any
authorial intrusion would, but is surprising on account of the
degree of embodiment which accompanies this intrusion. We read
'Io che racconto questa storia sono Suor Teodora, religiosa
dell'ordine di San Colombano. Scrivo in convento, desumendo da
vecchie carte, da chiacchiere sentite in parlatorio e da qualche
rara testimonianza di gente che c'era1 (285). Thus we have the
first image of the 'monaca scrivana1 and it is important to
stress both aspects of this image. As a nun, the narrator
represents a high degree of otherness, perhaps exemplifying the
idea of a non-desiring subject having renounced all worldly
attractions. Secondly, the image of the scribe is significant,
for it intimates the work of a copier and not a creator. The
narrative is, as a result, told through rather than by Suor
Teodora. She cites her sources which are both literary and
testimonial, but importantly both are linguistic. Her position
is one of a second degree narrator. She goes on to ironise her
own position as one who narrates about life, but who has little
experience of it, yet the point she finally makes is this:-
'l'arte di scriver storie sta nel saper tirar fuori da quel nulla
che si 6 capito del la vita tutto il resto; ma finita la pagina
si riprende la vita e ci s'accorge che quel che si sapeva d
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proprio un nulla1 (300). To put life into literature is to
attempt the impossible, for one can only imitate its processes,
and it is with this imitation that its mimetic possibilities lie.
The act of writing is also revealed as a material and time
consuming process. Suor Teodora writes as a penance, her writing
is an act of contrition in which all of life's labours are seen
as one. Writing is restitution. It is an onerous activity which
is conditioned not by the limits of imagination, but by the
material conditions under which she writes:-
'Sotto la mi a eel la d la cucina del convento.
Mentre scrivo, sento 11acciottolio dei piatti
di rame e stagno: le sorelle sguattere stanno
sciaquando le stoviglie del nostro magro
refettorio... Ieri scrivevo dell a battaglia e
nell'acciottolio dell'acquaio mi pareva di
sentir cozzare lance contro scudi e corazze...e
cosi quello che le mie orecchie udivano, i miei
occhi socchiusi trasformavano in visioni e le
mie labbra silenziose in parole e parole e la
penna si lanciava per il foglio bianco a
rincorrerle.1 (294)-20
Life is transcribed metaphorically into the text, determined by
the conditions of its production. Writing is not an autonomous
activity, but like all activities is dependent on its historical
situation for its realisation. The temporal reference 'ieri1
also demonstrates the way in which narrative conceals the nature
of its own performance by excluding information which would
reveal itself as a durative process. For the writer, writing
takes place in time, but the labour is not normally perceived.
Suor Teodora's reference to the previous day's writing highlights
the temporal separation between the narrative we read with its
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own temporal co-ordinates, and the time of writing itself.21
The material nature of the narrative act also comes to bear
on the question of desire in narrative. It is possible to equate
narrative desire with Suor Teodora's task of penance, for both
seek fulfillment and cessation through the completion of the
narrative, through its closure, but at times the narrator tells
of how the physical imprint of the narrative is heavier than its
transcendental, liberating effect. She notes:
Ci si mette a scrivere di lena ma c'e un'ora in
cui la penna non gratta che polveroso
inchiostro, e non vi scorre piu una goccia di
vita, e la vita e tutto fuori, fuori dalla
finestra, fuori di te, e ti sembra che mai piu
potrai rifugiarti nella pagina che scrivi,
aprire un altro mondo, fare il sal to. Forse d
meglio cosi: forse quando scrivevi con gioia,
non era miracolo ne grazia: era peccato,
idol atria, superbia. Ne sono fuori, allora?
No, scrivendo non mi sono cambiata in bene: ho
solo consumato un po' d'ansiosa incosciente
giovinezza. Che mi varranno queste pagine
scontente? II libro, il voto, non varra piu di
quanto tu vali. Che ci si salvi 1'anima
scrivendo non e detto. Scrivi, scrivi, e gia
la tua anima e persa. (307)
Writing is an act of renunciation which is undertaken in the hope
of restoring to the subject that which she has lost, but the
value of this is put in doubt, as writing becomes more and more
closely associated with 'la penna' and 'la pagina bianca', and
the 'veritd' which the narrator seeks to discover constantly
recedes in the chase over the white pages, which seem to offer
the promise of the desired object, but which, in fact, serve only
as lures in the never-ending chase.
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The impossibility of the narrative ever attaining its
object, and the frustration which this results in, lead the
narrator to adopt graphic means in order to further her
narrative. Instead of narrating, she begins to draw lines on the
paper to indicate the paths which the knights travel, and
pictures to represent the places where they go. This shift from
a linguistic to a non-linguistic signifier cannot alter the fact
that the presence of the sign irrevocably denotes the absence of
that which it stands for.22 Finally, the narrator resorts to the
use of the arrow to combat the abyss discerned between life and
the blank page, but as Jo Ann Cannon points out: 'The recourse
to the arrow merely confirms the inability of signs to be
anything other than indicators: the arrow is in fact a sign par
excellence, representing a movement toward something else.1 (45)
It is a testament of the failure to represent desire in language,
desire which is felt through movement towards its object and
likewise is experienced as absence.
Paradoxically, the signs which the narrator chooses to adopt
are not reproduced graphicially in the text, but are themselves
indexed by linguistic signs. We are told of the signs, but they
are themselves absent. Richard Andrews argues that by writing
about signs, Calvino has breached the impasse perceived by Suor
Teodora:
Words and signs, it is true, have no intrinsic
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meaning but nor does the world as a whole -
until it is selectively interpreted into words
and signs.... The impossibility of writing is
successfully written about. To watch a story
being composed, to be aware of the conscious
and arbitrary choices involved, turns out
neither to obscure the story nor to make it
insignificant. Rather the story becomes doubly
interesting - as an event described, and as an
artefact which describes it.23
This assertion would appear to be supported by the conclusion of
the novel itself when life and literature are almost miraculously
reunited, as Suor Teodora reveals herself to be Bradamante and
finds her happy ending with Rambaldo. Cannon remarks: 'this deus
ex machina ending becomes a metaphor for the desired
reconciliation of fiction and the external world1 (46). Such an
ending cannot evoke a sense of closure for the 'desired
reconciliation' does not engage with the issues which the text
has broached. Cannon concludes: 'regardless of the author's
intentions, the conciliatory conclusion is overshadowed by the
evidence of the text itself: the "segni alfabetici" and the
"complessit^ della vita" remain distinct' (47).
Having called the value of the signifier into doubt, the
dilemma cannot be resolved through the use of the same process of
signification. The narrative, which has been constructed through
a series of arbitrary choices, cannot be closed through the
arbitrary identification of the narrator with one of her
protagonists. Calvino's strategy which seeks to transform
process into product belies his own argument. Also the cessation
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of desire achieved through Bradamante/Suor Teodora's abandonment
of the imaginary signifier, ie Agilulfo/the word in favour of
Rambaldo, the male subject/life, is merely the transfer of desire
from one signifier to another, and does not result in evoking the
presence of the signified. The reconciliation effected by Suor
Teodora between life and literature when she writes: 'la pagina
ha il suo bene solo quando la volti e c'& la vita dietro che
spinge e scompiglia tutti i fogli del libro' (350), operates only
on the level of the plot and only at the expense of the medium
through which the plot is expressed. This assertion reveals a
wish to ignore the material dimension of the signifier, and
identify solely with the desire which propels the medium. The
narrator becomes the desire by becoming part of the plot and
renouncing all notion of authority as the subject of the
16nonciation1. The author, figured in the persona of Suor
Teodora, consciously surrenders to the plethora of signs
constructed by the text, accepting the absence which the sign
implicitly bears.
In his essay 'What is an author?', Michel Foucault discusses
what he considers to be two of the major themes of contemporary
writing.24 Firstly, he notes that 'today's writing has freed
itself from the dimension of expression' (142) with the result
that it is a strategy concerned with the signifier, rather than
with the signified content. He concludes: 'in writing, the
point is not to manifest or exalt the act of writing, nor is it
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to pin a subject within language; it is rather a question of
creating a space into which the writing subject constantly
disappears.1 Secondly, Foucault discusses the relationship
between writing and death. He argues that contemporary writing
subverts the tradition which sought to 'perpetuate the
immortality of the hero' i.e. the idea of narrative as redemption
by conceptualising narrative as a sacrifice. He writes: 'it
(writing) is now a voluntary effacement which does not need to be
represented in books, since it is brought about in the writer's
very existence. The work, which once had the duty of providing
immortality, now possesses the right to kill, to be its author's
murderer'. This is compounded by the fact that writing cannot
individualise the author. Foucault concludes: 'the mark of the
writer is reduced to nothing more than the singularity of his
absence; he must assume the role of the dead man in the game of
writing' (143).
Foucault's ideas are relevant here because both Suor Teodora
and Biagio are figured as authors, and both experience the
dilemma outlined by Foucault. The crisis is not confronted by
Biagio until the final passages of his narrative. Effectively,
he has been writing in order to perpetuate the life of his
brother through narrative, but he finally realises that the
written word does not ensure immortality, but is the definitive
stamp of death. Cosimo's absence is intensified through the
confrontation with the text as a purely graphic sign, and Cosimo,
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as sign, thus signifies pure absence. In the end, all that the
written word can represent is its own materiality. Biagio's task
is not unlike that of Scheherazade who wards off death every
night by telling a story. Biagio, however, ultimately runs out
of plots, and the narrative which signals the death of Cosimo,
necessarily entails the death of his author. The text becomes a
testament to his own demise.
While II barone rampante ends at the moment of crisis, in II
cava!iere inesistente the crisis seems to have been overcome.
Suor Teodora not only experiences the alienation of the signifier
from the signified, but also the dislocation effected between the
sign and its producer. Her association is one of pure
materiality, as she chases the pen over the page, in its
ceaseless momentum from signifier to signifier. The resolution
of this conflict, in which she assumes herself as a textual
signifier in the figure of Bradamante, signals the end of
authorship. Indeed she becomes an intertextual signifier
denoting pure literariness, for Bradamante is a sign which refers
only to other books, as the heroine of the romance.25 The
resolution becomes, in effect, a kind of suicide as she accepts
the inevitability of her disappearance. Like Agilulfo, whose
identity is constructed by his own intention, but whose death is
caused by his failure to signify within the discourse of the
other once Sofronia is (mistakenly) discovered not to have been a
virgin, Suor Teodora's identity is dependent on its place in
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discourse. It is constructed at a point created through the
interplay of signs. Her surrender to the narrative is a
recognition that the author cannot escape death by baring the
bones of his narrative and by trying to introduce his presence by
the back door. To write that one is writing inevitably entails
the fact that one is written. Patricia Waugh in Metafiction
writes:
A last, desperate strategy before the game is
handed over entirely to language is to admit
that one is telling a story, creating an
alternative world. Such an admission
functions, however, merely to assert more
emphatically that 'one' exists, 'one' is the
source of this world, 'one' is an author.
However, once 'one' is recognised as itself a
construction produced through textual
relationships, then worlds, texts, and authors
are subsumed by language.26
In the light of this, it is somewhat paradoxical for Calvino to
assert that II cavaliere inesistente represents 'la conquista
del 1'essere'. This conquest can only function at the level of
the plot, but as has been demonstrated, the plot is only the
result of a succession of arbitrary choices whose logic and
referentiality point to nothing but its construction as a product
of discourse. The link between life and literature which had
been said to exist at the level of story-telling is shown to be a
form of perdition as the subject's position as producer of
discourse is rendered untenable.
At this stage, it is important to make a distinction between
the narrators of Bassani and Pavese and the author/narrators of
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Calvino's Trilogy. In the first instance, the narrators of
Pavese and Bassani are conceived of in the fiction as historical
subjects whose biography is constructed in a phase subsequent to
their life experience. We have seen how as subjects they are
constructed as products of discourse, but an essential part of
the fictional autobiography is that history necessarily precedes
its rendering into discourse. Their subjectivity is dependant
upon a supposedly historical reference. Conversely, in the
Trilogy this hierarchy is reversed. The shift from a realist to
a fantastic mode, and the conscious figuring of the narrators in
terms of their otherness, undermines the realist motivation of
the first person text. Here, the producers of discourse are
never posited as being anything more than discursive entities who
participate in an avowedly fictional world. All sense of
referentiality to an exterior world is conspicuously abandoned.
What we see unfolding is a discourse which consciously precedes
'histoire' and which therefore adopts preeminence over it.
The result of Calvino's progressive abandonment of the
fiction of the narrator, as an historical referent, results in
attention being focussed solely on the narrator as the embodiment
of the narrative function. Teresa de Lauretis writes: 'The
narrator has no function in relation to action development, nor
is she there to favour the author's identification or to provide
a specific point of view. On the contrary her voice is totally
outside the narrative context and is thus capable of attracting
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the attention to the very act of narrating as discourse, that is,
creation by means of language and to the structuring process of
writing (<§criture)' (416). A gap is created between author and
narrator as all notions of verisimilitude are subverted and the
narrator is shown to be uniquely a textual voice. De Lauretis
continues: 'As the narrators become more and more anonymous,
pure literary personae, so is discourse increasingly detached
from and finally deprived of any narrative support proper1 (417).
The idea of a narrating consciousness has been reduced to a
narrative function. The narrators of Pavese and Bassani and
their narratives are engaged in a mutually validating system of
authentification by virtue of their claims to an historical
existence. Calvino rejects this fictional projection to
demonstrate the priority of discourse and the narrative function.
The verisimilar code which regulates first person narrative is
openly flaunted by Calvino, who exposes the code as nothing more
than a textual strategy designed to uphold the authoritative
mystique. The fusion of the figures of Bradamante and Suor
Teodora is a recognition that the attempt to assert authorial
authority over the text by entering into its level of discourse
inevitably leads to the author becoming a textual property, part
of the textual fiction.
By making the role of the narrator/author an overt part of
the fiction, Calvino succeeds, almost despite himself, in
dismantling the concept of the author as the sole authority for
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the discourse. The narrative can no longer be seen as the
property of one being, for the text constantly refers not to this
supposed origin but to itself as text and to other texts. In
this context, Calvino's adoption of the medieval romance as a
point of reference is not casual.27 The romance consists of a
conscious reworking of already known situations with familiar
characters and displays a high degree of intertextuality. Born
of an oral tradition in which the I who recited the tale laid no
claim to proprietorial rights over the narrative, the text was,
in a sense, public property, and its authority lay not with its
'spokesman1, but with its own tradition. Two other features seem
to characterise the romance. Firstly, it is a narrative of
action, its appeal lying in the tale well told and the constant
renewal of narrative desire as episode follows episode. Secondly
it lends itself to an allegorical interpretation, with the quest
for identity occupying an important position.28 in the
introduction to the Trilogy, Calvino seems to adopt all three
facets of the tradition, which, it might be argued, is
anachronistic in this century. He does so, however, not to flee
reality but in order to question it. The constant subversion of
the reader's genre expectations both in terms of the novel and of
the romance force a confrontation with the narrative as a textual
construct.29
As has already been noted, the fantastic can only function
when read in terms of the real, for it owes its otherness to this
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implied norm. The image which it reflects, however, is then re¬
read, and it is through the creation of this gap that fantasy
works on the preconceived reality. The trilogy works to
undermine the notion of the I-narrator/author as anything other
than a textual voice. The struggle between the subject and the
word/discourse can only be resolved, it seems, through the
subject's surrendering to discourse, and through his acceptance
of the self as a sign amongst signs. While, on the one hand,
this signals the death of the author, it does not necessarily
entail the death of the subject. It does, however, suggest that
the construction of narrative alone does not compensate for the
subject's lack, for narrative by its very nature is not whole,
but is in itself a sign amongst signs whose meaning undergoes
continual reformation. While this notion is implicit in the
works of Pavese and of Bassani, it is overtly foregrounded in
Calvino's trilogy. The solution which seems to be proposed is
that the subject should not try to seek confirmation of a self
which can only be constituted as a sign, but should enter into
the game of language and accept its mobility. The alternative is
death, the realm of non-signification.
Barthes has written 'Le Roman est une hort; il fait de la
vie un destin, du souvenir un acte utile et de la duree un temps
dirig£ et significatif'.30 The anti-realist novel challenges
death by its refusal to accept an empirical referent, and by a
rejection of the narrative structures which would close its
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meaning. Calvino's texts subvert the quest for wholeness and
belie the intention to conquer discourse by the adoption of a
ludic metanarrative. The conciliatory solution proposed in II
cava!iere inesistente perhaps betrays the fiction-making process
and its priority over the historical subject, but at the same
time reveals its power to refuse closure by predicting the
beginning of further tales to tell. The text refuses to end, and
thus disputes the death of the subject. It seeks to harness the
structures of desire generated by the other and appropriate them
for itself. It is an assertion of the self as master of the
ludic structure of narrative.
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CHAPTER SIX
Strategies of Mastery - II castello dei destini
incrociati and Se una notte d'inverno an viaggiatore
The transition which is witnessed through the course of the
Trilogy, from interest in the 'vissuto' to interest in the act of
narration itself, is carried further in II castello dei destini
i ncrociati, and its companion La taverna dei destini incrociati.
We have seen the way in which the hierarchy of lived experience
and narrative experience was reversed, by the manipulative hand
of Suor Teodora, who demonstrated the precedence of narrative
ordering in attributing significance and form to a disorderly
past. Authority has been seen to lie with the language of
narrative and not with the events which supposedly precede it,
and the authority of the narrator is due to a privileged, albeit
restricted, relationship with the linguistic reconstruction of
experience which permits the production of the subject as
narrator, as much as it allows the production of 'her'
narrative.i The idea of possession itself is seen to be an
illusory image of control over the system of signs, for the
system necessarily exists prior to the subject's entry into it.
Calvino's later work emphasises the precarious nature of this
possession, and underlines the incomplete nature of the subject's
relationship with the narrative system, demonstrating the
inevitable lack experienced by the subject in narrative.
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If the Trilogy can be said to be set in a fantastic-
historical realm, the setting of II castello and its companion
piece seems to elude the element of historical referentiality
completely, replacing it with a set of co-ordinates which refer
only to the literary experience itself. Both are set in a kind
of lost demesne in the midst of a dark forest. In the first
book, the narrator arrives at the castle by crossing a
drawbridge. He dismounts from his horse and then enters the
castle which is already thronged with other travellers. Crossing
the wood has been fraught with danger for the traveller, and his
sense of weariness and confusion is only added to by his entry
into the castle. He is immediately confronted by two diverse
aspects of the setting and cannot decide which predominates,
unable to assimilate the meaning of what he sees before him. The
great hall into which the traveller enters, has both the aspect
of a royal court and that of a 11ocanda di passo'.z Either the
court has fallen into decline and taken on the customs of a
wayside inn, or the inn has gradually adopted some of the customs
of a refined lifestyle. This mystery is never resolved, but
remains open with possibilities.
To add to the traveller's sense of disorientation, he
realises that everyone in the great hall, including himself, has
been struck dumb. Thus a fundamental human need has been
frustrated: that of communication. Traditionally, the wayside
inn was a place where people met in order to exchange their
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experiences, to tell their own tales, and likewise travellers
were amongst the keenest storytellers of all. Deprived of the
power of speech, the travellers must resort to other means in
order to tell their tales, and the way out of this impasse is
provided by a pack of tarot cards. The pattern is set thus:
Uno dei commensali tiro a se le carte sparse,
lasciando sgombra una larga parte del tavolo;
ma non le radund in mazzo ne le mescolo; prese
una carta e la posd davanti a s<§. Tutti
notammo la somiglianza tra il suo viso e quello
dell a figura, e ci parve di capire che con
quell a carta egli voleva dire 1io' e che
s'accingeva a raccontare la sua storia.(6)
Having identified himself with the first card, the traveller goes
on to tell his story by choosing other cards and placing them in
a linear sequence in order to form his narrative.3 The first
person narrator's subsequent narration is, in fact, a
narrativised reading of this and the stories which follow. As we
shall see, this is not an unproblematic procedure.
The cards are of a highly intricate and ornate design,
themselves the work of a skilled craftsman. Placed alongside the
narrator's own text to produce the effect of a dual narration,
we, the readers of the printed text, may fail to perceive the
subtleties of their design, with the result that part of their
narrative becomes disseminated and lost due to the vagaries of
the printed medium of reproduction. The cards themselves are, as
Maria Corti points out, divided into two separate categories,
i.e. 'carte-soggetti1 and 1carte-predicati'. The former refers
to the face cards which are used to represent 'characters' in the
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tales, while the latter group symbolically conveys the action.
One of the principal functions of the first group is to provide a
set of ideal images or egos with which each narrator can identify
and select the appropriate image from this range of
possibilities. The range is obviously limited, however, so in
effect when each narrator says 'I' and identifies with a
particular image, he is necessarily compromising his
individuality in order to adopt a position which will permit him
to enter into the narrative role. Thus while the 'carte-
soggetti1 provide a necessary element of identification for the
subject, they also delineate the point of separation and
alienation between the self and the narrating subject. By
adopting the role of narrative subject, the self must necessarily
effect a choice which is not of his own making. He is not the
origin of his own story. Similarly, once this choice has been
made, the narrator can only develop his story with the aid of the
signs which are available to him. Consequently, this means that
only certain things may be said, and what these are, depends not
on the narrator, but on what the system of signs offers to him.4
As he progresses along the narrative chain, each card takes him
further and further away from his own story.
To use a pack of tarot cards as a narrative medium for
recounting the past would seem to indicate a radical departure
from the traditional uses to which the cards have been put. The
cards would normally be used either to predict the future, or
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simply, for the purpose of playing a game. However, these
dimensions are not entirely absent from the function which they
fulfil in the text. In order to predict the future, the reader
of the cards must construct a narrative exploiting, on the one
hand, the traditional wisdom of interpreting the cards, and on
the other, bringing to bear a personal intuitive gift in order to
attribute specific signification. It is, however, a narrative of
possibility which emerges, as the future is as yet uncertain, but
again it is the narrative act which constructs this realm of
possibility, in the same way as another narrative predicates a
narrative of the past. In predicting the future, the reader of
the cards selects one series of possibilities from the many, but
this choice inevitably involves a rejection of the other
eventualities which might befall. However, because the events
predicated have not yet occurred the structure of their narrative
remains much more open, for at the moment of narration there can
be no recourse to history in order to substantiate their
authenticity.
The narrator of the future unleashes a series of
possibilities which engage the imagination alone, suggesting a
multitude of readings beneath the cryptic signs proffered by the
cartomancer. The cards are complex signs, for they are
polysemantic and reject any attempt to subjugate the richness of
this multiplicity of meaning. The cards have no absolute
univocal meaning and are indeed meaningless, if deprived of a
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wider narrative support. Calvino in his note to the text writes:
'ho ritenuto sopratutto 1'idea che il significato d'ogni singola
carta dipende dal posto che essa ha nella successione di carte
che la precedono e la seguono1 (124). Thus it emerges that while
some cards e.g. 'il Sole' may possess a literal, iconic meaning,
their semantic potential can only be realised in the combinatory
process which is narrative.5 The nameless first person narrator
of the text is thus placed in a similar position to that of the
fortune-teller. Not only is he the narrator of the text which we
read, he is also the reader of the various narratives which form
the text. Consequently, the two apparently contradictory
functions merge, as it becomes clear that every narrative is
inevitably a primary reading, and the primacy of the former over
the latter is reversed.6
From the beginning, it is clear that the narrator is engaged
in an activity which can only reveal a literature of possibility
and not of historical certainty. He offers us a reading of the
cards but his narrative indicates the provisional nature of this
reading as one interpretation amongst many. Having seen the
opening sequence of cards relating the first story, he writes:
'dunque 1'inizio del la storia poteva essere questo' (8),
indicating his uncertainty in the act of reading. As to the
meaning of the 'Due di Coppe', he suggests that it might
represent 'un indizio piu che probabile d'un incontro amoroso'
(9). When 'II Sole1 is laid on the table, he speculates that
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'forse piu che sul significato allegorico del la figura conveniva
soffermarsi su quello letterale1 (11). He then ponders 'la
soluzione dell'enigma' (11), and concludes, when faced with the
opacity of the narrative, 'non ci restava che azzardare delle
congetture1 (12).
The narrator's use of the conditional tense throughout
underlines that reading is merely the selection of a series of
possibilities, and that this selection, inevitably, entails the
rejection of a number of equally valid interpretations. The
reader works, not only to construct a linear logic linking the
cards, but also fleshes out and amplifies the story. The
narrator imagines dialogue between the participants of the tales
and suggests alternative endings to the story. What we witness,
is the reader as an active tabulator and not a passive recipient
of the narrating voice. The reader actively anticipates the next
card in the sequence - 'ora ci raccontera il duello' (12) - but
is also subject to the strategy of the narrator who may choose to
toy with the reader's desire to know what happened next. The
gestures of the narrators (again lost to us readers of the text)
accompany the laying down of the cards, as if to accentuate the
tension and revitalise the anecdote.
Each narrator exhibits different traits which, in turn,
demand a different response from the reader. When Faust tells
his tale, a literal interpretation is made difficult 'per il modo
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di raccontare dell'alchimista, sempre ellittico e allusivo' (19).
Thus the narrator and his audience become engaged in a struggle
to elicit meaning from the cards which are opaque, on account of
the very plethora of possible meanings which they suggest, but
refuse to render. The iconic nature of each card suggests a
meaning which is subsequently amended and modified by the cards
which follow, thus subjecting each reading to a re-reading, and
more significantly, to a constant deferral of meaning. This
deferral of meaning is similar to the deferral necessitated by
the attempt to look into the future, for it allows a limitless
free play from one signifier to another, where all meanings are
possible, and whatever is rejected, can always be retrieved.
The element of play which is suggested by the cards is also
incorporated into the structure of the text. Card games may
largely be regarded as pastimes, and indeed in II castello one of
the main functions of the storytelling activity is to allow the
travellers to consume the period of waiting before re-embarking
on their journeys, just as Scheherazade, perhaps the greatest
storyteller of al1, is dependent on this quality in order to gain
time for herself. The story itself, however, inhabits a
curiously atemporal zone, just like that of a card game, for
although the context in which both take place may change, both
are capable of infinite repetition, and consequently, infinite
sameness. Both have other features in common. While one may
play cards, the nature of the game is, in no way, anarchic. Card
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games are highly formalised and channel the desire for play in
specific ways, according to specific rules. Each card has a
value, but the value is not inherent to the card: it is
dependent on the place attributed to it within the game.
Likewise, each player participates only according to the
possibilities offered by the rules of the game, and can adopt
only the positions offered to him by the game. His self is lost
to the role of player.7 Thus the narrators too obey the rules of
narrative established by the first narrator, as they all commence
by nominating a card to represent themselves, and go on by
following the pre-established pattern.
The tarot cards are the language which the narrators use,
and the narrative grammar is composed by means of the linear and
symmetrical patterning of the cards. While each player must obey
the rules of the game, there nevertheless remains some scope for
the player to develop an individual strategy. This degree of
choice is paralleled in the construction of the narratives, as
each narrator can choose the cards which he wishes to represent
his tale. Bernardini Napoletano writes:
'I tarocchi sono percio i segni del la lanque,
il mezzo di comunicazione; nella parole si
attua lo sforzo individuale di dare un ordine
al disordine dell a natura entro, una struttura
logica, il quadrato del la 1raccontabi1ita1 in
cui confluiscono tutti i racconti e gli ordini
possibili, trasformando la natura attraverso
1 'espressione in mondo, ciod civiltd.s
The order, which permits individual expression within a socially
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defined context, proves to be both the starting point and the end
of narrative possibilities. Once all the cards have been used
and laid on the table, their geometrical symmetry appears before
us, but although all the signs have been displayed, the fullness
of their meaning has not been achieved, for having been read,
they can now be re-read and re-interpreted according to their
position in the final schema. The provisional nature of this
apparently definitive structure is most fully demonstrated as the
landlady of the castle, having reached the end of the game
reaches for the cards: 'allora le sue mani sparpagliano le
carte, mescolano il mazzo, ricominciano da capo' (48). Like all
games, the game of narrative can constantly renew itself and
produce new variations within the structures furnished by its
rules, but it does so on the basis of its combinative
possibilities and on the inexhaustibility of its readings. It is
the form of the game which permits this, and not the uniqueness
of the players.9
One of the features which allows the success in the
development of the narrative structure in II castello is the
acceptance of the rule of chance in the game. After the opening
tale, each story is built out of the 'affiancamenti casuali1 of
two cards and each player/narrator happily builds his narrative
out of this chance encounter and the remaining cards. In La
taverna, however, possession of the cards is more fiercely
contested, as each narrator must fight to take hold of each card
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and protect it, from the grasping hands of his fellow narrators.
This desire for mastery entails the destruction of the
symmetrical pattern achieved in II castello, for cards appear and
re-appear in various places out of sequence. The 'grammar',
which would structure the whole, disintegrates as the rules are
constantly violated and the symmetry of the structure collapses.
Bernardini Napoletano writes: 'I tarocchi, non piu segni con cui
istituire una grammatica sono diventati le rappresentazioni
sparse dell'esperienza vissuta e dell a realty, non piu
strutturabi1e' (150). The dissolution of the structure seems to
entail the incapacity of the structure to enclose the demands of
experience. The void at the centre of the final pattern in La
taverna is suggestive of the existential abyss over which the
structure has been created, unable to represent life experience
without distortion and compromise, but contemporaneously offering
the only possible means of representation.
The tales, which are produced by the narrator's reading of
the signs, appear as the re-elaborations of the great tales of
the Western tradition. The fates of Orlando, Oedipus, Faust,
Macbeth and Helen of Troy are interwoven, creating a landscape
that is purely literary, with no historical referent other than
the history of the text itself. These tales have become common
property, and the story of the self is at once subsumed to the
social context, which can only allow the production of a limited
number of variants. While each tale may be unique in its
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manifestations, inevitably, it tells the same story as every
other tale.10 The ludic nature of the combinatory narrative
process is contained within the compact structure of II castello,
but in La taverna, both thematically and structurally, the tales
take on a vertiginous dimension, in the spiralling vortex of
literariness, as the reading becomes increasingly problematised.
The relationship between the narrator and the tale enters into a
phase of crisis as chronology becomes destabilised and the
subject ever more irretrievable.il
The possibilities of meaning, which were indicated in II
caste!lo, develop into contradictory messages which point the way
to an impossibility of meaning, ending in the three tales of
madness and the abandonment of the game. This final dissolution
is already prefigured in the 'storia del regno dei vampiri', in
itself the story of a transgressive and unacceptable
transformation. The narrator contemplates the array of cards and
writes:
Le stesse carte in questo racconto vengono
lette a rilette con significati diversi; la
mano del narratore oscilla convulsa e indica La
Torre e l'Appeso come invitandoci a riconoscere
nelle telefoto sfocate d'un giornale del la sera
le istantanee d'un atroce fatto di cronaca:
una donna che precipita da vertiginosa altezza
nel vuoto tra le facciate dei grattacieli. (87-
88)
The plethora of possible readings, unleashed by the cards, flees
the tremulous control of the narrator's intentions. The
anachronistic images of death, in which the unknown woman
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plummets into the void, parallel the heady transportation of the
narrator whose meaning is lost in the graphics of narrative and
its readings. The word-image transcends the barriers of time,
creating a dechronologised atemporal existence. The game betrays
the player.
Although each tale has a narrator, this role does not appear
in the first person in the written text. However, it might be
asserted that this role is figured in the graphic narrative of
the cards. The first person 'authority' belongs to the reader of
the stories, but into the complex narrative framework of II
castel1o and La taverna, this unnamed narrator/reader also
attempts to insert his own narrative. In II castello, the
narrator tries to discern his own story amidst the arrangement of
cards, but is unable to do so. He writes:
Certamente anche la mi a storia e contenuta in
questo intreccio di carte, passato presente
futuro, ma io non so piu distinguerla dalle
altre. La foresta, il castello, i tarocchi
m'hanno portato a questo traguardo: a perdere
la mi a storia, a confonderla nel pulviscolo
delle storie, a liberarmene. Quello che rimane
di me e solo 1'ostinazione maniaca a
completare, a chiudere, a far tornare i conti.
(46)
The narrator has lost his story in the complexity of the
narrative structure, suggesting also the unremarkable character
of the story of the self, and the tenuous hold which the self
might have on its own story. The loss of the self is, however,
immediately figured as liberation, as the narrator makes no
attempt at retrieval. Failure to possess the part, however, is
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transformed into the desire to possess the whole, as the narrator
goes on to complete the symmetry of all possible tales. The
narrator does not possess the cards, and at the very moment of
completion, as has already been noted, the cards are reshuffled,
and the narrator's tale is lost forever.
In La taverna, greater space is devoted to the narrator's
own destiny. In the chapter entitled 'Anch'io cerco di dire la
mia', the narrator attempts to articulate his own past at greater
length. Like each of the other narrators, he must choose a card
with which to introduce himself. Initially, he identifies with
the 'Re di Bastoni' who appears to be wielding a tool which might
be identified as a pen. It is not enough for the narrator to
select one mirror-image of himself, and he subsequently selects
three other cards in which he imagines himself to be figured:-
il Cavaliere di Spade, l'Eremita and II Bagatto. Thus the writer
identifies not with one imaginary double, but with four,
suggesting a further fragmentation of the writing-I in its
habitual confrontation with the other. The image of wholeness,
which is suggested but belied by the adoption of an imaginary
ego, is further undermined by the splitting involved in the
adoption of further subject positions. The biography produced by
this choice is instructive. The narrator writes:
Per sentieri d'inchiostro s'allontana al
galoppo lo slancio guerriero del la giovinezza,
l'ansia esistenziale, l'energia del 1'aventura
spesi in una carneficina di cancellature e
fogli appal 1ottolati. E nella carta che segue
mi ritrovo nei panni d'un vecchio monaco
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segregato da anni nella sua eel la, topo di
biblioteca che perlustra a 1 ume di lanterna una
sapienza dimenticata tra le note a pie di
pagina e i rimandi degl i indici analitici.
Forse d arrivato il momento d'ammettere che il
tarocco numero uno d il solo che rappresenta
onestamente quello che sono riuscito a essere,
un giocoliere o illusionista che dispone sul
suo banco da fiera un certo numbero di figure e
spostandole, connettendole e scambiandole
ottiene un certo numero d'effetti. (104-105)
The first image presented is specifically associated with
the figure of Stendhal, 'l'Egotista di Grenoble'. It is a heroic
image, lived nevertheless vicariously through the written word,
and indeed destroyed by it. The written word is seen to be the
graveyard of desire. The second card offers the picture of the
writer as scholar tapping the fonts of wisdom, but he is also
figured as a solitary ascetic in a dimly-lit world of books,
searching for the light of knowledge which should radiate from
them. Finally, the narrator adopts 'II Bagatto' as the ego which
most fully represents him. The image of the conjurer, who by
sleight of hand, is able to generate certain illusions but
nothing which is real, re-introduces the notion of play into the
text and the idea that literature is unable to fulfill any
function beyond that of its own creation.i2
Although the narrator creates a chronological effect by
displaying the cards in a linear fashion, it is misleading to
read the cards as signifying a temporal progression. The various
mirrors which the narrator selects, co-exist to create a collage
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effect rather than a pictorial narrative. Each image is partial,
and its truth emerges from its very fragmentation. The wholeness
of each image is modified by its relationship with the others,
and if a composite image of the self is produced, the result is,
as Marilyn Schneider points out, that neither the card nor the
storyteller 'exceeds the ontological status of image'.
In his essay, 'I livelli dell a realty in 1etteratura',
Calvino argues that the only reality which the written word can
create, is that of the 'parola scritta'.i3 He goes on:
la condizione preliminare di qualsiasi opera
letteraria e questa; la persona che scrive
deve inventare quel primo personaggio che e
1'autore dell'opera. Che una persona si metta
tutto se stesso nell'opera che scrive e una
frase che si dice spesso ma che non corrisponde
mai a verita. E sempre solo une proiezione di
se stesso che 1'autore mette in gioco nella
scrittura, e pud essere la proiezione d'una
vera parte di se stesso come la proiezione d'un
io fittizio, d'una maschera. (316/7)
Thus at most the self which does emerge from the text can only be
a projection, an imaginary I which is not the 'real' I. The
literariness of the self created by narrative is confirmed by the
readings offered by the first person narrator. Each series of
cards produces a reworking of a tale already told; thus the
narrator can only read what has already been read. This is
reminiscent of the principle feature of the folk-tale, noted by
Calvino in his introduction to Fiabe italiane, when he writes of
the most secret property of the folk-tale as being 'la sua
infinita varietd ed infinita ripetizione'. While the folk-tales
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may vary in detail, their central concerns remain irreducibly the
same. Nevertheless, Calvino goes on to argue the central
importance of the narrator to each tale and the uniqueness of
each narration. It is through the narrator, he writes, 'che si
mutua il sempre rinnovato legame del la fiaba atemporale col mondo
dei suoi ascoltatori, con la Storia1 (XIX).
In II caste!lo and La taverna, this relationship between the
narrator, his tale and history seems to have been lost to the
atemporality of narrative, consequently, instigating a different
relationship between the self as a historical construct with a
real temporal existence and the self as a literary, discursive
construct, whose time is that of the narrative and whose space is
the printed page. This radical separation between the two
spheres departs from the notion of history as discourse, through
which we had argued that the self in the works of Pavese and
Bassani was constructed. In II castello and La taverna, there is
no sense of history beyond that of the printed word. The idea of
a historical subject disappears as the projected self is figured
as purely a literary creation.
Having selected his ideal egos from the pack of tarot cards,
the narrator imagines an analogous situation in an art gallery
and attempts a narrative reconstruction of the sequence of
paintings which might be hung there.i4 He alights on the figures
of St George and St Jerome who figure large in Renaissance
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iconography. The first is again the symbol of the heroic and
active, but is considered to be purely a fictitious personage.
St Jerome, however, is endowed with an historical existence and
is the symbol of the contemplative writer. Traditionally, he is
depicted in a natural setting and the narrator writes:
nel paesaggio gli oggetti del 1eggere e dello
scrivere si posano tra le rocce le erbe le
lucertole, diventano prodotti e strumenti dell a
continuity minerale-vegetale-animale. Tra le
suppellettili dell'eremita c'e anche un
teschio: la parol a scritta tiene sempre
presente la cancellatura dell a persona che ha
scritto o di quel la che leggerd. La natura
inarticolata ingloba nel suo discorso il
discorso umano. (105-106)
Death is a common theme in the tales of II castello and La
taverna, and the skull in the paintings of St Jerome is a momento
mori, not only of physical death, but of the death of the self in
writing. The loss of the self is double-edged, however, for
although death and silence may be the fate of the narrator they
are also the salvation of the tale. Walter Benjamin writes:
'Death is the sanction of everything that the storyteller can
tell. He has borrowed his authority from death1.15 it is the
finality of death which is authoritative, for it represents the
final card in the sequence. Ultimately, however, writing is
figured as loss of the self. The narrator concludes: 'il
mestiere dello scrivere uniforma le vite individuali, un uomo
alio scrittoio assomiglia a ogni altro uomo alio scrittoio'
(106).
Whereas for St Jerome writing or creation signifies death,
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for the fictitious St George, it is the source of life. The
narrative, which erases its producer, engenders the vitality of
that which is produced. The imaginary St George becomes a
historical entity through the medium of his creation. The
narrator writes that fiction engenders belief and that 'nel modo
che hanno i pittori e gli scrittori di credere a una storia che e
passata per tante forme, e per il fatto di dipingerla e
ridipingerla, di scriverla e riscriverla, se non era vera lo
diventa1 (108). Thus the creation takes on a dimension which is
denied to the creator. Art bestows its own reality, but it is a
reality which pertains solely to its own dimension. The degree
of intertextuality, apparent throughout the tales, confirms this
inability of the fictive creation ever to go beyond itself. Each
discourse can only refer to other discourses, but its creative
possibilities are a testament to the power of the signifying
system itself which authenticates the narrative content by virtue
of its structuring potential.
The narrator's own story is, of course, not made up only of
1carte-soggetti'. These images are added to, and modified, by
the sequence of 'carte-predicati' which recount the path which
the subject has followed. The first of these cards, selected by
the narrator, is the Cinque di Bastoni. Now the narrator is also
the reader of his own narrative, and the interpretation proffered
by him is that the Bastoni might signify, either the first
childish strokes of the pen of him who seeks to communicate by
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means of signs, or the 'legni di pioppo da cui s'impasta la
bianca cellulosa e se ne sfogliano risme di pagine pronte per
essere (e ancora i significati s1incrociano) vergate' (99). The
choice of the final adjective here is interesting with its dual
connotations of 'lined' and 'beaten', the violence of the
metaphor again evoking the murderous quality of the written word.
This card is followed by the 'Due di Denari' which is interpreted
as a 'segno di scambio' (100). The reference is to the 'value'
of different types of writing and how writing itself can
incorporate value by dint of its very presence. The narrator
also dwells on the ornate graphics of the card and, in
particular, the shape of the letter 'S' which can be discerned -
'la lettera Esse che serpeggia per sigm'ficare che 6 li pronta a
significare significati, il segno significante che ha la Forma di
un Esse perch6 i suoi significati prendano forma di esse pure
loro' (100). The materiality of the writing suggests the primacy
of the signifier over the signified, and the ability of the
signifier to order and control the signified on account of the
material existence which it has. It in itself is a signifying
mediurn.
The following two cards, the Sette di Coppe and Temperanza,
symbolise the infernal or sublime inspiration which the writer
awaits, but the Fante di Coppe indicates that the narrator's wait
is in vain, for 'l'anima e un calamaio asciutto' (100). The next
option is to make a pact with the devil in order to ensure the
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success of the work, and it is with the diabolic image that the
narrator most closely associates. Writing becomes the saying of
the unsaid and the unsayable and the scene of confrontation with
the other. Elsewhere Calvino has written 'e il richiamo di cio
che e fuori dal vocabolario che muove la 1etteratura', for
writing is the writing of desire, the compensation of the lack.ie
It is thus appropriate that the model to which the narrator turns
is the Marquis de Sade, 'che ha spinto la parol a a esplorare i
confini neri del pensabile1 (101) and to his story of Justine.
Here the text goes beyond simple narrative to become the
narrative of the Other which speaks through the narration,
bearing the liberating effect of the dream. The narrator
continues 'Nella scrittura ci6 che parla d il represso' (102) and
inevitably at this stage evokes Freud and his reworking of the
Oedipus myth. Both the stories of Justine and Oedipus are
interwoven with the narrator's tale for they are his also. He
concludes: 'di tutto questo la scrittura avverte come 1'oracolo
e purifica come la tragedia... La scrittura insomma ha un
sottosuolo che appartiene alia specie, o almeno alia civiltci, o
almeno a certe categorie di reddito' (103). That which writing
makes possible is not the self, but the self as a culturally
defined construct. If writing sanctifies the story of Oedipus,
it is through its transformation into the primal story of us all.
Throughout II castello and la taverna, the first person
narrator exists on the margins of the discourse. The narrator
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becomes a function as his role is in no way individualised beyond
that of narrative voice. He thus parallels the situation of all
narrators who, necessarily, inhabit the margins of their
discourse, for their tale is sanctioned not by their own
experience and entry into discourse, but by the context supplied
by discourse. The image of the mirror or double, by means of
which the subject enters discourse, gives an imaginary illusion
of wholeness, but by its very nature the double or specular image
is inevitably other in that it is not the subject. The subject
in discourse is not the subject, but ultimately represents the
only position open to the subject. The discursive subject is the
only identity which is sanctioned.
The fragmentary and contradictory images which the narrator,
who is every narrator, gives of himself are paralleled throughout
the rest of the stories. The narrator's story is one of loss,
and this loss is figured elsewhere in terms of madness,
metamorphosis and of death. Perhaps the archetypal character in
all of this is Faust, who spends his life attempting to alter the
nature of things, and who finally loses himself in his pact with
the devil. His quest is for mastery of the whole, but his
conclusion belies the search: 'II mondo non esiste...non c'& un
tutto dato tutto in una volta; c'& un numero finito d'elementi le
cui combinazioni si moltiplicano a miliardi di miliardi, e di
queste solo poche trovano una forma e un senso e s'impongono in
mezzo a un pulviscolo senza senso e senza forma; come le
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settantotto carte del mazzo di tarocchi nei cui accostamenti
appaiono sequenze di storie che subito si disfario1 (97). The
contrary conclusion is, temporarily at least, found by Parsifal
whose story has been interwoven with that of Faust. He affirms
the harmony of the empty space around which the world is
constructed, but like everything else, the position is dependent
upon the arbitrary shuffling of the cards.
That no-one holds the solution of the enigma is predicated
in the story of Astolfo who has gone to the moon in search of
Orlando's reason. Here he meets the poet whom he supposes to
possess the secrets of the universe, but the poet's response is
negative: 'la luna e un deserto...da questa sfera arida parte
ogni discorso e ogni poema: e ogni viaggio attraverso foreste
battaglie tesori banchetti alcove ci riporta qui, al centro d'un
orrizonte vuoto' (39). This annihilatory image of the poetic
function is compounded in the final chapter of La taverna which
is introduced as the highest mode of expression to which the
cards might rise. The tales of Hamlet, King Lear and Macbeth
intersect in a series of bloody murders, encounters of death and
of madness. Macbeth has the final word as he says: 'Sono stanco
che II Sole resti in cielo, non vedo 1'ora che si sfasci la
sintassi del Mondo, che si mescolino le carte del gioco, i fogli
del 1'in-folio, i frantumi di specchio del disastro' (120).
Macbeth seems to announce his surrender to the realm of non-
meaning, signalling also the demise of the signifying system
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itself. The incompleteness of the self which was first figured
by the mutilatory loss of speech at the opening of II castello,
finally, becomes total loss. Paradigmatic of this are perhaps
the two cards in the first tarot pack, La Torre and II Diavolo,
whose image has been lost, but who still achieve signification in
their absence. They become meaningful on account of the place
which they occupy within the system of the tarot, but are
entirely dependent on this discourse, for outside of it they do
not exist. Deprived of a graphic existence, they rely solely on
their position in the signifying chain, and are able to effect
modifications in the meanings of the cards in their sequence.
Like the I, they cannot signify outside of this discourse, for
they have no intrinsic meaning; therefore their part in
discourse is to remain on the margins. They signify in the
shadow of an absence.
The relationship posited between the narrator of the texts
and the texts themselves is indeed complex. Here there is no
question of what Romberg would call 'role narrative', for the
narrator has no 'personality', no name, no place in history.
What remains, is the narrator figured as narrative function, or
as a rhetorical strategy. He (sic) has no existence outside that
of the written word, and his text refers not to a pre-existing
historical reality, but to a pre-existing textual reality. Both
reader and narrator, he is a producer of discourse, but
nevertheless, the discourse does not originate in him. If there
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is a transcendent term here, it is not the I, but the system of
signs which precedes the I. Significantly, however, it should be
noted that although the I does not create the signifiers which
generate the signifieds, it is instrumental in producing a
specific discourse from the miasma of all possible discourses.17
This is not to argue that the discourse produced by the I
deserves to be viewed as having a primal position in the
determination of meaning, for the chance aspect of the
1affiancamenti casuali1 of the cards can only undermine this
notion. However, each narrative does have meaning, and this
meaning emerges from the dialectical process which is constructed
between the self and discourse.
The effacement of the I, as an individualised historical
self, is itself pregnant with significance, for it betrays a
particular conception of the self and its relation to history.
The ambiguity of this position is inscribed in the dual role of
the narrator/reader. This is not a role which can be separated,
for the reading function of the narrator is simultaneously a
narrating one. Each reading constructs its own narrative and, as
the graphic positioning of the cards suggest, the original text
remains in the margins.18 Likewise, each narrative is
essentially a re-elaboration or a reading of another text. It is
thus impossible to maintain the hierarchy whereby narration is
seen to precede the reading experience. The production of
discourse is necessarily the narrativisation of the already read.
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This lack of originality in writing precipitates a crisis in
which the self no longer attempts to construct an
autobiographical text in its own image, but allows itself to be
dispersed and distorted through a veritable hall of mirrors. The
mirror image is no longer one of wholeness, but of continual
refraction, of perceived otherness. The result is that the self
no longer portrays itself through one ideal image, but is seen to
be constructed through an array of partial images which fail to
reveal a composite whole. The final consequence of this is that
the fragmented self which is revealed by the text becomes a
product of the process of secondary reading undertaken by the
other.
While the instability of the narrating I was apparent in the
texts of Pavese and of Bassani, it is the acuteness of this
perception in the work of Calvino which radically alters the
status of the I at the level of the text. Effacement and loss
are saliently inscribed in the disembodied I's flight from
narrating persona to narrative function. Unable to generate
original meaning, the self in crisis adopts a posture which
consciously conceals its intent. The ludic structure of II
caste!1o and La taverna both parallels this deceit and indicates
that no other strategy is possible, in the context of the
terrible shuffling of the cards. The dilemma of the self is
therefore partially resolved in the shift from narrating/writing
to reading. Authority is transmitted from the I to the You which
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becomes responsible for the story. The You assumes the role of
the originator of the text, as the I renounces its role as the
generator of meaning and particularly of self meaning.
In II caste!lo and La taverna, the narrating I retains this
dual function. However, if we turn our attention to Calvino's
later novel, Se una notte d'inverno, un viaqgiatore, it becomes
evident that a further significant shift has taken place. Here
the activity of the Reader is foregrounded while the narrating I
formally renounces its place of prominence, by refusing to
inscribe at all its presence as text.
The novel begins: 'Stai per cominciare a leggere il nuovo
romanzo "Se una notte d'inverno un viaggiatore" di Italo Calvino'
(3). The direct address to the reader and the overtly self-
referential allusion to the novel itself are the first of the
many vertiginous effects which we encounter in reading the novel.
The main protagonist of the novel is the 'Tu, Lettore' who is
consistently addressed and whose story occupies the greater part
of the novel. It is a story about reading and the quest for the
Book, a quest which involves many adventures and which is
essentially a quest for possession, a struggle for mastery.
Written in the second person, it is obviously questionable if
this can be described as a first person narrative at all and to a
discussion of this point we shall shortly return. As Richard
Andrews has said, however, it is 'a book about books' and, as
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such, is instructive in dealing with the issues which we have
already raised.19
Briefly, the plot of the novel can be summarised as follows:
the hero, il Lettore, has purchased Calvino's latest novel Se una
notte... and, having settled down to read the first chapter,
discovers that the book has been incorrectly bound and that he
does not possess a complete volume. Furious, he returns to the
bookshop where a second surprise awaits him. Due to a further
publishing error, the book he had purchased is not Calvino's
novel, but the work of a Polish author. Anxious to continue his
reading, he decides to take a copy of the Polish work, only to
discover that this is an entirely different novel, but, gripped
by the tale, reads on. Now he is accompanied in his reading by
Ludmilla, la Lettrice, and together they join forces in the
search for the completed book. The novel which we read is the
story of their unending search, their subsequent romance and in
addition, the chapters of the numerous books which they read.
Their desire becomes ours, as we become doubly engrossed in each
of the incomplete novels and in the narrative of their own desire
for love and the completed work. They never find the definitive
novel, but, at the end of the novel, they do find each other, and
we are left on the happy-ever-after note of wedded bliss. Se una
notte is a novel about desire, and the link between sexual desire
and desire in narrative is pursued and maintained throughout.
Our interest, however, lies with the more prosaic topic of
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narrative technique, and in this domain the novel is interesting
both on account of the fact that each of the fragments of novels
which the Lettore comes across is written in the first person,
and for the way in which the Tu, Lettore is consistently
addressed directly through the novel.20
To return to the question of whether or not the novel may be
regarded as a first person narrative, it is valuable to return to
the work of Genette and of Benveniste for an elucidation of this
point. In Nouveau discours du rdcit where Genette expands on
some of the issues raised by his previous work 'Discours du
rdcit', he firmly concludes that a text written in the second
person must be classed as 1hererodidgetique1. His definition
appears somewhat arbitrary, for it rests on the contention that
'est hetdrodiegetique toute narration qui n'est pas...a la
premidre personne' and he might easily have asserted the contrary
to be true i.e. that any narrative not in the third person is
'homodidgdtique'.21 It might be argued, however, that his
designation is correct, for the 'Tu' of Se una notte... can be
differentiated from the 'tu' of novels such as Fallaci's Lettera
ad un bambino mai nato or Tomizza's L'amicizia.22 in the latter
cases, the presence of the 'tu' is constantly evoked, but this is
done by an identifiable first person narrator who occupies a
primary position. Conversely, in Calvino's work the narrating I
is never present as such, i.e. the narrator never says "I", hence
we appear to have an instance of a genuine second person novel,
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albeit something of a 'cas 1 invite'. The difficulty can perhaps
be resolved if we return to the work of Benveniste.23
In his discussion of 'histoire' and 'discours', Benveniste
drew attention to two essentially different types of language.
The first, 'histoire1, would seem apparently speakerless in that
its meaning is not derived from the time of utterance itself,
whereas the second, 'discours', is dependent on the moment of its
utterance for the construction of its meaning, and we have seen
that each type of language has specific temporal, spatial and
pronomial constructions which allow us to differentiate between
the types.24 An essential feature of 'discours1 is shifters,
locutions which rely on the moment of utterance for their
signification, and primary amongst these is the I-you matrix upon
which 'discours' is based. If, as Benveniste argues, every I
presupposes a you, i.e. a listener or recipient of the message,
it perhaps follows therefore that every you must have an I. Just
as the you is not necessarily overtly activated by the I, it can
be assumed that although 'you' may appear without an 'I' overtly
marked, it is nevertheless dependent on the I-you system of
communication for its evocation. This being the case, the 'Tu,
Lettore' of Se una notte is being addressed by a first person
who, in fact, commands the discourse.
The direct address to the Lettore is also characterised by
other shifters, e.g. the use of present and perfect tenses,
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temporal locutions such as "yesterday" and "today", spatial
locutions such as "here" and "there", which all indicate that we
are reading a first person text. The only difference between
this and other first person texts is that the narrator does not
specifically refer to himself, but remains in the most marginal
of positions in relation to his discourse, leaving only the trace
of his I as a reminder of the site of the text's production. We
have obviously come a long way from the definition of first
person narrative given by Romberg, but the absent presence of the
first person narrator of Se una notte... seems the inevitable
extension of the impossibility of writing the self. The desire
for mastery claimed by the narrator of the classic first person
text, whereby the self was its own authentification, but which
was seen as problematic in the works of Pavese, Bassani and in
the earlier Calvino, is now renounced completely in this
discourse. Handing the text over to the reader and telling his
story is the final abandonment of the fiction of the self as
master.
A further point emerges from an examination of Benveniste's
work and the question of the you in discourse. Just as the I-
subject is split between the I of the 1^nonciation1 and the I of
the 16nonc<§', and is thus made irrevocably other by language, so
also is the you-subject divided. In the same way that the I of
the first person text becomes a kind of third person, so too does
the you. The you is figured both as the receiver of the
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dnonciation but here is also the subject of the enoncd, and is
thus captured by language. It is therefore appropriate that the
story of the Tu, Lettore is one of desire and the search to
complement his lack. He too has entered language and indeed,
even more than the I, must be subject to it.
Jonathan Culler, in The Pursuit of Signs, dedicates one
chapter to the discussion of apostrophe in narrative and in the
lyric.25 He writes that apostrophe 'makes its point by troping
not on the meaning of a word but on the circuit or situation of
communication itself'. (135) Thus apostrophe constructs its own
sense of temporality which is that of discourse. It is
completely self-referential. This in itself problematises the
use of apostrophe as an extended metaphor, as is the case in Se
una notte, for as Culler goes on: 'apostrophe resists narrative
because its now is not a moment in a temporal sequence but a now
of discourse, of writing...a fictional time in which nothing
happens but which is the essence of happening' (152)-26 The
narrative of Se una notte therefore occupies an apparently
anomalous position, for it short-circuits the communicative
strategy of the narrator. Narrative occurs in spite of the
narration. However, as has already been noted, every narrative
inhabits two distinct time zones i.e. it obeys its internal
chronology, but also takes place in time. The narrative act is
durative, although this aspect is often eschewed by the fiction.
To trope continually on the communicative situation, is to
emphasise primarily this second temporal aspect as a constant
reminder of the fiction-making process. To evoke consistently
the you, consistently draws attention to the source of the
discourse, and as Culler concludes, 'this figure [apostrophe]
which seems to establish relations between the self and the other
can in fact be read as an act of radical interiorisation and
solipsism' (146).
To address the other is to recall the self for, as has been
argued, the self is constructed only through language and cannot
escape it. The strategy adopted by the narrator of Se una notte
is curiously narcissistic, for it involves a pretence of absence
which persistently attempts to deny this absence through its very
structure. It is, nevertheless, somewhat misleading to construe
Calvino's novel as one extended apostrophe and indeed, it is
possibly less so than the two novels previously mentioned, in
which the you plays a significant role. While the Tu, Lettore is
often addressed as such, and the main tense of the novel is the
present, the greater part of the novel is narrative.27 The you
of the 'enonciation' becomes subordinate to the you of the
'6noncd' as the story of the Lettore unfolds, and is only
reactivated when the narrator adopts the more explicit formula of
Tu, Lettore, which ruptures the effect of the historic present of
storytelling by introducing the 'real' present of discourse. The
retention of the present tense throughout blurs the distinction
between 'histoire' and 'discours' which was noted in our
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examination of II qiardino dei Finzi-Contini. It is significant
also for the rejection of the verb forms of 'histoire' and
particularly, of the past historic which, as we have seen,
functions as an indication of the mastery of the past through
discourse. The present tense here operates in a fashion similar
to the predictive manner of '1 tarocchi', for it posits a
narrative of uncertainty, of unfulfilled desire. It appears,
therefore, as another indication of the loss experienced by the
narrating subject who chooses not only to conceal himself in the
text, but who also refuses to claim mastery over the text by
adopting the closed tense system of the 'histoire1 mode. Thus
the narrator's address to the Lettore, and his narrative of the
Lettore, seem to fuse on a temporal level at least, but they do
remain distinct, and the following passage may serve as a useful
indication of this.
Midway through the novel, the Lettore enters the apartment
of Ludmilla for the first time. She is not at home, so the
Lettore has the chance of 'reading' the text constructed by
Ludmilla's apartment in order to obtain clues about her life, and
an insight into her personality. Suddenly, an abrupt change
takes place:
Come sei, Lettrice? E tempo che questo 1ibro
in seconda persona si rivolga non piu soltanto
a un generico tu maschile, forse fratello o
sosia d'un io ipocrita, ma direttamente a te
che sei entrata fin dal Secondo Capitolo come
Terza Persona necessaria perch<£ il romanzo si a
un romanzo, perch<§ tra quel la Seconda Persona
maschile e la Terza femminile qualcosa avvenga,
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prenda forma, s'affermi o si guasti, secondo le
fasi delle vicende umane (142).
Several points emerge from this. Firstly, the narrator
interrupts his 'dialogue' with the Lettore to evoke for the first
time the Lettrice. The rejection of the Lettore betrays the
narrator's wish to control the narrative and draws attention to
the narrator as source, relegating the Lettore to the position of
object. The you of the Lettore is thereby cancelled from the
text and his dependence on it is highlighted. Secondly, the
written quality of the discourse is underlined in the reference
to the book. The searchers for the Book are overtly inscribed as
text themselves. Thirdly, the narrator alludes to the demands of
the plot to which the novel owes its existence and from which,
springs narrative desire. The most revealing feature is,
however, to be found in the phrase referring to the male you,
'forse fratello o sosia d'un io ipocrita'. This is suggestive of
the narcissistic element of apostrophe noted by Culler, for the
image of the you, as the I's double, reveals not only the
rhetorical strategy of the narrator, but also the alienation
experienced by the narrator in the conscious representation of
the self as other. It is the final recognition of the failure of
the I to represent itself in discourse.
The narrator continues his address to the Lettrice, and now
the Lettore is figured in the third person: 'questo 1ibro e
stato attento finora a lasciare aperta al Lettore che legge, la
possibility d'identificarsi col Lettore che d letto' (142).
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Before going on to discuss the text in greater detail and the
status of the you, it must be noted that just as the I of first
person narrative cannot be confused with the I of the author even
though it might function in a homologous manner, so too must we
distinguish between the Tu, Lettore and the real reader. The Tu,
Lettore is at most a projection of the real reader and of the
activity of reading, but it cannot be argued that the real reader
is addressed more directly by this text than by any other
(although we may indeed be disconcerted by this strategy). Nor
too can the Tu, Lettore be equated with concepts such as Iser's
'Implied Reader' nor Eco's 'Lettore Model 1o'.28 These notions
refer to the quality of reader competence which any text demands,
and the subject positions offered to the reader by any text. The
Tu, Lettore is a textual object and as such partakes of the
text's proliferation of meaning, but does not take part in it.
He is not us, for he too is read as text.
The narrator continues: 'Sta continuando la sua
ricognizione dell a casa di cui gli hai dato le chiavi, il
Lettore' (144). The Lettore has now been excluded from the
circuit of communication and has been reduced to the level of
Benveniste's 'non-personne1. This ludic juggling of language
echoes the strategy of II castello, demonstrating the power of
language over the subject and the loss of the subject in
language. Some pages later, the Lettore is again conjured up -
'Lettore drizza 1'orecchio' (147) - and now it is the Lettrice
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who is lost to the text, only to reappear a little later, before
becoming fused with the Lettore's 'tu' to become a 'voi': 'Siete
a letto insieme, Lettore e Lettrice. Dunque d venuto il momento
di chiamarvi con la seconda persona plurale, operazione molto
impegnativa, perchd equivale a considerarvi un unico soggetto'
(154).
Interspersed with these passages addressing alternatively
the Lettore and the Lettrice are sections which recount their
actions, albeit in the second person. It is in those sections
that the you is no longer figured as the receiver of the
utterance, but is constructed in it and by it. The passivity of
the recipient of the address in the shifting strategies of the
narrator serves to support the quest for mastery of the latter.
Just as the I of the texts we have examined constantly disappears
within the text so too does the you-subject figured here. Hence
there is something ironic in the narrator's address to the
Lettore as he re-evokes his presence: 'II tu che era passato
alia Lettrice pud da una frase all'altra tornare a puntarsi su di
te. Sei sempre uno dei tu possibili. Chi oserebbe condannarti
alia perdita del tu, catastrofe non meno terribile dell a perdita
dell'io?' (147-148). Again this appears to be an attempt by the
narrator to wield his power over the Lettore, by threatening to
eradicate him from discourse, and drawing attention to his
precarious status as a signifying entity. The 'tu' inhabits the
dangerous territory of the textual margin.
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In their search for the Book, the Lettore and the Lettrice
encounter a number of other characters who are involved in the
sphere of literature either as consumers or producers of texts.
The Lettore himself is presented as someone who 'per principio
non s'aspetta piu niente da niente1 (4) and whose sole escape,
from his general feeling of cynicism or disillusionment, is in
■questo piacere giovanile dell'aspettativa' which he finds in the
world of books. Literature is a safe activity, for it seems to
harness and tame the unruly circuit of desire of the extra-
literary text, although the two are indeed paralleled. Ludmilla,
the Lettrice, is presented as an even more rapacious reader and
devourer of novels. Her literary preferences are quite distinct.
She states: 'preferisco i romanzi...che mi fanno entrare subito
in un mondo dove ogni cosa e precisa, concreta, ben specificata.
hi da una soddisfazione speciale sapere che le cose sono fatte in
quel determinato modo e non altrimenti, anche le cose qualsiasi
che nella vita mi sembrano indifferenti' (29-30). Ludmilla is a
reader who seeks closure and an order which would compensate for
the lack experienced outside reading. Akin to this is her
retention of detail from the books which she has read, a facet
which suggests again a desire for control in the appropriation of
another's text. Her desire is also the desire for the other.
She remarks: 'leggere e andare incontro a qua!cosa che sta per
essere e ancora nessuno sa cosa sard' (71). Her image of
literary production is an organic one as later she admits: 'i1
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romanzo che piu vorrei leggere in questo momento...dovrebbe avere
come forza motrice solo la voglia di raccontare, d'accumulare
storie su storie, senza pretendere d'imporrti una visione del
mondo, ma solo di farti assistere alia propria crescita, come una
pianta, un aggrovigliarsi come di rami e di foglie' (92). In her
view, the book is the transcendent term in the field of
literature, endowed with an existence independent of its author.
Its origins are in itself and it is the very image of the self-
begetting novel.
It is this notion which explains her reluctance to cross
over to the 'altra parte', which is the world of the writer, by
accompanying the Lettore to the publishing house. Were she to
have done so she would have met Cavedagna, the publisher
disillusioned with the world of writing on account of the daily
contact which he makes with real authors. He has a nostalgic
vision of 'gli autori veri1 (10) who only existed as names on the
cover of their books, and who were endowed with the same reality
as that of their characters. The voice of the author was the
voice of the Other, 'un vuoto percorso da fantasmi' (102), and
this ideal could only be marred by the contingency of the
everyday.
In contrast to Ludmilla and her complete absorption in the
text, Lotaria, her sister, is presented as a voracious violator
of the text. She is oblivious to the eroticised relationship
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between the reader and the text, and subjects it to a series of
dismembering procedures in the aim of obtaining all meaning.
Perhaps the most brutal of these is the computer analysis which
calculates the number of times that each word appears in the
text, thus supposedly enabling the reader to 'read' the text
without wasting time on the actual reading. Like Ludmilla,
Lotaria betrays a desire for appropriation, although her desire
is not to be fulfilled through narrative itself, but through the
possession of all possible meanings which the text might
disseminate. This need for appropriation is paralleled by the
struggle of the two university professors who both claim
proprietorial rights over the same text. It is a fight for
possession between readers and it is they who will decide the
fate of the text. The lost author of the text has been cancelled
out of the signifying process as possession of his text is
contested by the reader.
Another figure presented as a textual butcher is Arkadian
Porphyritch who ruthlessly censors and destroys texts by day but
who is an avid reader of these same texts by night. While this
indicates both the power of narrative as a subversive medium and
its power too to hold the reader in thrall, it nevertheless
posits the reader as the final and most powerful partner in the
literary chain. Once the text has been published, it is the
reader who ultimately controls its destiny and who makes of the
text what he will. The insignificance of the author is
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highlighted in two final images of consumers of books. Firstly,
there is the Sultana, a latterday Scheherezade, whose desire for
literature is fed by computer produced books, so that the
activity of reading may absorb her desire for revolution. Unlike
Scheherezade, she is told tales in order to assuage her desire
for death and destruction. In this instance, the author has no
place at all. Even more significant, however, is the non-reader,
Irnerio, who uses books with which to sculpt. He exploits the
material existence of the book while ignoring its quality as
text. Surely the author did not intend this!
In the second chapter of the novel the narrator remarks to
the Lettore: 'Chi tu si a, Lettore, quale si a la tua etci, lo
stato civile, la professione, il reddito, sarebbe indiscreto
chiederti'. This obfuscation of the possible identity of the
reader highlights the role of the reader as reading function, but
this refusal to name, to attribute other meaning to the reader,
is a strategy which serves to mirror the situation of the
narrator. The novel offers us not only images of readers, but
also several authorial/narratorial images which function as a
further series of doubles of the 'io-ipocrita' of the narrator.
In many ways the prime mover of the narrative is Ermes Marana,
the translator and forger of texts, whose machinations are
responsible for the tortuous path which the Lettore must follow
in his quest.29 The eroticised relationship which, as we have
briefly noted, is fundamental to the relationship between reader
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and text, lies at the heart of Parana's urge to destroy and to
disseminate. An ex-lover of Ludmilla, he was inspired by
jealousy for the 'rivale invisibile1 (159), the author whose
presence constantly came between him and Ludmilla. His dilemma
therefore became: 'Come fare a sconfiggere non gli autori ma la
funzione dell'autore, l'idea che dietro ogni 1ibro ci si a
qualcuno che garantisee una verity a quel mondo di fantasmi e
d'invenzioni per il solo fatto d'avervi investito la propria
verity, d'aver identificato se stesso con quel la costruzione di
parole?1 (159). His aim, therefore, is to destroy the myth of
the author as the site of textual authority and to undermine the
mysterious link between the author and 'his' text. He therefore
dreams of 'una letteratura tutta d'apocrifi, di false
attribuzioni, d'imitazioni e contraffazioni e pastiches' (159),
in order to alter radically the relationship between the reader
and the text and instigate a mistrust of the authorial voice as
origin.
What Marana seeks is to appropriate the authorial mystique
for himself, thereby positing himself as origin, albeit the
origin of a complex web of deceit. In this, he is not unlike the
figure of II Bagatto in La taverna, who symbolises the writer as
a verbal illusionist, and indeed it is on account of his
narrative trickery that the Lettore is propelled halfway across
the world in his search. Like the 'genuine' author, Marana is
driven on by his anxiety or desire for completion even though his
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task consists of causing the proliferation of incomplete novels,
false attributions and fake translations. He is the diabolic
image of the writer (which was also evoked in La taverna), as he
unleashes the demons of the word which is no longer the Word.3o
In opposition to Marana, who seeks to dissolve the very
notion of the text, stands the 'Padre dei racconti1, the
'veggente indio che racconta tutti i romanzi del mondo1 (125).
In his own way, however, the Padre dei racconti equally
undermines the task of the author for he provides tangible
evidence of the idea that all texts are already written, and thus
disposes of the notion of the originality of the writer.3i The
access which he has to the universal store of texts prefigures
the end of the novel where, the Lettore visits a library in a
final attempt to obtain the books which he has been searching
for, only to be thwarted once more. He falls into conversation
with a group of other readers who discuss their experiences of
reading. One of these readers mistakenly reads the titles which
the Lettore is searching for as a single sentence, the opening
paragraph of a single novel. He is not mistaken, however, for
all books insistently recall other books which in the end are all
one.
The anxieties created in the author due to this seemingly
universal desire for appropriation of the text are expressed in
the diary of Silas Flannery. Firstly, he writes of his readers
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who 'sono i miei vampiri1 (170) and expresses the wish to
disappear from the scene of writing so that this parasitical
appropriation would not be of him. He then speculates on two
contradictory possibilities in the writing function:
Alle volte penso alia materia del libro da
scrivere come qualcosa che gid c'e pensieri
gia pensati, dialoghi gid pronunciati, storie
gi& accadute, luoghi e ambienti visti, il libro
non dovrebb1essere altro che 11equivalente del
mondo non scritto tradotto in scrittura. Altre
volte invece mi pare di comprendere che tra il
libro da scrivere e le cose che gici esistono ci
pud essere solo una specie di complementarity:
il libro dovrebb1essere al controparte scritta
del mondo non scritto; la sua materia dovrebbe
essere cio che non c'e nd potra esserci se non
quando sard scritto, ma di cui cid che c'd
sente oscuramente il vuoto nella propria
incompletezza. (171-172)
The conflict here is between the notion of writing not only as
representational, but also as the already read, and the idea that
writing may function as a kind of oracle, producing a breach in
the texture of the non-written by virtue of some unique, inherent
property. Both, however, induce a feeling of stasis in the
writer, in his oscillation between the two poles of writing. He
develops the idea that the written word somehow transcends the
individual writer, and, as such, necessitates the use of an
impersonal construction of the verb 'scrivere1. However, the
oracular function of the written word can only be activated by an
individualised reader, whose act of reading validates and
sanctifies that which is written.
The association between the written word and the sacred is
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confirmed in Flannery's anecdote concerning Mohammed and his
scribe. The prophet is dictating to his scribe, but, at one
point, fails to complete his sentence. Instinctively the scribe
does so for him, but is horrified when Mohammed elects to leave
this sentence as it stands, accepting the scribe's word as the
Word of Allah. As a result, the scribe loses his faith and
deserts the prophet. Flannery's conclusion is that the scribe
was wrong to do so, for power is invested in the word and not in
the man. In Flannery's rewriting of the tale he proposes:
d sulla pagina, non prima, che la parol a, anche
quell a del raptus profetico, diventa
definitiva, cioe scrittura. E solo attraverso
la limitatezzaa del nostro atto dello scrivere
che 1'immensity del non-scritto diventa
leggibile, cioe attraverso le incertezze
dell 1ortografia, le sviste, i lapsus, gli
sbalzi incontrollati dell a parol a e dell a
penna. Altrimenti cio che e fuori di noi non
pretenda di comunicare con la parol a, parlata o
scritta: mandi per altre vie i suoi
messaggi.(182-183)
Writing bears its own authority which is not inherent in the
prophet but in itself. In the light of this, it is appropriate
that the author disappears from the text, although he is
contemporaneously saved by the sanctity of his vocation.
Nevertheless, it is in the image of the scrivener that the
tensions between reading and writing are apparently reconciled:
'II copista viveva contemporaneamente in due dimension!'
temporali, quel la dell a lettura e quel la del la scrittura, poteva
scrivere senza l'angoscia del vuoto che s'apre davanti alia
penna; leggere senza 1'angoscia che il proprio atto non si
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concentri in alcun oggetto materiale' (178). The scrivener,
however, is a figure of the past and his role is no longer
conceivable in the modern world, hence it is inevitable that
Flannery follow the way offered to him by Marana.
Marana has approached Flannery in the belief not only that
his work is eminently falsifiable, but also that he, Flannery, is
particularly suited to the work of forger, and, as such,
represents Marana's ideal author. Marana's aim is to proliferate
and disperse the homogeneous image of the author whereas Flannery
claims 1i1 mio scopo e di catturare nel 1ibro il mondo
illeggibile, senza centro, senza io' (180). He seeks not to
write that which is writable, but to reveal the impossible, the
Other itself through writing. Two alternative paths appear open
to him; either to write a single book which would contain
everything, or to write every book and exhaust the potential of
literature in this manner. The idea of the single book brings us
back to the idea of the sacred text which would exclude
everything not written in it, so he must adopt the second
alternative. Both projects are, however, designed to secure
mastery for the author and to restore the author to the primal
position of signification. He receives a salutary warning from
Ludmilla, who, on hearing of the plot to falsify Flannery's
manuscripts which Flannery believes to be masterminded by Marana,
counsels sagaciously that 11e congiure sfuggono sempre dalle mani
dei loro capi 1 (193). Mastery is an impossible achievement, for
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it is inevitably betrayed by those whom it seeks to master. The
only strategy left open to Flannery is to become the writer of
apocryphal texts in order that this act of concealment might
reveal its truth through the veil drawn over it.
He decides on this vocation 1perchd scrivere e sempre
nascondere qualcosa in modo che venga poi scoperto; perche la
verity che pud uscire dalla mi a penna d come una scheggia saltata
via da un grande macigno per un urto violento e proiettata
lontano; perchd non c'e certezza fuori dalla falsificazione.'
(193) Flannery's dilemma knows no solution, but perhaps he has
arrived at the only compromise possible. To recognise that the
self inevitably disappears in writing is to accept the rules of
the game and to postpone the crisis by means of participation.
Nevertheless, by hoping to reveal the self through the conscious
strategy of denying the self in writing, the writer betrays again
his desire to gain possession of the text.
Interspersed between these authorial images are the ten
titled chapters of the novel which are the ten first chapters of
the novels which the Lettore encounters in his search. Each of
these chapters is written in the first person and each displays a
degree of self-ref1exiveness which mirrors the anxiety displayed
by the author characters.32 None of these novels exceeds the
confines of the first chapter, so all contain the limitless
potential of the unfinished novel.33 in the first of these
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chapters, entitled 1Se una notte d'inverno un viaggiatore1, the
nameless first person narrator refers to his status as first
person character. He points out to the reader that the only
thing which the reader as yet knows about him, is that he is
called I, but that this, in itself, is enough for the reader to
begin to identify with him. He continues:
cosi come 1'autore pur non avendo nessuna
intenzione di pari are di se stesso, ed avendo
deciso di chiamare "io" il personaggio quasi
per sottrarlo alia vista, per non doverlo
nominare o descrivere, perch6 qualsiasi altra
denominazione o attributo 1'avrebbe definito di
piu che questo spoglio pronome, pure per il
solo fatto di scrivere "io" egli si sente
spinto a mettere in questo "io" un po1 di se
stesso, di quel che lui sente o immagina di
sentire. (15-16)
This identification is precarious, for the 11s story is as
yet ill-defined. The I is indeed a strange signifier, for
although it seems to welcome some form of reader identification
as the primary source of meaning, this 'spoglio pronome1 is, in
fact, devoid of meaning until it is constructed through the
discourse. The reader therefore identifies initially with the
subject position taken up by the I as the producer of discourse,
yet subsequent identification requires the reader to abandon the
difference which exists between the self and the other, but such
is the desire of the reader to identify that he is willing to
undergo any transformation in order to fulfil his desire. It is
this desire which is constantly thwarted at the end of each
chapter, when the reader is unable to discover what happened
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next. The reader's identification with the I must therefore be
figured as loss.
None of the various Is of the titled chapters recur
throughout these sections of the novel. Each time the I of the
narrative appears, its proliferation prevents any single
identification. We have already seen how the I of writing is
inevitably split and distorted by discourse, and the
multiplication of the I seems to vindicate this argument.34 The
narrator of the chapter, 'In una rete di linee che
s' intersecano', offers a different interpretation. He writes of
the countless images produced by the kaleidoscope and suggests a
parallel role for the self in narrative: 'E la mi a immagine che
voglio moltiplicare, ma non per narcisismo o megalomania come si
potrebbe troppo facilmente credere: al contrario, per
nascondere, in mezzo a tanti fantasmi illusori, di me stesso, il
vero io che li fa muovere' (162). Again we have returned to the
I who is conscious of the disappearance of the self in language,
but who tries to minimise and recoup this loss through the
adoption of a particular narrative strategy. Here the narrator
deliberately seeks to conceal rather than reveal the self in
narrative and by doing so aims to preserve the notion of a
unified self who has authority for the text he writes.
This is a development of a remark made by the narrator of
'Sporgendosi dalla costa scoscesa' who dismisses any interest in
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the search for the perfect form, 'la natura vera delle cose
rivelaridosi solo nello sfacelo' (56). This idea of fragmentation
is fundamental to the whole of Se una notte, for Calvino's work,
on the one hand, seems to attest to the impossibility of
literature signifying beyond itself, and also develops the
insight of II castello, whereby the reader is seen to be the
primary producer of the text. As JoAnn Cannon notes: 'the void
created by the authorless text frees the reader from the
constraint of a subservient 'faithfulness' to the author as
origin of literature's truth and forces him to play an active
role in filling out, completing the text. It is not the voice of
the author that guarantees literature's truth but rather the
activity of reading' (104). She concludes, however, that
Calvino's strategy is in itself deceitful, and she sees this as
being exemplified by the neat arbitrary closure effected by the
author at the end of the novel, when the Lettore and Lettrice
marry at the point when the Lettore happens to finish reading Se
una notte d'inverno un viaggatore. She writes:
This final, true conclusion belies Calvino's
desire to incorporate the fragment into a
meaningful whole, to become the source which
would give closure and meaning to the text.
The conclusion in fact reflects Calvino's
strategy throughout the novel. The author's
attempt to inscribe the activity of reading
into his text ultimately reveals his desire to
domesticate the dialogue between text and
reader which is beyond the writer's control.
But this strategy is unsuccessful: rather than
bringing the text back within the author's
sphere, it merely underlines the degree to
which the text cannot be controlled or closed
by the author. (108-109)
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We have witnessed the many strategies adopted by Calvino and
his author figures to bring the text back into their domaine by
seemingly accepting its dissemination but, at the same time,
claiming authority on account of their awareness of this
dissemination. Cannon is right to argue that this ploy
ultimately fails. At best, the conciliatory ending can be viewed
as yet another ludic strategy which is undermined by the text
itself, but the final reference to Calvino's book seeks to
confirm supremacy over the text. The careful concealment of the
narrating I does not prevent the I becoming a feature of
discourse, but rather underlines this. The I has no existence
outside discourse and, as the titled fragments demonstrate, each
is defined by its part in a discourse.35 Each of these I-
narrators appears in a consciously worked genre pastiche. The
ambiguity here stems from the insight offered by II castello that
narratives inevitably refer to other narratives, and that the I
of narrative is endowed with an existence dependent on the
possibilities of the already written text. To write a pastiche,
is to claim that one is aware of this, but, in itself, this does
not extricate the I from its peril.
The strategy employed in Se una notte is a final desperate
attempt to assert the authority of the self over discourse. In
the works which we have dealt with here, the I foregoes all
efforts to portray an embodied self endowed with an historical
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identity. This desire to conceal the self, denotes the wish to
create a source which cannot be discredited and which is
identified with the vatic power of all writing. The aim is,
however, undermined by the text itself, for its fragmentation and
persistent refusal to shed one unitary meaning, demonstrates the
power of discourse to disperse the I, because the literary system
itself establishes the transcendent term. In this context, the
fate of the Cimmerian author and his texts come to symbolise the
fate of all writers and their texts. The professor states:
1i 1ibri sono i gradini del la soglia... Tutti
gli autori cimmeri l'hanno passata... Poi
commincia la lingua senza parole dei morti che
dice le cose che solo la lingua dei morti pud
dire. II cimmerio e 1'ultima lingua dei
vivi...e la lingua del la soglia1 (70). He goes
on: 1i 1ibri cimmeri sono tutti
incompiuti...perchd e di Id che
continuano...nell'altra lingua, nella lingua
silenziosa a cui rimandano tutte le parole dei
1 i bri che crediamo di leggere'.
All books are incomplete for they engage in a dialogue with
the Other which knows no completion. Thus the self inhabits the
threshold of the realm of non-being and is indexed by the text,
not as source or authority, but as being at the command of
discourse. The mastery which is sought is an attempt to ward off
death. This is the story of all narrative for as one of the
readers whom the Lettore meets in the library remarks: 'II senso
ultimo a cui rimandano tutti i racconti ha due facce: la
continuity dell a vita, 1 ' inevitabi1itd dell a morte' (261). Life
is to be found in the text itself and with the reader, while
death figures the silence of the author less text. First person
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narrative is no longer conceived of as a retrospective evocation
of a past ordered in language, but as the adventures and
vicissitudes experienced by the I in language. The retention
throughout the novel of the present tense of discourse indicates
the priority of the fiction-making experience over the fiction
produced. The cynicism of the I with regard to its own
ontological status, which is manifest in the various strategies
of textual concealment, does not rescue the I from the margins of
the text, but rather, mirrors the impossibility of its being
constructed as source.
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Notes to Chapter Six
1 Barthes notes, 1"ce qui se passe" dans le recit n'est, du
point de vue rdferentiel (reel), a la lettre: rien; "ce qui
arrive", c'est le langage tout seul, 1'aventure du langage,
dont la venue ne cesse jamais d'etre fetde'. In 'Introduction
h 1'analyse structurale des rdcits', p.33.
2 See Maria Corti, 'II gioco dei tarocchi come creazione di
intrecci1 in Viaggio Testuale, (Turin, 1978) pp.169-184,
(p.171).
3 Marilyn Schneider, in 'Calvino at a Crossroads: II castello
dei destini incrociati', PMLA, (1980), 73-91 (p.75) notes that
each face card serves as a 'title' for each narrator's
autobiography, confirming the relationship traditionally
perceived between the identity of the speaker and the
existential dimension of the tale.
4 Cannon remarks in reference to II castello: 'On both the
thematic and structural levels, Calvino's text exposes the
conventional nature of narrative fiction, its dependence on a
finite number of forms governed by internal laws. This
perception of the text as a mere combination of pre-
established elements might seem to deny the richness of the
literary text. But II castello dei destini incrociati, at the
same time that it unmasks the priority of the literary system
over individual expression, upholds the tremendous potential
of the literary system itself (p.65).
5 Guiseppe Bonura in Invito alia lettura di Calvino, (Milan,
1985) writes that the travellers use 'i mazzi dei tarocchi
come un sistema di segni, come una lingua: ogni figura
impressa nella carta ha un senso polivalente come lo ha una
parol a, il cui esatto significato si desume dal contesto in
cui viene pronunciata', (p.91).
6 Schneider also notes the reversal inherent to the reading of
the cards but interprets it differently: 'the castle and
tavern dining rooms seem to belong to an afterworld, and the
inhabitants to be dead souls, reviewing their past. In
turning to the past, their fortune telling overturns the usual
tarot focus on the future. This is noteworthy, since in other
respects, Calvino adheres to the rules of tarot divination.
But perhaps Calvino's tarot readers, in some mysterious way,
already see their futures as past.' (p.74).
7 In his preface to Orlando Furioso, Calvino writes: 'non si
deve dimenticare che i giochi, da quel 1i infantili a quel 1i
degli adulti, hanno sempre un fondamento serio, sono
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sopratutto techniche d'addestramento di facolt& e attitudine
che sararirio necessarie nella vita' (p.xxv).
8 Francesca Bernardini Napoletano, I seqni nuovi di Italo
Calvino : da "Le CosTiiicomiche" a "Le citta invisibili", (Rome,
1977), p.135.
9 See Schneider, pp.75-76.
10 John Updike in 'Card Tricks', Hugging the Shore, (London,
1985) pp.463-469, writes that 'Calvino contemplates the death
not of that notorious old moribund, the Novel but of the Story
itself, of the hopeful impulse that makes beginnings and seeks
outcomes and imagines adventures in the middle' (p.464).
11 Barthes in 'Introduction a 1'analyse structurale des recits'
remarks: la temporality n'est qu'une classe structurale du
recit (du discours), tout comme dans la langue, le temps
n'existe que sous forme de systdme; du point de vue du rdcit,
ce que nous appelons le temps n'existe pas, ou du moins
n'existe que fonctionnel1ement, comme element d'un systdme
semiotique' (p.18). This fictional temporality constructed by
narrative is exploited here by Calvino.
12 The complexity of Calvino's position on the relationship
between writing and the world is made clear if his early
essays, 'II midollo del leone1 (1955) and 'La sfida al
labirinto' (1962) where he espouses a positive notion of
literature's ability to intervene in reality are compared with
his later essays where he appears to regard literature as a
more circumscribed, self referential activity. His interview
with Gregory Lucente dating from 1984 seems to suggest a
return by Calvino to his earlier position although this is
probably belied by his fictional output.
13 In Una pietra sopra pp.310-323, (p.312).
14 See Calvino, Lezioni americane, p.90.
15 Walter Benjamin, 'The Storyteller', in II1uminations,
(Suffolk, 1970), pp.83-109, (p.94).
16 In 'Cibernetica e fantasmi', p.174.
17 See 'Cibernetica e fantasmi' p.177 where Calvino discusses the
'gioco combinatorio' of all narrative and the effect of the
single combination.
18 See Schneider, p.83, who discusses the idea of the debasement
of the original through its reproduction.
19 Andrews, p.275.
Ill
20 For a discussion of the 'You' see Cesare Segre, 'Se una notte
d'inverno uno scrittore sognasse un aleph di dieci colori',
in Strumenti Critici, (1979), 177-214.
21 Gerard Genette, Nouveau discours du recit, p.92.
22 Oriana Fallaci , Lettera ad un bambino mai nato, (Milan, 1975)
and Fulvio Tomizza, L'amicizia, (Milan, 1980). Both texts are
structured round the call to the absent 'you' figure, a
constant feature, although not always explicit, of the texts
we have studied.
23 See chapter 1, pp.36-38.
24 Patricia Waugh in Metafiction remarks on the feigned element
of 'histoire': 'a "story" cannot exist without a teller. The
apparent impersonality of histoire is always finally personal,
finally discours.' (27)
25 Jonathan Culler, 'Apostrophe' in The Pursuit of Signs,
(London, 1981), pp.135-154.
26 Similarly, Paul de Man in 'Autobiography as De-facement'
argues that prosopopeia, the addressing of the absent or dead,
constitutes the central rhetorical figure of autobiography.
See esp. pp.925-926.
27 See Segre, pp.177-180.
28 Wolfgang Iser, The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication
in Prose Fiction from Bun.yan to Beckett, (Baltimore and
London, 1974) and Umberto Eco, Lector in fabula: la
cooperazione interpretativa nei testi narrativi, (Milan, 1979)
esp. pp.50-66.
29 Hermes/Mercury as Calvino points out in Lezioni Americane is
' i 1 dio del la comunicazione e delle mediazioni'. He goes on:
'Mercurio, con le ali ai piedi, leggero e aereo, abile e agile
e adattabile e disinvolto, stabilisce le relazioni degli dei
tra di loro e quelle tra gli d&i e gli uomini, tra le leggi
universa!i e i casi individuali, tra le forze dell a natura e
le forme dell a cultura, tra tutti gli oggetti del mondo e tra
tutti i soggetti pensanti. Quale migliore patrono potrei
scegliere per la mi a proposta di 1etteratura?' (50-51).
30 Barthes in 'From Work to Text' in Textual Strategies pp.73-81
compares the monistic 'work' to the plural 'text', writing
that 'the text might well take as its motto the words of the
man possessed by devils: "My name is legion, for we are
many" (Mark 5:9)' (p.77). See also chapter 7, pp.298-302.
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31 A similar idea is developed by Genette in 'L'utopie
litteraire', in Figures 1, (Paris, 1966), pp.123-132.
32 See Segre, p.188.
33 In his preface to II sentiero dei nidi del raqno, (Turin,
1964). Calvino writes: 'finche il primo libro non & scritto,
si possiede quell a liberty di cominciare che si pud usare una
sola volta nella vita, il primo libro gid ti defim'sce mentre
tu in realty sei ancora lontano dall'esser definito, e questa
definizione poi dovrai portartela dietro per la vita cercando
di darne conferma o approfondimento o correzione o smentita ma
mai piu non riuscendo a prescinderne1 (22). The strategy of
instigating a series of multiple beginnings aims to avoid the
definition of the 1I' through its taking up a position in
discourse.
34 Hutcheon writes that 'in self-conscious parodic literature,
the reader-character identification circuit is often broken.
It is sacrificed in order to engage the reader in an active
dialogue with the generic modes of his time, an exercise that
is usually only the writers. By reminding the reader of the
book's identity as artifice, the text parodies his
expectations, his desire for verisimilitude, and forces him to
an awareness of his own role in creating the universe of
fiction' (139). It may be argued, however, that this is also
a prime strategy for the author's assertion of authority over
the reader.
35 See also 'I livelli della realta in letteratura' (esp. p.312)
where Calvino subjugates the experience of the reader to the
power of the 'Io scrivo'.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Deadly Games - narration and murder in
Todo modo and II nome del la rosa
Perhaps the only feature common to the texts which we have
so far studied is that they each betray some anxiety regarding
the question of identity, and demonstrate, in different ways, the
precarious and provisional construct of the self. This anxiety
is figured, particularly, in the images of death which
proliferate in what was assumed to be a testament to life. First
person narrative, therefore, seems to incorporate the
annihilation of the subject at the very point at which it should
celebrate its emergence and triumph. The shift which we have
witnessed from first person narrative as the narrative of the
subject in history to the type of narrative in which the story of
the subject takes place overtly in and through language, has not
eliminated the idea of the quest for identity as a major
structuring element, but has increasingly reflected the
problematics of a quest which uncovers the dangers posed to the
self through its representation in discourse, rather than
discovering a unified self. Historical referentiality and sheer
textuality have been demonstrated to provide shaky props on which
to bolster a fragmented subject. History is itself a discursive
entity and even an awareness of the strategies which would
undermine the authority of discourse, fails to permit the self to
be recognised as the source of its own text. Thus we have seen
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that the text becomes a surrendering to death and the narrative
which would ward off death becomes its harbinger. Calvino's
attempt to rescue and recuperate the death of the self from
discourse in Se una notte through an avowed strategy of
concealment has been seen to fail, for the I's rejection of and
withdrawal from the symbolic order can only be represented by
means of recourse to that very order of representation. At this
point, it might seem that we have reached an impasse, whereby the
self is condemned to an existence of laceration and dismemberment
before being obliged to acknowledge its final loss. However, if
the inevitable fate of the I is loss in its confrontation with
the Other, perhaps one final strategy open to it, in order to
parry this ultimate blow, might be to attempt a narrative which
would narrate the death, not of the self, but indeed, of the
other.
The archetypal vehicle for such an enterprise would
obviously be the detective/murder novel which, as we shall see,
incorporates into its structure many of the issues which are of
concern to us. Stefano Tani, in The Doomed Detective, examines
the use made of the detective novel in contemporary Italian and
American fiction, including Cal vino's Se una notte in this
category.i This choice may, at first, seem puzzling for this
novel is clearly not a classic tale of murder and suspense in
which the detective triumphs over the perpetrator of a bloody
crime, as we know he must, and in doing so re-establishes order
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iri the world.2 Nevertheless, in Calvino's novel, images of
carnage do abound, but the 'corpse' is no longer a human body but
the text.3 According to Tani, the criminal is no longer
contained within the text but is the writer himself, whereas the
reader assumes the role of detective and seeks to piece together
the fragments of the text and unravel the mystery. The ludic
structure of the novel lends itself to this activity by
intensifying the hermeneutic performance which necessarily
accompanies any act of reading. Tani argues that Calvino's use
of the genre represents the absolute subversion of the
traditional detective form, yet he fails to perceive that by
placing the struggle for mastery between the writer and reader
outside the text, he eschews the problematics of narrative and
language through which this struggle is enacted. Tani recognises
Calvino's strategy as an attempt to assert the self through the
eradication of otherness, but interprets it as a radical
departure rather than as profoundly nostalgic. If the self is to
challenge its death in discourse, it must encounter the Other
where the Other is itself represented. Given that the subject
has been unable to effect authorship of its own life, it remains
to be seen whether or not it can affirm its subjectivity through
the authorship of someone else's death.
It may be argued that the significance of murder lies in the
association of the notion of self-affirmation with that of
transgression.'' Consequently, it suggests that the emergence of
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the self can only be achieved through the transgressive rupturing
of the symbolic order. Such a perspective demands that the
murderer become the creator, the origin of his criminal act, and
thus accede to a position of transcendence. The act of murder,
however, requires recognition or representation so that the
subject's impulse to self-affirmation may be confirmed. It is,
therefore, in the dialogue between the subject/author of the
crime and the subject/object of the representation that the quest
for transcendence must be articulated.
That murder is transgressive indicates that the act of
murder must be considered as a collective phenomenon.
Consequently, when the social order has been disrupted or
transgressed, the breach caused by the murder must be subject to
an act of recuperation by the dominant order. The dominant order
seeks redress and, therefore, an area of conflict is mapped out
between the individual and the collective where the latter seeks
to assert its authority over the former through the establishment
of individual guilt, in order to remove responsibility from
itself. The perpetrator of the crime is thus forced to adopt
strategies of concealment in order to retain his authority over
his act. We must now examine these processes of transgression
and concealment in order to establish the possibility of self-
affirmation through the creative act of homicide.
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In the traditional detective/murder tale, the structure of
the narrative asserts the primacy of the dominant order by means
of its resolution.5 There is a movement from mystery to
elucidation, a movement which reveals the identity of the
murderer and makes explicit his crime. This recurrent structure
makes traditional detective fiction the most codified of
narrative modes. There is a crime, a criminal and a detective,
and we know from the outset that the detective will catch the
criminal on account of his superior powers of reasoning and of
the psychological consistency of the killer. There is always a
motive, for classic detective fiction does not allow for casual
killing, and there are always suspects from whose midst the
murderer will finally be singled out. The novel is strewn with
clues to the identity of the killer, but, normally, these will
only be perceived by the more able look of the detective.
In many ways, the detective novel intensifies the
hermeneutic procedure inherent to every act of reading and is
generally more satisfying because it is known that meaning will
inevitably be found. It is a mode which demands closure, and
achieves closure in its certainty regarding issues of motivation
and more particularly identity. The novel commences with the
revealing of the victim's identity, and ends with the naming of
the murderer. Once this has been achieved, order has been
restored and the transgression has been healed and exorcised.
The aim of the text is to restore and comfort, and as such, is
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deeply nostalgic. Nevertheless, if we look more closely at the
representation of murder in detective fiction, we shall see that
the situation is somewhat more complex.
Todorov in his essay 'Typologie du roman policier', quoting
Butor, notes:
'tout roman policier est bati sur deux meurtres
dont le premier n'est que 1"occasion du second
dans lequel il est la victime du meurtrier pur
et impunissable, du detective' et que 'le r^cit
superpose deux series temporelles: les jours de
1'enquete qui
commencent au crime et les jours du drame qui
mdnent h 1ui'.6
These remarks are highly suggestive for they draw attention,
firstly, to the role of the double in the detective novel and,
secondly, to the two temporal orders which necessarily co-exist.
The detective is figured as the murderer's double in the
sense that he must reconstruct the other's pattern of thought in
order to become himself the 'murderer'.7 The murderer, in turn,
becomes the victim, for he is imprisoned by the pattern of
thought through which he would have transgressed. The
implication is that the murderer's original act could not exceed
the symbolic order for the detective is able to demonstrate this
act as already read. The murderer can, therefore, no longer
claim originality, for his act is seen to lie outside the
fictions of his motivations. However, although the detective,
the representative of the symbolic order, is able to tame the act
of transgression by reassimi1ating it into an existing pattern,
285
the fact that he is able to do so introduces an element of the
uncanny which may be discerned despite the apparent logic of the
hermeneutic procedure. This duality is perceived by Tani who
recognises the conflict between the creative and resolvent
aspects of the narratives of Poe, the founder of modern detective
fiction.s The act of creativity or murder must be appropriated
by the detective who only succeeds in exorcising the
transgression through making it his own. The transgression is
thus only partially repressed through its assimilation into the
symbolic order. While this element of the uncanny remains
visible to an extent in the fictions of Poe and later of Conan
Doyle, in the work of Agatha Christie, the power of logic
triumphs to produce a narrative free from the spectre of
homicidal desire. Here, the act of murder is robbed of its
transgressive drive, for it is shown to be an act without
consequence, merely the occasion for the dominant order to assert
itself over the subject.9
Todorov's second point regarding the existence of two
temporal orders is interesting for it demonstrates the
fundamental role of narrative in the exorcism of the
transgressive. The first temporal level is that leading up to
the crime whereas the second takes its starting point from the
crime, and is the story of the investigation and resolution. Of
the two stories, Todorov writes, 'la premidre, celle du crime,
est en fait I'histoire d'une absence: sa caracteristique le plus
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juste est qu'elle ne peut etre immediatement prdsente dans le
"livre'-io The second, however, 'c'est une histoire qui n'a
aucune importance en elle-meme, qui sert seulement de mddiateur
entre le lecteur et 1'histoire du crime" n. He correctly
perceives that the murder must, of necessity, take place
elsewhere beyond the immediate gaze. It must bear an unknown
quality, shrouded in mystery, for at the time of happening, it is
beyond meaning and, so, cannot be witnessed or represented.
Todorov is mistaken, however, to suggest that the second story,
where the mystery is unravelled, is of no intrinsic importance,
for it is through this second story, the narrative itself, that
the transgression comes to be represented, tamed and re¬
integrated into the symbolic. It is through this second act that
the murder, conceived of originally as an absence, may be made
(however illusorily) present. It is narrative which makes murder
a meaningful act, but does so through incorporating it into the
symbolic. The detective story is an enactment of the attempt to
establish mastery which refuses to concede the position of
authorship or origin to the perpetrator of the crime.
The detective novel with its emphasis on origin and on
identity seems to parallel the quest which we have noted as
central to first person narrative as the writing of the self. In
both, there is a "crime" which is figured in terms of absence and
loss, anterior to the attempt to recuperate this loss and
establish signification and origin. Tani's remarks on the form
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of the traditional detective novel seem to underline this
similarity, he writes:
the traditional detective novel presents a
reconstruction of the past and ends when this
reconstruction has been fulfilled. To
reconstruct the past is to go back to a point
(the one of the crime) about which the
detective is concerned. There must be a fixed
point otherwise the regressing in time would be
infinite. So to go back in time is equal to
finding a criminal, to unravelling a mystery
(45).
Likewise, first person narrators either go back in time in order
to unravel their own mystery only to uncover their deaths
inscribed in the symbolic order of narrative, or attempt to
recuperate a sense of origin by apparently disrupting the
symbolic order, but finding that their only means of
representation lies within that very order. However, in the
roman-memoir, unlike in detective fiction, the mystery is never
fully unravelled, for there is no satisfactory solution to be
found. The point to which first person narrators may be said to
regress, is the point at which they entered language and were
forced to recognise the moment of their collision with the other.
Not all detective novels adopt the traditional mode and Tani
turns his attention to novels which exploit the structure of
detective fiction by subverting it, in order to produce a
narrative which rejects the domestication of the traditional
closed form.
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In his study of post-modernist detective fiction, Tani
points to the way in which the closed structure of the
traditional detective genre and its fetishisation of the solution
is turned upon itself by the refusal to accept a closed system of
meaning.12 He examines the means by which certain texts exploit
the rigid genre codification only to shatter it by undermining
the conciliatory lure offered by the solution as a monolithic
representation of reality. Tani divides these subversive texts
into three categories according to the way in which they
destabilise the hermeneutic rationale and the solution, its
inevitable product.
The first category he refers to as the 'innovative1 where
the solution is not arrived at through the superior reasoning
powers of the detective, but rather by chance.i3 There does seem
to be an order to events, but the perception of this can only be
fortuitous.
Secondly, he identifies the 'deconstructive1 category which
more acutely problematises reality and the detective's
relationship to it.14 Here' there is no Possibility of a
solution but only a plethora of bewildering possibilities. Tani's
definition merits closer attention, he writes:
The detective is unable to impose a meaning, an
interpretation of the outside occurrences he is
asked, as a sleuth, to solve and interpret.
Reality is so tentacular and full of clues that
the detective risks his sanity as he tries to
find a solution...At the end, he (or she) quits
sizing up clues and admits the mystery; he
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discovers that in the meanwhile, even if he has
not found an objective solution, he has at
least grown and understood something about his
own identity. In a very Poesque way, the
confrontation is no longer between a detective
and a murderer, but between the detective and
reality, or between the detective's mind and
his sense of identity, which is falling apart,
between the detective and the 'murderer' in his
own self (76).
The 'deconstructive' detective novel thus displaces the
transgressive act, for it no longer maintains a simple dichotomy
between the murderer, as purveyor of evil, and the detective as
upholder of justice. The transgression returns and cannot be
recuperated by logic or reason, for the detective's self is
placed in direct confrontation with an order which is unable to
yield the assurance of a stable identity. The detective's
malevolent double is no longer externalised in the figure of the
murderer, but is seen to form part of the detective himself, and
hence, of the order which he represents. Guilt cannot be
considered as an isolated, individual phenomenon whose source can
be re-traced. The narrative becomes a narrative of fragmented
possibilities where there is no hierarchy of meaning and the
detective no longer stands as guarantor of a fixed order and
redeemer of the transgression. He becomes the murderer's second
victim through his inability to resuscitate the logic and
motivation of the original crime. That this form of the
detective novel does not ensure the transcendence of the self
through murder on account of the detective's defeat is a point to
which we shall return.15
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The third category identified by Tani is that of the
'metafictional1 detective novel to which reference has already
been made in relation to Se una notte.16 Here the writer has
turned murderer and the reader detective as he tries to piece
together the corpse/text mutilated by the writer's strategies
which seek to confound all narrative logic. The dubious nature
of this strategy has been discussed in the previous chapter, but
it is interesting to note that the ground on which the conflict
between murderer and detective is fought is that of the text or
the impulse to representation. In all detective novels, the
question of representation is paramount, for it is here that the
unspeakable act must be articulated or again silenced.
Tani sees all three of his categories as combining to create
an anti-detective novel. The significance of the adoption of
this form by contemporary writers is noted by Patricia Waugh who
remarks that 'in the post-modern period, the detective plot is
being used to express not order but the irrationality of both the
surface of the world and of its deep structures'.17 it is to
this representation of reality in which the irrational is openly
acknowledged that we must now turn the focus of our discussion of
first person narrative. We shall examine two novels which adopt
the over-coded genre of detective fiction but seek to subvert it
while, unlike in the work of Calvino, still retaining a
purportedly realist referent. Sciascia's Todo modo and Eco's XI
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nome del la rosa both deal with the problematisatiori of the self
in its confrontation with a reality which is recognised as having
no definitive solution.
In his essay, 'Typologie du roman policier1, Todorov notes
that while the primary 'histoire' of detective fiction
necessarily eschews any element of literary self-consciousness,
the second 'histoire', on the other hand, 'est non seulement
censde tenir compte de la rdalitd du livre mais elle est
precis^ment 1'histoire de ce livre meme'is. Even in the most
traditional form of the detective novel, there tends to exist a
degree of self consciousness present in the text, drawing the
reader's attention to the narrative as a 1inguistic
reconstruction of events. This is perhaps related to the
impossibility of omniscience in the detective novel. At the time
when the murder is committed, the narrator cannot know who the
guilty party is, for the whole point of the genre lies in
dispelling the mystery. The writing of the detective novel,
therefore, becomes the writing of how a logical, causal narrative
is constructed through a primary reading. Its writing becomes a
repetition not only of the crime, but also of the resolvent
investigation which serve as rehearsals to the narrative itself.
It may be asserted therefore that rather than containing two
temporal levels, the detective genre, in fact, embodies three:
the time leading up to the crime, the time of the investigation
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arid, finally, the time of the narrative which ensures the victory
of the detective. The notion of repetition is important to an
understanding of the detective's procedure, for although the
detective is essentially a reader, indeed an ideal reader, for he
is able to elicit full meaning from the signs of the murderer's
text, he seeks ultimately to rewrite the text with the added
appendix of the solution. His hermeneutic skill becomes a
creative act in itself, for it cancels out the creative impulse
of the murderer and, as we have noted, makes him the victim. We
shall now examine these aspects of detective fiction as they
appear in Sciascia's novel.
In Todo modo, the nameless 'io narrante' specifically draws
attention to the fact that he is in the process of constructing a
written account of events which have already taken place. He
writes: 'chi leggera questo manoscritto o, se mai sara
pubblicato, questo libro, si domanderci. . . (99), underlining not
only the avowed literariness of the text, but also indicating
that the text has been written in order to be read, therefore
seeking some response from the other. Although renowned as a
painter, the nameless narrator claims also to be a writer of
'gialli' and states ' 1 i scrivo e li pubblico con pseudonimo'
(70).19 Already it can be discerned that the narrator of Todo
modo not only wishes to remain anonymous, but is consciously at
pains to obscure his identity. In the course of the novel, he is
recognised by the other characters on account of his fame, yet he
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refuses to yield anything to the reader in terms of biographical
information. His I flickers, therefore, between that of the
anonymous producer of discourse and that of a more fully
'embodied' persona whose identity is constructed in a precise
historical context.20
More significant than the scattered allusions to the
literariness of the text is the fact that the discourse of the
novel refers constantly to other books and, in particular, to
other writers.21 The novel opens with a quotation from
Debenedetti, and throughout the novel we find quotations from and
references to Pirandello, Kant, Pascal, Voltaire, Freud, Mallarme
and many others.22 it is not an uncommon feature of detective
fiction to allude to its status as fiction although this effect
is often achieved through the avowed declaration of its
dissimilarity to detective fiction, i.e. by making a claim that
what is happening is real and not part of a detective story. In
Todo modo, the result is somewhat different, for the constant
references to other books and the large sections of the novel
devoted to discourse on books, creates a set of parameters in
which the self is constructed through a proximity to, and
absorbtion of, artistic forms. Ricciarda Ricorda writes:
la citazione arricchisce effettivamente il
testo di un surplus di senso e lo dota di un
secondo piano espressivo, autonomo sebbene di
continuo intersecato con quello realistico.
(75)
Ricorda argues that the level on which the literary quotations
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function should be regarded as offering a higher level of
meaning. It is the level of mediation through which 'real'
events are filtered in order to assume a more profound
significance. We would prefer to suggest, however, that rather
than offering a higher level of interpretation, the extensive use
of literary allusions creates the boundaries in which events and
the self may be comprehended and actualised. Rather than opening
out the field of interpretation, these allusions serve to limit
the context of interpretation.
This seems to be the view of don Gaetano, the catholic
priest who is in charge of the retreat at which the narrator
happens to arrive. Don Gaetono compares his celibacy to a work
of art, stating:
i limiti e le preclusioni espressive ne sono la
forma, non sono limiti e preclusioni. Alio
stesso modo la castita e la forma piu sublime
cui 1'amor proprio pud accedere; un far
diventar arte la vita (41).
This seems to lead us to the central problem of Todo modo, and
all detective fiction, which is the relationship between
identity, form and language, and the possibility of transcendence
expressed here by don Gaetano's reference to the sublime. His
remarks suggest that transcendence is possible through adherence
to form and that form, in turn, permits authorship. To attempt
to verify this assertion, it is necessary to examine images of
authorship within the text.
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Like many detective novels, Todo modo is set in an enclosed
community, in this case a monastic retreat. The necessity of
this type of setting is that it precludes the possibility of the
crime being committed by someone from outside this closed group.
The suspects, therefore, are known and the murderer is present
from the outset although his identity remains obscure until the
denouement.23
In Todo modo, three murders take place and the assumption,
therefore, is that they have some causal link.24 This is very
much the approach of the police who arrive after the first murder
and who insist on the primacy of the motive in any murder
investigation. Scalambri, the police inspector, remarks to a
government minister who has doubted the existence of a motive,
'c'e sempre, signor ministro, c'd sempre; futile, folle,
invisibile all'occhio della normalita; ma c'e sempre1 (63), and
the novel terminates with his ironic re-affirmation of the
necessity of the motive, even though the police investigators
have proved unequal to the task of uncovering it, and of
preventing the subsequent murders.25 The identity of the
inspector and the authority of his office depend on the existence
of the motive and on the possibility of uncovering this motive
through the exercise of reason and the evaluation of clues.
Conversely, the desire of the minister to believe in a motiveless
crime betrays a wish not to have to identify with the victim, for
to do so would be to figure himself in an identical position. It
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also parallels his desire to have the murderer come from outside
the community so that the transgression may be tamed by its
association with the other.26
However, as in many detective novels, the 'detective' is not
a representative of the police force, but an outsider, who yet
has access to the closed circle and who becomes more familiar
with the circumstances of the crime. In Todo modo, it is the
first person narrator who ostensibly takes on this role, but, as
we shall see, he fails to fulfil his function of revealing the
complete sequence of events to the reader.2?
Whereas the narrator had merely chanced upon the religious
retreat, the other residents of the community are all well-
connected members of the ruling class who gather each year in the
guise of spiritual penitents, but who, in fact, meet in order to
confirm their positions of authority and organise deals with the
aim of advancing this authority. The narrator initially accuses
don Gaetano of 'mauvaise foi' for encouraging the spiritual
pretext on which the group meets, but gradually he is forced to
recognise the degree of his own complicity with the ruling elite.
As an artist whose success is based on the desire of the ruling
class to accumulate both wealth and prestige through the
acquisition of 'art', he must acknowledge that his art is merely
a commodity used as a unit of exchange by a certain group. The
system of class values is seen to be self-validating and self-
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perpetuating and finally, the narrator asks of the ruling class:
'e che cosa dirigeva in concreto, effettivamente? Una ragnatela
nel vuoto, la propria labile ragnatela. Anche se di fili d'oro1
(74). As the murder enquiry progresses, a web of intrigue is
discovered which links the first two murders as part of a spiral
of political corruption and double dealing, but the identity of
the murderer is never found. It is, however, the third murder,
that of don Gaetano, which will prove most significant and
through which the discourse of murder, the self and the other
wi11 be articulated.
The image of the double, present in the relationship between
the detective and the murderer, has already been noted, but in
Todo modo, the situation is made more complex by the
'detective's1 assumed failure to reproduce the murderer's mode of
thought and trap the criminal. However, the image of the double,
as it occurs in the narrative, is essential to the issues at
stake. Here, the detective's double is not ostensibly the
murderer, but the third victim, don Gaetano, and much of the
novel is taken up with conversations between the two. As Tani
points out, the physical presence of don Gaetano is characterised
in particular by its ineffabi1ity.28 He is present in every
corner of the retreat, but seems to appear out of thin air only
to disappear just as discreetly and mysteriously. The narrator
writes:
quando se n'era gid andato, la sua immagine
persisteva come negli occhi chiusi o nel vuoto;
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sicch£ nori si riusciva mai a cogliere il
momento preciso, reale in cui s'allontanava
Che era poi an effetto consequente a quel la
specie di sdoppiamento di cui ho tentato di
dire. II fatto e che stando con lui si
stabiliva come una sfera di ipnosi (17-18).
The type of 1sdoppiamento1 to which the narrator refers, is a
comparison he has made to the children's game in which the child
stares at a black silhouette with a small white dot in the
centre, looks up to the sky and continues to see the silhouette
only now it has become white and diaphanous. This ethereal aura
attributed to don Gaetano's corporal presence is figured as
disquieting and macabre, for it is at odds with the material,
worldly ambiance of the retreat.
There then follows a series of images which increase this
feeling of unease and their complexity is revealing. Don Gaetano
who, from the outset, is characterised by the imposing nature of
his presence, grows further in stature as he greets his guests:
Pur in atteggiamento di filiale devozione, di
gioia e a tratti d'ilarit&, don Gaetano
manteneva un distacco, una fredezza, una
severity che mi suscitavano sentimento di piena
ammirazione. Altro che cardinale: poteva
anch'essere il papa. (21)
Shortly afterwards, the narrator notes the degree of complicity
which has grown up between himself and the priest but also 'che
la sua immagine fosse, piu vecchia e saggia e consumata, la mi a
cui aspiravo' (24). Then whilst don Gaetano is relating the
history of the retreat to the narrator, he draws attention to a
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copy of Manetti's 'Tentazione di Sant'Antonio' upon which the
narrator remarks, 'ma quel che piu colpiva del diavolo, era il
fatto che aveva gli occhiali h pince-nez, dalla montatura nera'
(29). The significance of this is then made apparent as he
realises that the spectacles worn by don Gaetano are the same as
those worn by the devil in the painting: 1i suoi occhiali erano
una copia esatta di quelli del diavolo1 (30). The series of
images takes on an even more sinister tone when don Gaetano
points out that Buttafuoco, the copier of the original painting,
whose very name bears an infernal imprint, had made a self-
portrait of his representation of the devil.
The chain of imagery thus elevates don Gaetano from his
position of filial subservience to that of the Pope and the
Devil. Through the allusions to art, the narrator also takes on
a diabolic persona which is confirmed by the image of the priest
as his alter ego. Important too is the image of the artist as
copier, a role which subverts the notion of authorship, but which
becomes diabolical through the dissemination of a false image or
icon. Thus, the narrator's self is imaged both as God the Father
and the Devil, an ambivalent but not impossible identity.29
Freud, in his essay 'A Seventeenth Century Demonological
Neurosis', discusses the manner in which God and the Devil
function as images of the child's ambivalent relationship to the
father.30 Split into two separate entities, they originally
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represented the child's antithetical emotions towards a single
being. God and the Devil must consequently be seen as one
figure. In relation to the imaging of God, he writes:
We know that God is a father-substitute; or
more correctly, that he is an exhalted father;
or, yet again, that he is a copy of a father as
he is seen and experienced in childhood - by
individuals in their own childhood and by
mankind in its prehistory as the father of the
primitive and primal horde. Later on in life
the individual sees his father as something
different and lesser. But the ideational image
belonging to his childhood is preserved and
becomes merged with the inherited memory-traces
of the primal father to form the individual's
idea of God.3
Read in this context, the narrator's relationship with don
Gaetano bears the traces of an archaic conflict which is at once
personal and part of the collective. The effect of doubling
indicates the narrator's desire to usurp the role which don
Gaetano is perceived to fulfil, and suggests the re-enactment of
the original Oedipal conflict; the conflict between the self and
the other.
We have already noted the sense of unease which pervades
Todo modo. In his essay 'The Uncanny', Freud states that this
feeling of unease is often associated with the idea of the
double.32 He sees the double as a form of regression to an
earlier phase of the self's psychic development as, in fact, are
all feelings of the uncanny.
They are a harking-back to particular phases in
the evolution of the self-regarding feeling, a
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regression to a time when the ego had not yet
marked itself off sharply from the external
world and from other people.33
The narrator's own impressions, after having been struck by the
glasses worn by the Devil, seem to confirm this idea of return.
He has '11impressione di aver gid visto qua!cosa di simile, senza
ricordare quando e dove, [che] conferiva al diavolo occhialuto un
che di misterioso e di pauroso: come l'avess[e] visto in sogno o
nei visionari terrori dell 1infanzia1 (29).
The sense of the uncanny which may be said to pervade the
narrative is not due to the occurrence of the first two murders,
but to the ambivalent relationship between the narrator and don
Gaetano. In addition to the chain of physical similarities which
link the two characters, there exists also an effect of doubling
on a mental level. Freud also remarks on the importance of the
link between both physical and psychological resemblance:
We have characters who are to be considered
identical because they look alike. This
relation is accentuated by mental processes
leaping from one of these characters to
another...so that the one possesses knowledge,
feelings and experience in common with the
other. Or it is marked by the fact that the
subject identifies himself with someone else,
so that he is in doubt as to which his self is,
or substitutes the extraneous self for his own.
In other words, there is a doubling, dividing
and interchanging of the self.34
The problematisation of the relationship between the self
and reality was noted by Tani as one of the constitutive features
of deconstruct!'ve anti-detective fiction. However, in Todo modo,
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it is the detective who becomes victimised by the eventual
victim's ability to reconstruct his mental processes and, in a
sense, to 'kill' him. This is most notable on two occasions.
The first is when don Gaetano correctly deduces the type of Mary
Magdalene which the narrator would have painted were he to have
undertaken the task, and the second is when don Gaetano seems to
anticipate a conversation between himself and the narrator by
leaving a copy of Pascal's Pensees marked at the apposite point
by the narrator's bed.35
The first instance is interesting, for it challenges the
notion of authorship by implying that the narrator's production
bears not the originality of genius, but the highly formalised
work of a copyist. The painter discovers his work already
complete in the mind of don Gaetano. The second example of the
priest's power seems to exceed even the most advanced capacities
of logic, and the appearance of the book cannot be explained
without recourse to a more sinister order of things. The law of
the Father seems absolute for not only does don Gaetano possess
the key to the innermost recesses of the narrator's mind, but it
is also suggested that as confessor to all the suspects (except
paradoxically the narrator), he must know the identity of the
ki11er.36
The role of confessor is particularly suitable for the
figure of don Gaetano as it enables him to function as the Father
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by receiving the penitent's call to the Other and then ensuring
contrition and absolution. He functions in a similar way with
the narrator, albeit on a supposedly secular level in the course
of their dialogue which fills out the narrative. Just as Freud
notes the centrality of repetition in the uncanny, don Gaetano
points out to the narrator the compulsive nature of his
relationships with women, and seems to indicate the superiority
of his celibacy in that he has disrupted this cycle of
compulsion. His life has become art and he has become its
author. The problem for the narrator is how to disrupt this
cycle of repetition. Predictably, it might be argued, he resorts
to killing his father.3 7
This is the solution offered by Tani although he does not
see the resolution in Freudian terms.36 Tani effects a
persuasive close reading of the text to show that the third
murder was committed by the narrator although he is never found
out. That the first person narrator is the murderer represents a
subversion of the rules of detective fiction, for the narrator
must share his knowledge, however limited, with the reader and
make explicit his relationship to the crime.39 In Todo modo,
moreover, the act of murder is specifically linked to the
question of authorship. The narrator writes:
Appunto nel delitto non ci si pub fermare...non
ci si pud fermare, intendo, finche non si
eliminano gli errori, gli incidenti, le
sbavature che si sono verificati commettendo il
primo; e poi correggendo con altro delitto,
quelli che ancora, imponderabilmente,
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insorgario; e cosi via... Questo, ovviamente,
nei delitti il cui autore ha tutto calcolato
per riuscire al 1 'impunity. E poichd nori c'6
calcolo che non abbia un margine in cui
11imponderabi1e, il fortuito, e insomnia la
fortuna non giuochino un ruolo fatale (79-80)
Apart from the allusion to the murderer as author of the crime,
three main points emerge: the first relates to the compulsive and
repetitive nature of murder, the second to the murderer's wish to
go undetected and thirdly, to the role of chance in the crime.
Claude Ambroise has written:
Scrivere un romanzo giallo e veramente come
trasformare la morte di qualcuno in una
esperienza narrabile... In Todo modo, il fatto
di scrivere tende addirittura a coincidere,
simbolicamente, con l'atto stesso di
uccidere.4o
It can be argued that the level on which they do coincide is that
of their shared, repetitive structure. To narrate is to go back
and, as we have seen, involves an attempt to exorcise the loss
and absence experienced by the self. To murder, it would appear,
is to re-stage the killing of the Father, the original act which
offered the lure of plenitude to the desiring subject. The self
seeks to affirm its identity in the confrontation with the
symbolic order and to master this order by conquering its most
potent constituent, the Father, and by reproducing the original
moment of plenitude.
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Ambroise goes on to state that 'Todo modo e una esperienza
di ricupero dell a propria identita', but one must question
whether this attempt fully succeeds. We never know who committed
any of the crimes in Todo modo and, as readers, can only play
with the text, constructing our own hypotheses.41 At the end of
the novel, the narrator confesses to the murder of don Gaetano,
but the police do not recognise his guilt i.e. his identity, and
to murder with the aim of self-affirmation requires recognition
by the other for as don Gaetano had earlier remarked, 'le cose
che non si sanno, non sono' (35). The narrator does not claim to
be guilty of the murder, and if we assume that he had the right,
it is perhaps here that the narrator succeeds in subverting the
symbolic order.
At the beginning of the novel, the narrator claims to be
free from the everyday forces which imprison the self, with no
worries or fears 'tranne quelle, oscure e irreprimibi1i, che h a
sempre avute, del vivere e per il vivere1 (4). He goes on:
e vi si innestavano e diramavano 1'inquietudine
e 1'apprensione per 1'atto di 1iberta che
dovevo pur fare: ma leggere e leggermente
stordite, come mi trovassi dentro un giuoco di
specchi, non ossessivo ma luminoso e quieto
come 11ora e i luoghi che percorrevo, pronto a
ripetere, a moltiplicare, quando sarebbe
scattato, quando avrei voluto farlo scattare,
il mio atto di liberty. (4)
As the writer of a retrospective account of events, the narrator
must know what his 'atto di liberta' consisted of. It is
tempting to view this in the terms which we have suggested i.e.
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of killing the Father, and the novel's closure on the lengthy
quotation from Gide's Les caves du Vatican pushes further an
identification between the narrator's 'atto di libertd' and
Lafcadio's 'act gratuit'.42 Lafcadio's attempt fails as he is
forced to recognise the impossibility of his desire so,
consequently, it is perhaps mistaken to presume that the
narrator's act of freedom consists in committing what seems to be
the ultimate transgressive act. The detective novel with its
fetishisation of the solution traditionally eschews the
importance of the murder itself, and instead, focuses on the
resolvent aspect of the crime. The ultimate transgression
becomes not the murder, but the failure to detect the murderer
and re-establish the primacy of the dominant order. It can
perhaps be suggested that the narrator's 'atto di liberta' is not
constituted by his killing don Gaetano, but by his refusal to
seek recognition for his act (killing or not killing) from the
symbolic. Consequently, his narrative can be read as a
repetition of his challenge to that order by refusing to close
the text and confirm the notion of a fixed identity based on the
concepts of guilt and innocence. This refusal also constitutes a
refusal to exorcise the uncanny by permitting limitless play
around the point at which the self rejects recognition by the
symbolic.
Towards the end of the novel, the narrator appears to have a
sudden moment of inspiration which causes him to uncover the
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solution to his 'problema'. He declines to surrender his
insight, indicating only that the solution is reminiscent of the
solution arrived at by Dupin, in Poe's 'The Purloined Letter'.
Poe's short story, although considered to be one of the
prototypes for detective fiction in the last century, is not the
story of a murder. Instead, it deals with the recovery of a
letter which had fallen into the wrong hands and which Dupin has
to locate, the official upholders of law and order having failed
in this task. Dupin succeeds through finding the letter in a
hiding place so exposed to the gaze that it appears not to be
one. Having secured the return of the letter, Dupin cannot
resist a moment of hubris and replaces the purloined letter with
a substitute which will allow the thief to glean the identity of
Dupin. Not overtly concerned with murder, the tale is
nevertheless concerned with power and the relation between the
self and the other. The thief commits his crime in full view of
his victim who is rendered helpless for fear of exposing her
secret. As Dupin, therefore, remarks 'Here then...you have
precisely what you demand to make the ascendancy complete - the
robber's knowledge of the loser's knowledge of the robber1.43
Power demands recognition by the other and when this look is
denied the thief's position disintegrates. The narrator
(incidentally not Dupin) notes that 'it is this possession and
not any employment of the letter which bestows the power. With
the employment, power departs'.44 The result of Dupin's hubris
is that he employs the letter to ensure recognition by the thief,
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of his superior intellect. Unlike Dupin, the narrator of Todo
modo refuses to succomb to the temptation of allowing the other
to identify his position.
In his seminar on 'The Purloined Letter', Lacan sees the
letter as a 'pur signifiant' which only accrues meaning according
to the position it occupies in the drama.45 its importance,
however, is due to the fact that it also constitutes the identity
of the beholder according to the position in which he stands to
its authority:
L'ascendant que le ministre tire de la
situation ne tient done pas a la lettre, mais,
qu'il le sache ou non, au personnage qu'elle
lui constitue.46
The fault of the minister/thief and Dupin is believing that they
have assumed the position of 'maitre absolu' or exhalted father
in relation to the letter, for, as Lacan points out, this
position is located solely in the imaginary. While they fall
prey to the lure of the symbolic and the false position of
transcendence, the narrator of Todo modo refuses this position by
declining to close the hermeneutic sequence through imposing a
resolution. It is, therefore, through this refusal to reveal and
establish meaning that the narrator is able to rescue the self
from its struggle with the symbolic.
The absence of logic and the failure of reason which seem to
underpin Todo modo, also feature prominently in Eco's II nome
della rosa. Eco's work is also a detective novel and like
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Sciascia, Eco uses the conventions of the genre as a means of
subversion in order to lead the narrative on to other fields of
enquiry. Like Todo modo, the novel is told in the first person,
but rather than depriving the reader of biographical information,
the narrator bombards the reader with details of his identity and
the geographical and historical background to the narrative. The
reader does not have to wonder about who the teller of the tale
is, for it seems that he reveals himself from the outset. We
shall see, however, that the question of identity is fundamental
to II nome dell a rosa but, once again, the parameters in which
the debate is situated have been displaced. Firstly, therefore,
we shall explore the biographical and historical context in which
the narrator is located before going on to deal with the text
which he is purported to have written. Finally, we shall attempt
to elucidate some of the complexities and contradictions which
emerge from the uneasy juxtaposition of the subject and his text.
Contrary to what we have noted in the texts previously
studied, the narrator of II nome del la rosa is well and truly
named, for names are by no means in short supply in this
narrative. The name of the narrator is Adso da Melk and we soon
learn that, at the time of his narrative, he was a young novice
returning to his native Germany in the company of Guglielmo da
Baskerville, a senior English monk, entrusted with the task of
effecting a reconciliation between the warring factions of the
Church. The novel is set in the latter part of 1327, and the
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tumultuous events of the period, the struggle between Church and
Empire, are responsible in part for Adso's flight from Italy and,
hence, his involvement in the events which he will relate.
Adso's narration, however, takes place at a much later date,
somewhere towards the end of the fourteenth century when, as an
old man in his cell, he looks back on the events of his youth.
The dual perspective which this gap in time introduces, is, as we
have noted, very much a part of the traditional roman-memoires
form.4 7 on the one hand, there is the naivety of the younger,
experiencing I who finds himself in medias res while, on the
other, there is the more authoritative, mature vision of the
older self who is able to look back and construct an ordered
narrative out of the disordered events of the past. The
importance of this structural feature is commented upon by Eco in
the Postille a il nome del la rosa, for despite the wisdom of
hindsight, Adso never becomes anything other than a naive reader
of events and, as we shall discover, the text comes to exceed its
narrator.
Adso's narrative relates the series of murders which take
place in a Benedictine abbey, somewhere in the north of Italy,
during the course of one week in November, 1327. He details the
task of Guglielmo to catch the culprit, a task upon which the
political struggles of the period constantly encroach. In the
Postilie, Eco underlines the crucial function which the naivety
of the narrator affords in the transmission of complex historical
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data to the reader.49 As an inexperienced foreigner, Adso is as
unaware of the upheavals which beset the peninsula as the
contemporary reader, and his function is to transcribe the
lengthy and often convoluted explanations which Guglielmo offers
to him, thus allowing the reader to become acquainted with the
period. It is important to stress that it is as a scribe that
Adso considers his role to be in the documentation of the past.
He serves in this capacity both to Guglielmo, claiming to be his
'scrivano e discepolo al tempo stesso' (22), and more
significantly to God the Father as a faithful witness to the
events which occurred. He vows that he will relate past events:
ripetendo verbatim quanto vidi e udii, senza
azzardarmi a trarne un disegno, come a lasciare
a coloro che verranno (se l'Anticristo non li
precedera) segni di segni, perche su di essi si
eserciti la preghiera della decifrazione. (21)
Finally, he begs that 1i1 Signore gli conceda la grazia di
essere testimone trasparente'. As a narrator, Adso is not only
naive but totally self-effacing. He dare not interpret what he
witnessed for that is the work of others. Later in the novel,
when the Abbot initiates the novice into the language of precious
stones and the multiplicity of their symbolic meaning, he
remarks:
II linguaggio delle gemme e multiforme,
ciascuna esprime piu verita, a seconda del
senso di lettura che si sceglie, a seconda del
contesto in cui appaiono. E chi decide quale
si a il livello di interpretazione e quale il
giusto contesto? Tu lo sai, ragazzo, te
I'hanno insegnato: e 1'autorita, il
commentatore tra tutti piu si euro e piu
investito di prestigio, e dunque di santita.
(451)
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Interpretation and the elucidation of meaning are not the
task of the novice monk; his is faith. As a scribe, Adso's
authority, like the muslim scribe in Se una notte, is invested in
God and whatever truth may be gleaned from his manuscript is of
divine and not earthly origin. Adso lays no claim to the text.
As he indicates, however, God's truth may only be transcribed by
means of signs, words which stand for other signs and his account
begins, 'in principio era il Verbo e il Verbo era presso Dio e il
Verbo era Dio' (19). God and the Word become synonymous and His
authority is seen to extend to the Word itself. Throughout our
study, we have noticed the extent to which the self which had
been posited as the site of authority, has become subject to the
authority of discourse, of the Word. Here, the authority vested
in the Word is sanctified through its association with the
paternal deity thus suggesting a transcendence attached to the
word which is denied to the subject. The implications of this
are multiple and far-reaching, but before exploring them fully,
we must turn to the alternative source of authority upon which
Adso draws, the authority of History.
The events documented are precisely dated, but more than
this, are situated in a precise historical context. We might
argue that Adso documents not only the traumatic happenings of a
brief but significant moment of his past, but also the struggles
between Church and Empire out of which the modern age was born.
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He proceeds with the faith of one writing a chronicle, a witness
to his times, leaving a testament for those who follow to
decipher.50 The significance of this should not pass unnoticed
for while, on the one hand, Adso, as a witness, acts as a
guarantor of the period, on the other, history functions to
guarantee the veracity of his account. These two aspects, the
personal and the historico-political, serve the purpose of mutual
validation, and combine with the authority of the Deity to
authenticate the text.
The various strands of authority are brought together by
Adso as he sets out to relate his shameful, sexual encounter with
the village girl in the monastery kitchen. He begins by invoking
the succour of God, the Virgin Mary and all the saints in heaven
before continuing:
ma mi sono ripromesso di raccontare su quei
fatti lontani, tutta la verita, e la verita e
indivisa, brilla del la sua stessa perspicuita,
e non consente di essere dimidiata dai nostri
interessi e dalla nostra vergogna. II problema
e piuttosto di di re cosa avvenne non come ora
lo vedo e lo ricordo...ma come lo vidi e sentii
allora. E posso farlo con fedelta di cronista,
perchb se chiudo gli occhi posso ripetere tutto
quanto non solo feci ma pensai in quegli
istanti, come se copiassi una pergamena scritta
allora. (246)
Adso thus makes recourse to all the sources of authority which we
have seen to be typical of first person narrative. His vow of
truthfulness is made in the name of God and of his duty as
'cronista1, but significantly, he alludes also to the gap between
writing and experience, and to his own mnemonic capacities. This
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is not the first occasion on which Adso has referred to the feat
of memory which his labour betokens:
forse, per comprendere meglio gli avvenimenti
in cui mi trovai coinvolto, e bene che io
ricordi quanto stava avvenendo in quello
scorcio di secolo, cosi come lo compresi allora
vivendolo cosi come lo rammento ora, arricchito
di altri racconti che ho udito dopo - se pure
la mi a memoria sara in grado di riannodare le
fila di tanti e confusissimi eventi. (20)
Adso's statement draws attention not only to the work of memory,
but also to the manner in which time, but more particularly other
stories, have enriched his memory. This earlier remark suggests
a more complex relationship between the subject and the text than
that allowed by Adso when he claims to write 'come se copiass[e]
una pergamena scritta allora1 which implies a belief that writing
can reflect life directly. The gap between writing and
experience is no longer innocent, but weaves its own plots into
the text. It becomes impossible to speak solely of the
perspectives of then and now, for it is perhaps in that which
lies between that the most crucial perspective is formed. To
view life and the chronicle as parallel texts does not
necessarily betray a naive stance on the part of the narrator if
it allows an exploration of the gaps which lie between.
Two final points which need to be made concerning Adso's
relation to his manuscript are that of his relationship with the
reader, and the idea that the writing of the text serves as a
confession, a catharsis in itself. At one point in the novel,
Adso reiterates his pledge to veracity, but adds that this was
315
riot his only motivation nor was it 'per il desiderio (peraltro
degnissimo) di ammaestrare i [suoi] 1ettori futuri; ma anche per
liberare la [sua] memoria appassita e stanca di visiom' che per
tutta la vita 11hanno affannata' (281). The desire for mastery
has been a feature common to all the texts which we have studied,
whether it be expressed as mastery of the past, the text or the
reader, it is always the expression of a desire to master the
other. The desire to write for posterity reveals an essentially
paternal, procreative relationship to writing in which the self
will live on thanks to the organic properties of the text. The
final pages of the manuscript, where Adso envisages his own
imminent return to dust, will somehow save the self from the
dissolution which is forecast in the writing. The concept of the
narrative as confession not only situates Adso firmly in the
tradition of first person narrative, but also seeks to acquire
salvation for the self through writing.si a life in words is a
life saved by words.
It would seem at this point that Eco has produced a first
person narrative which harks back to a more innocent age where
the relationship between the I and the text was devoid of
conflict. We earlier stated that the text exceeds the narrator,
and we can now show the ways in which the text undermines Adso's
project of truthfulness to demonstrate the self as product of the
text. In the end, it is this purpose which Adso's naivety
serves, casting doubt and confusion on to the alleged
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transparency of the text.
Adso's fourteenth century manuscript is preceded by a
preface, written not by Adso, but by an unnamed I figure,
detailing how the medieval manuscript came to print.52 The
reader learns that the text comes not in its original version,
but is presented through a series of translations and rewritings
whose authenticity cannot be assured due to an involved trail of
loss and false attribution. The vicissitudes of the text are
documented amidst such a welter of detail that it requires a
certain degree of intellectual concentration on the part of the
reader to follow and comprehend the circuitous path which leads
to the text's publication. The preface is precisely dated, as is
the occasion on which the anonymous I first discovered the
manuscript. It is revealed that the search for the lost text
caused the unnamed I to travel the world before finally securing
the text and writing his own version. He writes of his wish to
present the text 'come se fosse autentico' (15), ironisizing in
advance Adso's claims to veracity and authenticity. He asserts
also that he feels '1ibero di raccontare, per semplice gusto
fabulatorio, la storia di Adso da Melk'. This too will
contradict Adso's later claims, for he writes not simply out of
pleasure, but as a duty to himself, God and history. The writer
of the preface concludes that the pleasure of the text is due to
its distant temporal location far from our own cares and worries,
for the book '& storia di 1ibri, non di miserie quotidiane'.
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Here, in a gesture of self-referentiality, it is suggested that
the narrative is not about medieval monks but about books. The
preface prepares for such a reading by alluding to the overtly
fictional nature of the narrative and by forming a set of
parameters within which Adso's later claims to veracity must be
read.
If the fiction is cast into doubt so too is Adso, for he is
effectively erased from the first person pronoun by the anonymous
I's claim to be writing his story. Finally, it might be argued
that the circumstantial detail surrounding the origins of the
text has a more complex function than, at first, might appear.
Rather than enlightening the reader, this information serves to
confuse and disorient, subsequently rendering itself meaningless.
Through saying too much, it says nothing at all. The questions
which the preface raises regarding authority, authenticity and
meaning, seem to contradict the position of Adso on these issues.
The preface to his text suggests that narrative is not a
transparent medium and that the relationship between the self and
language is more complex than the position which he articulates.
Adso's role in the events which he witnesses is a minor one,
and it is from the point of view of an onlooker that he writes.
On arrival at the monastery, Guglielmo is requested to unravel
the circumstances behind the mysterious death of one of the young
monks. Death and murder then start to multiply, and it is on
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this level that the main plot lies. Consequently, it is within
the confines and conventions of the detective genre which we
shall now treat the narrative.53.
Like Todo modo, II nome dell a rosa is set in an isolated,
monastic community. This self-enclosed setting is typical of the
detective genre, for it precludes the possibility of the murderer
coming from outside so allows the narrative to focus on the
motives and relationships of the characters or suspects who
inhabit the enclave.54 as is common, the detective will be an
outsider, removed from the pattern of intrigue and emotion which
envelopes the crime. In this case, the detective is Guglielmo da
Baskerville whose name playfully evokes the hero of the stories
of Conan Doyle. This is the first and most obvious of the many
intertextual references which abound in the narrative, and while
the reference specifically draws a parallel between the
relationship of Guglielmo and Adso and that of Holmes and Watson,
it also raises some interesting questions regarding the
temporality of fiction.
If we accept that Adso's manuscript belongs to the
fourteenth century, its two heroes are logically precursors of
Conan Doyle's duo; Holmes and Watson intertextually cite Adso
and Guglielmo. Logically, however, this is not the case for as
twentieth century readers, we regard the nineteenth century
detectives as the precursors of their earlier counterparts and
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thus the logic of temporality is reversed through the fiction.
The notion of texts speaking through the centuries, and in spite
of them, makes each text contemporaneous with its reading and not
its writing. Any authority is passed from author to reader. The
allusion to the detectives of Conan Doyle escapes Adso, situated
within the text, but its significance is obvious to the reader.
We are not reading an historical novel.55
This discussion may be specious, yet it is the question of
writing and the meanings disseminated by the text which lies at
the heart of a reading of II nome dell a rosa, the title by which
Adso's manuscript is known, although not thus entitled by him.
The hermeneutic quest is the central proposition of all detective
fiction and the resolution of this quest within the narrative
determines the status of the act of writing itself and the
accommodation which must be effected between the representation
and its referent. The chronological inversion implied by the
reference to Holmes is compounded by the temporal construction of
the narrative.56 in compliance with the rigid structuring of the
detective genre, the narrative takes place over the course of
seven days with one murder occurring or being revealed on each
day. Time is further subdivided, not according to the
chronological ordering of the clock, but by the equally rigid
ordering of the canonical day. In a note to the text, however,
the unnamed I points out that the canonical hour varied according
to the locality and the season, and also that in the fourteenth
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century the order prescribed by St. Benedict would probably not
have been adhered to anyway. Again, the effect of this is not
merely to inform the reader of historical circumstance, but to
undermine the authority which Adso seeks to attribute to his
text. Time is not an absolute, but a fluid entity and its
measurement proves arbitrary.
In addition to the archetypal sleuth's name, the physical
descriptions of Guglielmo also echo Holmes, as perhaps does his
predeliction for certain herbs, unsuited for the use of the young
novice.57 in his methodology, Guglielmo also recalls Voltaire's
Zadig, but, moreover, the plot abounds with murder, intrigue,
deception and false identity, involving labyrinths, mirrors,
secret passages, poison, arcane codes and inscrutable scripts.
The over-abundance of these devices seems to overdetermine the
status of the text as detective fiction and veer in the direction
of overt parody. The significance of each of these devices is,
however, linked to the problematics of reading and writing which
is central to the text. Each device demands a solution for it
conceals a secret, but functions as a sign which does not
willingly yield the truth, but serves to deflect the eye from it.
Each device both conceals and contains a lie.
Detective fiction is centred round the hermeneutics of
identity which are presumed to reveal a truth, and order is
restored through its revelation. The devices which we have
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mentioned seek to confound the notion of a transparent reading
and demand a reader whose knowledge can reconstruct that of their
maker who has used them in order to deceive, in order to
perpetrate a lie. It can consequently be asserted that in
detective fiction, we are faced with the notion of the murderer
as a liar, for having committed the crime, he strives to
eliminate all traces of his authorship of the crime.
Paradoxically, the act of murder through which he asserted his
authorship becomes the locus also of his denial of authority.
The murderer sets out to conceal his traces through the
distortion of the text which will lead to him. In opposition,
stands the detective whose task is not only to read the clues
left behind by the murderer, but also to read tangentially the
false signs constructed by the murderer's disavowal of authority,
and negociate the truth of the lie. In A Theory of Semiotics,
Eco writes:
Semiotics is concerned with everything that can
be taken as a sign. A sign is everything that
can be taken as significantly substituting for
something else. This something else does not
necessarily have to exist or to actually be
somewhere at the moment in which a sign stands
in for it. Thus semiotics is in principle the
discipline studying everything which can be
used in order to lie. 5a
The task of the detective equates that of the semiotician. Both
seek to make good the absence of things by reconstructing a
presence by means of a system of signs, and both are aware that
things as well as signs are not necessarily what they seem. It
is, therefore, on account of his ability as an astute reader of
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signs that Guglielmo is called upon to solve the chain of murder.
In the Postilie, Eco remarks that the attraction of the
detective genre lies in its being a text of pure conjecture.59
We should add, however, that in the traditional form, the
detective inevitably arrives at the facts, and the murder serves
only as a pretext for the resolution whose function is to re-
enforce the dominant order. It is, nevertheless, in the realm of
pure conjecture which Guglielmo chooses to operate. As he
remarks 'tutto pud darsi...ma una cosa sola si d&, o si d data, o
si sta dando...' (459), but the problem lies in trying to
discover this one true thing. In order to do so, Guglielmo has
already stated that 'bisogna immaginare tutti gli ordini
possibili, e tutti i disordini' (420). The question, therefore,
remains as to how the detective is able to orient himself and
interpret what signs really mean amidst the disorder.
The positing of the world as a system of signs implies the
textualisation of the world as we experience it. Guglielmo
quotes:
omnis mundi creatura
quasi liber et pictura
nobis est in speculum (31)
Not only do books provide a homology to life, but they are also
the condition of our reading of it. After Berengario has
recounted to Guglielmo his meeting with Adelmo's ghost, the
detective confides to Adso:
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quel fantasma mi pare pochissimo fantasma e in
ogni caso [Berengario] recitava una pagina che
ho gid letto su qua!che 1ibro a uso dei
predicatori. Questi monaci 1eggono forse
troppo, e quando sono eccitati rivivono le
visioni che ebbero sui libri. (124-125)
The margins between what lies within books and that which lies
outside become obscure as the effects of words create the context
of experience. In the end, the word becomes the experience and
the world becomes an inter-text.
Given the symbolic role of the Word in II nome del la rosa,
it is only fitting that the action of the novel be centred round
the monastery's library, the repository of the Word, and that the
main participants are all involved with the world of books. For
them, the world is indeed text, and it is their relations with
the text which determine the course of events. The first victim
in the chain of carnage is Adelmo, and Guglielmo's investigations
soon lead him to the library which is revealed to be not a
peaceful site of learning, but a nest of intrigue, hatred,
jealousy, lust and suspicion. Murder is committed out of the
frustration of desire, and the desire which permeates the library
is the desire for the Word. Access to the Word is not freely
granted, for all reading must be vetted and approved by the
librarian. As the custodian of the Word, the librarian thus
wields great power, for only he has access to the library's inner
sanctum where the desired texts lie in store.
Guglielmo also discovers through his study of the library's
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catalogue, in effect another sign of signs, that not all the
books held by the library may be read by the monks. The desire
not only to read, but to make impossible certain readings,
indicates the power which is thought to inhere to the Word.
Censorship and prohibition can only function if they protect that
which is desired most, and the effect of prohibition is not to
stultify desire, but to intensify it through its mediation. It
becomes apparent to Guglielmo that it is the desire to acquire
and the desire to conceal the 11ibro proibito1 which is at the
origin of the series of bloody crimes. It is the desire to
possess the forbidden book which motivates the monks, and the
significance of this lies not solely in the desire to read, but
in the desire to gain the authority of the proscribed text
through its appropriation.
It seems possible, therefore, to read the murderous desire
of the monks in classical Freudian terms. Their motivation can
be interpreted as a desire to re-enact the original crime, the
primal killing of the father. This killing is motivated by the
desire to usurp the authority of the father, appropriating it for
the self and thus assuming the position of the Father. In this
world bounded by the authority of the text, it is inevitable that
the primal killing be staged in terms of the appropriation of the
Word. Adso's own initial appropriation of the words of John may
be re-cast citing instead the words of Freud.so The forbidden
works entombed in the library are considered taboo for the
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majority of the monks, and it is only the librarian who assumes
the symbolic position of the father who may gaze upon them. The
notion of taboo is particularly apt, for it contains both the
idea of the sacred and that of the unclean. The forbidden texts
are unclean in that familiarity with them will spread the
contagion of their discourse, yet their prohibition also marks
their veneration. As Freud notes: 'what is sacred was originally
nothing more than the prolongation of the will of the primal
father1.61
The concept of taboo is built on an antithesis which may be
explained by the ambivalent emotions which the subject feels with
regard to the Father. An object of both love and hatred, his
killing is celebrated and expiated, a cause for both mourning and
exhaltation. In time, the ambivalent emotions surrounding the
death of the father serve to intensify rather than vanquish his
authority. The word of the father thus becomes a totem
attributed with magnificent powers which not only enlighten, but
may destroy, whoever should venture to take possession.
Guglielmo's remark that 'si usano segni e segni di segni solo
quando ci fanno difetto le cose' (36), becomes doubly
significant, for it alludes not only to the constitutive power of
the sign, but also to the fact that their use symbolises another
reality: signs can be used to 'murder' the object, for they bear
all the murderous intent of the primal killing. Similarly,
Guglielmo states: 'un sogno e una scrittura, e molte scritture
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non sono altro che sogni 1 (441). Just as dreams are the
disguised fulfilment of repressed desires, so too are texts. For
the monks, there is no distinction between text and the world,
and their desires are worked out solely in relation to the
former.
The relation which has been drawn between the text as the
Father and the desire of the subject to appropriate its power is
inevitably erotic. Guglielmo unfailingly lays bare a network of
homosexual liaisons which illicitly traverse the life of the
monastery but, while on one level, it is revealed that sex
between men is used as a means by which to barter and exchange
the secrets of the library, the definitions of male sexuality
also bears another significance. Teresa de Lauretis examines
this question and comes to conclude that 'Eco's homo semeioticus
may find his most adequate legend in homo-sexuality defined as
pedagogy'.62 She arrives at this position having examined the
nature of Guglielmo's relationship with Adso who, as we have
noted, defines himself not only as his master's scribe, but also
his disciple. Like Holmes and Watson, they are bound by the
eroticised master/slave dialectic which marks the dependency of
the former on the latter. Guglielmo needs Adso in order to
perpetuate his own learning, and in order to achieve this, he
needs Adso's desire, for it is Adso's desire which will produce
the text. The erotici sation of their relationship is noted by
Adso, but is immediately negated. In his prologue, he catalogues
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his master's physical attributes and the manner in which he gazed
upon him, adding however, 1senza che ombra di lussuria inquini
questo modo (forse l'unico purissimo) di amore corporale' (23).
His negation serves not to disavow the erotic implications but
rather to intensify them. This statement may be paralleled with
Adso's remark when he writes of Guglielmo's gift to him, of his
miraculous lenses, as they take their leave of each other. He
writes:
Ero ancora giovane, mi disse, ma un giorno
sarebbero le 1enti tornate uti1i (e invero le
tengo sul naso, ora che scrivo queste righe).
Poi mi abbraccio forte, con la tenerezza di un
padre, e mi congedd. (500-501)
Guglielmo's gift stands as a symbol of the transmission of
his authority on to his disci pie.63 it is the symbol of the male
fantasy of self-procreation which, in this instance, involves the
handing down of the authoritative tradition of knowledge. Within
the boundaries of the text, it is significant that the only name
which is absent from Adso's manuscript, is the name of the girl
with whom he had his furtive encounter in the kitchen and whose
anonymity situates women as other, firmly outside learned
authority.
This argument may appear to have taken us to a point whereby
we must revoke our earlier suggestion that the text undermines
the authority of the narrator. An exploration of the means by
which the detective's enquiry is resolved will, however, redress
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the focus of our study.
We expect that in detective fiction, the superior acumen of
the detective triumphs in order to reveal the culprit and confirm
the power of reason even if we may find this power, at times,
uncanny. II nome del la rosa contains many of the classic
features of the genre, but we have suggested that Eco uses them
in order to subvert the fictions which they construct. It is,
however, through the conclusion that this subversion is enacted,
at the very point where detective fiction normally asserts its
achievement. The paradox of the ending in detective fiction has
been noted by Franco horetti:
Detective fiction's ending is its end indeed:
its solution in the true sense. The fabula
narrated by the detective in his reconstruction
of the facts brings us back to the beginning;
that is, it abolishes narration.64
Moretti underestimates the cathartic effect of narrative, but his
thesis is valid. Detective fiction only tells us what happened
before the narrative began. It serves as its own pretext, and
once the 'solution' is revealed, the narrative consumes itself
and hence abolishes its need. As we shall see, the conclusion of
II nome dell a rosa functions rather differently.
Throughout the novel, Guglielmo offers many displays of his
semi otic virtuosity, beginning with his reading of the tracks of
Brunellus, through his unravelling of the secrets of the library
to the disclosure of the murderer. Ultimately, however, he is
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defeated, for despite successfully identifying Jorge as the prime
mover behind the crimes, he arrives at the correct solution
through a misreading of the clues. Guglielmo reads the deaths in
terms of the apocalyptic sequence suggested to him by the
elderly, senile Alinardo, but he is mistaken. De Lauretis
writes:
non era quell a la chiave dei delitti a catena.
Anzi, la chiave non c'era, ogni crimine aveva
un autore diverso oppure nessuno, il disegno
non esisteva, e c'erano invece una serie di
cause e di concause le cui relazioni non
dipendevano tanto dal disegno di un autore
quanto dal progetto di un lettore, in questo
caso, Guglielmo.65
Here she echoes Guglielmo's confession to Adso:
Sono arrivato a Jorge attraverso uno schema
apocalittico che sembrava reggere tutti i
delitti, eppure era casuale. Sono arrivato a
Jorge cercando un autore di tutti i crimini e
abbiamo scoperto che ogni crimine aveva in
fondo un autore diverso, oppure nessuno. Sono
arrivato a Jorge inseguendo il disegno di una
mente perversa e raziocinante, e non v'era
alcun disegno, ovvero Jorge stesso era stato
sopraffatto dal proprio disegno iniziale e dopo
era iniziata una catena di cause, e di
concause, e di cause in contraddizione tra loro
che avevano proceduto per conto proprio,
creando relazioni che non dipendevano da alcun
disegno. (495)
Guglielmo is defeated by his own over-evaluation of reason, and
becomes trapped by his obsession to find the 'disegno1 and impose
a single meaning at all costs. Not only has the detective been
thwarted in the celebration of his logic, but the fundamental
tenets of the detective genre, identity and agency, are thrown
into question.
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The narrative reveals that while Jorge did poison the pages
of the forbidden text, so that the avid reader would, in effect,
be punished by his own desire to read on, he himself had no part
in the series of murders which developed of their own accord.
The sequence of deaths is shown to be determined by desire
itself, for it is desire which impels each of the victims to seek
out that which has been forbidden. The 'murderer' cannot be
collated with a single agent or 'autore', but can rather be
located in the primal desire to appropriate the position of the
Father through the possession of his Word. It can, therefore, be
asserted that the culprit, the totem figure of the genre, cannot
be designated simply as other, but resides in the collective
desire of the primal killing. The subject is murdered by the
text and is murdered on account of the desire to violate its
acknowledged position of supremacy. The metaphor of the library
as labyrinth symbolises the symbolic order and the erasure of the
subject within that order.
The hazards of engaging too closely with the library are
signalled prophetically by Alinardo who warns that 'la biblioteca
d un gran labirinto, segno del labirinto del mondo. Entri e non
sai se uscirai. Non bisogna viol are le colonne d'Ercole' (163).
The pillars of Hercules must, nevertheless, be transgressed, and
it is upon this violation that society is founded. The law of
the Father must be broken if it is to continue. In Adso's
narrative, this law is symbolised by the authority of the
librarian, but Malachia is merely an emasculated symbol for he
functions only as a surrogate for the blind Jorge. After
lialachia's death, the fraternal horde engage in a fierce battle
in order to attain his position, for it is the position of the
Father, the position of authority over the Word. This position
is purely imaginary, for he who seems to occupy the position of
the Father is merely a metonymic extension of another, a
substitute. Thus, the Abbot, the central authority within the
abbey, derives his power from being a substitute for the Pope
who, in turn, is God's representative on earth. The Abbot,
however, does not in fact command the abbey for it comes to light
that Jorge, the blind custodian of the library's secrets, holds
sway over the Abbot on account of the authority which he wields
over the Word.66
The importance of the relationship between the subject and
language emerges in the debates surrounding the Papacy and its
various heretical factions. These struggles are not based on
articles of faith, but rather on who has the power to tell the
truth, or rather, to impose his version. Guglielmo remarks that
'tutte le eresie sono bandiera di una realtd del 1'esclusione'
(206) and suggests that whoever interprets the Word differently,
is marginalised through adopting an incorrect position in
relation to the Word. The heretic is he who stands on the other
side of meaning.
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The duel between detective and criminal, characteristic of
the genre, is figured in the relationship between Guglielmo and
Jorge. Inevitably, it is a relationship which is built around
texts and the meaning which each attributes to the text. Both
appear to believe in the inviolability of the sign yet each
reacts to this in different ways. Guglielmo is a reader who
seeks to establish the relationship between signs and who
believes that while meaning is a product of these relationships,
it is not transparent and can only be elicited gradually and
partially. Meaning emerges in the space between reader and text.
He tells Adso:
I libri non sono fatti per crederci, ma per
essere sottoposti a indagine. Di fronte a un
libro non dobbiamo chiederci cosa dica ma cosa
vuol di re. .. (319)
Conversely, Jorge exhibits a more literal credence in the power
of the word. He is initially seen berating the work of Adelmo
whose illustrations depict the world 'a rovescio'. Laughter and
irony are the tools of the devil, for God's word is indivisible
and its purity must be preserved. The piety of the monastery can
only be upheld through the work of the scribes who copy, without
interpretation, the past works of the masters. In this, he
recalls the opening words of Adso who writes that the 'compito
del monaco fedele sarebbe ripetere ogni giorno con sal modi ante
umilta l'unico immodificabi1e evento di cui si possa asserire
11incontrovertibi1e verity1 (19). Whereas Guglielmo believes
that 1il bene di un libro sta nell'essere letto' (399), Jorge is
intent on concealment and on turning the library into a mausoleum
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so that the Pillars of Hercules may remain inviolate. Unable to
maintain complete material control over access to the library,
Jorge's poisoning of the text aims to ensure that the text once
violated, cannot be disseminated by the reader/criminal.
At this point, it is interesting to note that the roles of
detective and criminal have been reversed. While Guglielmo seeks
to track down the murderer by reading the clues aright, Jorge
aims to police and suppress the dissemination of clues in
advance. Moretti notes:
the clue is...that particular element of the
story in which the link between signifier and
signified is altered. It is a signifier that
always has several signifieds and thus produces
numerous suspicions... This is also part of the
criminal's guilt: he has created a situation
of semantic ambiguity, thus questioning the
usual forms of human communication and human
interaction. In this way, he has composed an
audacious poetic work. The detective, on the
other hand, must dispel the entropy, the
cultural equiprobabi1ity that is produced by
and is a relevant aspect of the crime: he will
have to reinstate the univocal links between
signifiers and signifieds.67
If the task of the detective is to re-establish order from
disorder, that of Jorge is to pre-empt such an initiative by
repressing the possibility of 'semantic ambiguity'.ee For Jorge,
reading is the repetition of the primal killing which he seeks to
avenge through the velenous parchment. His vengeful wrath is,
nevertheless, narcissistic, for it betrays his own desire to
master the text. His inability to destroy the iniquitous text in
the first place, reveals his need to usurp the text's authority.
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His desire is most fully realised in the manner in which the text
is finally consumed by him. On learning that Guglielmo has
discovered the means by which he sealed the secrets of
Aristotle's lost text and has protected himself from its poison,
Jorge seizes the book and begins to devour it:
Incomincid con le sue mani scarnite e diafane a
lacerare lentamente, a bram' e a strisce, le
pagine mol1i del manoscritto, ponendosele a
brandelli in bocca, e masticando lentamente
come se consumasse l'ostia e vol esse farla
carne dell a propria carne. (483)
The symbolism of the host comments tellingly on Jorge's desire to
be invested with the divine properties of the text through its
material assimilation. His narcissistic act of destruction is
compounded as he knocks the lamp from Adso's hands thus leading
to the conflagration which engulfs the abbey.
The dichotomy which exists in detective fiction between the
god-like hero and the diabolic villain is subverted by the
narrative. Both Jorge and Guglielmo see the other as the
incarnation of the devil or Antichrist. Their opposing positions
bring them into conflict, yet what they both desire is mastery
over the Word. In the end, both fail, for Guglielmo's reason is
defeated and his tracing of Jorge is coincidental while Jorge
instigates a series of murders, not the product of his intent,
but with a structure of their own which exceeds his design.
Jorge perishes in the biblioclasm while Guglielmo vanishes
leaving Adso, the narrator, to restore the authority of the text.
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In our discussion of II nome del la rosa, we appear to have
said comparatively little about its first person narrator. Like
Dr Watson, Adso is little more than an onlooker, yet it is only
through his telling that the apocalyptic events of 1327 come to
be known. What we read, however, is not Adso's text, but the
script of someone else's reading of his text, filtered through a
series of other texts. The overtly fictional nature of the
narrative's presentation serves to highlight the inauthenticity
of what we have called Adso's manuscript. The unreality of the
text is glimpsed by Adso at the close of his narrative when he
remembers the occasion on which he returned to the abbey, some
years after its destruction, to find the spot barren and
deserted. In the ruins of the monastery, he discovers fragments
of books which had escaped the flames and proceeds to gather
together all the scraps, taking them back with him to piece
together the remnants of the library. He writes:
alia fine dell a mi a paziente ricomposizione mi
si disegnd come una biblioteca minore, segno di
quell a maggiore scomparsa, una biblioteca fatta
di brani, citazioni, periodi incompiuti,
moncherini di libri. (502)
Throughout the years, Adso has consulted these fragments as if
they were an oracle which, on occasions, would seem to yield
their secrets, while on others, prove recalcitrant to any
interpretation. It is with this in mind that Adso turns to his
own text, concluding: 'piu rileggo questo elenco piu mi convinco
che esso d effetto del caso e non contiene alcun messaggio'
(502). His account which had begun with such conviction, bound
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to the dual authorities of God and History, ends by suggesting
its own meaninglessness as just a chance concatenation of words.
Adso imagines his own death as a return to indifferentation as
opposed to language which lives on in the continuous play on the
signifier. His last words: 'cadrd nella divinita silenziosa e
disabitata dove non c'e opera ne immagine' (503) seem to cancel
out the notion that the subject might be redeemed through
writing, yet as Adso, too, takes his leave, there is still a
substantial piece of text which, although recalcitrant to
meaning, is indubitably there.
The idea of the manuscript as the fragmented reflection of
the library was incorporated by Bompiani into their marketing
strategy heralding the novel's publication.69 The publishers
identified three types of reader who might be attracted to the
diverse aspects of the work. The first category was to be
attracted by the detective plot, the second, captivated by the
intellectual debates, but the third group 'si rendera conto che
questo testo e un tessuto di altri testi, un 'giallo' di
citazioni, un libro fatto di libri'.70 The idea of a 'giallo di
citazioni' demonstrates a shift in interest from the site of
writing to that of reading. This latter activity is posited as
the hermeneutic pivot of the work, and the reading process
constitutes the work's authority. De Lauretis notes:
It II nome dell a rosa is a novel made up
almost entirely of other texts, of tales
already told, of names already well-known or
sounding as if they should be known to us from
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literary and cultural history; a medley of
famous passages and obscure quotations,
specialized lexicons and subcodes (narrative,
iconographic, literary, architectural,
bibliographical, pharmaceutical et cetera), and
characters cut out in strips from a generic
World Encyclopedia.71
Adso's manuscript, just like the inscrutable greek and
arabic scripts of which he writes, becomes a code which must be
deciphered by a reader who will recognise and reassemble the
textual collage which is Adso's narrative. Not all readers (if
any) will have the competence to trace each piece of quoted text
to its original source, and although authority for the text comes
to be vested in the eye of the reader, each reader is free, or
bound, to interpret the text according to his or her knowledge of
the eclectic sources on which the narrative draws. If we
recognise a fragment of language as a quotation from another
text, we establish a particular relationship between the
signifier and the signified based on the intertextual referent.72
We cannot, however, conclude that this relationship establishes a
transcendent level of interpretation, for failure to recognise
and attribute the quoted fragment does not result in fumbling
with a meaningless piece of language, but simply in a piece of
language which means something else. Nor can it be asserted that
through perceiving one text across another, the meaning produced
is necessarily more resonant, for as the title of the novel
indicates, the greater the intertextual referent, the less
meaning is produced.73
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Just as Guglielmo cracks the narrative code which binds the
sequence of murders, but in doing so unmasks his own failure, the
reader can never claim absolute authority over the narrative for
the relationship between the signifier and signified is one which
not only is subject to modification, but also inhibits, at every
stage of its production, the notion of itself as a monolithic
voice. In the Posti1e, Eco advocates that the text is its own
authority, for once it has been given over to public consumption,
it ceases to be a product of the author's intent.74 De Lauretis
takes the argument further when she contends that the novel 'has
no authorial voice and hence no author-ity of its own, for every
scrap of discourse - every description, incident or character,
every turn of phrase, narrative sty!erne, metaphor or metonymy -
is an objet trouvd...1.75 This position belies her earlier claim
that one must consider II nome del la rosa to be 'a pre-meditated
lie', for the notion of the lie re-introduces the concept of
authority, designating an agent with the power over the sign to
obfuscate its meaning and subvert its intent. It is Eco whom she
denotes as a liar, but it is Adso who is the collector of the
'objet trouve', for as he assembles the past, he lays no claim to
authority, hence no claim to the lie.
For Eco, Adso may well be a feint, a fourteenth century monk
concealing a twentieth century intellect, yet it is with Adso
that the modernity of the text lies. Like the nameless narrator
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of Todo moclo, Adso refuses to lay claim to the power of the word,
for its deployment reveals the illusory nature of its possession.
Guglielmo, Jorge and don Gaetano are all defeated for presuming
to wield power over the sign - whereas Adso and his counterpart
in Todo modo refuse to adopt the imaginary position of 'maitre
absolu'. Adso recognises that authority lies elsewhere and,
unlike Guglielmo, does not presume that it can adhere to a single
reader. Nor can it be asserted that authority lies with the
text, for a text is always an intertext, and its very existence
is dependent upon other fragments which, in turn, lead elsewhere.
Adso's narrative ends where it had begun, with God and the
Word, but unlike traditional detective fiction, avoids the trap
of signalling its own negation. Writing is not a lie, but rather
a distortion, as in the words of St Paul cited by Adso: 'videmus
nunc per speculum et in aenigmate' (19) to which we might add the
words of Freud:
in its implications the distortion of a text
resembles a murder: the difficulty is not in
perpetrating the deed but in getting rid of its
traces.76
Both writing and murder imply agency, yet their execution
necessitates concealment and the renunciation of authority. The
detective cannot restore that which the murder had created, for
his narrative implies his own erasure. We can perhaps conclude
by completing the quotation from St Paul, begun by Adso, which
may serve as the text for all writers of the self:
For now we see through a glass darkly; but then
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face to face: now I know in part but then I
shall know even as also I am known.77
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Characteristic for the novel as a genre is not
the image of a man in his own right, but a man
who is precisely the image of a language.
(Bakhtin).
The words of St Paul and the image of the Aedificium which
dominates II nome dell a rosa can, in a sense, be said to
summarise the content of our study. Firstly, the notion of the
world as a verbal construct whose constitution is ever
precarious, is one which has been seen to inhabit, albeit in a
variety of ways, all the texts which we have studied. Further,
it has become apparent that while each text seeks to represent
the I in writing, the I which is uncovered, is subject to a
continual deferral of meaning and, consequently, cannot stand as
the transcendental signifier which would confer absolute meaning
onto the text. We have moved from texts which display an overt
historical referent through to texts which betray an awareness of
their own status as fiction, yet in each text the purpose has
remained the same: to demonstrate the performance of the I in
language. Throughout our study we have adhered to Beneveniste's
notion that language is the condition and the ground on which
subjectivity is constructed and we have treated each text as a
performance in that medium. The proliferation of images of death
seems to highlight the fact that the I is constantly endangered
with erasure from the very medium through which it would gain
recognition. Occupying an uneasy position midway between the
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poles of 'discours' and of 'histoire1, the narrating I is
involved in a perpetual address of the other which it seeks both
to master but also court, for it is recognition by the other
which will validate the I's discourse. The terrible revelation
made by first person narrative is the absolute dependency of the
I on the other, for alone, the I ceases to signify. The I is
dependent both psychically and culturally on this relationship
and at most, as we witnessed in the final chapter, can subvert it
through consciously working against its conventions, but this in
itself constitutes a recognition of the manner in which the I
comes to signify. To romance the abyss of first person narration
is to reveal that the man is not both 'subject and object1 of the
narrative, but doubly subject to his performance in discourse.
Our choice of texts has necessarily been selective, but it
is hoped that some of the ideas expressed in this study will find
a wider application. The purpose of the study was not to produce
another typology of first person narrative, but to examine the
manner in which first person narration can be said to function.
The texts on which this thesis concentrates, despite being
extremely varied, have in common an awareness of the literary
nature of their production and demonstrate some anxiety regarding
the consequences of this. They all belong to a relatively short
period in history, but unfortunately it is beyond the scope of
this study to investigate the conditions which might have
determined the reasons for their similarities. Neither have we
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been able to address the question of gender and the first person
pronoun, but this topic is equally vast and rather than offer a
cursory treatment of it, it is perhaps better to leave the
discussion to a later date.
As a conclusion to a study which has attempted to deal with
the question of the self as text, it is perhaps fitting to end by
quoting some of Calvino's last words on the subject. In his
essay 'Molteplicita', Calvino broaches the idea that the
contemporary novel is indeed a kind of encyclopedia, a maze of
references and cross-references, but he takes his argument
further, and his conclusion may also serve as a conclusion to
this study, indicating the multitude of significations which the
first person pronoun bears. He writes:
Qualcuno potra obiettare che piu 1'opera tende
alia moltipiicazione dei possibili piu
s'allontana da quell'unicum che e il self di
chi scrive, la sincerita interiore, la scoperta
dell a propria verita. A1 contrario, rispondo,
chi siamo noi, chi d ciascuno di noi se non una
combinatoria d'esperienze, d'informazioni, di
letture, d'immaginazioni? Ogni vita e
un'enciclopedia, una biblioteca, un inventario
d'oggetti, un campionario di stili, dove tutto
pud essere continuamente rimescolato e
riordinato in tutti i modi possibili.i
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